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M  A  W 
t    B  rest  -  LitovslC 


»AH   L. 


RUSSIA  and 
GERMANY 

at    Brest-LitovsK 


A  Documentary  History 
of  the  Peace  Negotiations 


By    JUDAH    L.    MAGNES 


Mew  York 
TKe  Rand   ScHool   of  Social  Science 


To  the  Reader: 

With  the  following  documentary  account  of  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  Peace  Negotiations,  hitherto  an  unwritten  chapter  in 
the  history  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  the  Department  of 
Labor  Research  begins  the  publication  of  a  series  of  mono- 
graphs on  economic  and  political  questions  which  it  is  hoped 
will  prove  valuable  contributions  to  the  literature  of  the 
Socialist  and  Labor  movements. 

The  American  Labor  Tear  Book,  which  the  Department  is 
publishing,  will  be  continued  as  a  part  of  the  series.  The 
1919  issue  (Yol.  Ill)  is  now  being  prepared  for  the  press  and 
should  be  ready  for  distribution  by  the  end  of  the  Summer. 

Organizations  and  individuals  interested  in  the  tcork  of  the 
Department  should  address 

ALEXANDER  TRACHTENBERG, 
Director,  Department  of  Labor  Research, 
Rand  School  of  Social  Science, 
7  East  15th  St.,  New  York. 


• '  Copyrig5it,'  1919, 

THE  BAND  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCE, 
New  York 


PREFACE 

An  attempt  is  made  in  this  book  to  give  an  impartial, 
documentary  account  of  the  Brest-Litovsk  negotiations 
and  their  general  background,  in  Russia,  Germany,  and 
other  belligerent  countries.  There  is  no  pretense  at  lit- 
erary style,  and  between  many  of  the  items  listed  there 
is  no  connection  other  than  that  of  similar  dates.  The 
general  division  into  thirteen  chapters  is  largely  arbitrary 
and  the  account  often  jumps  without  warning  from  one 
land  to  another.  Yet  the  story  has  essential  unity;  and, 
quite  apart  from  whatever  value  it  may  have  as  a  collec- 
tion of  documents,  for  me,  at  least,  it  possesses  the  fasci- 
nation of  a  mighty  drama. 

The  account  lays  no  claim  whatever  to  completeness. 
It  is  only  raw  material  for  a  structure,  or,  at  best,  the 
rough  frame-work.  The  justification  for  publishing  it  is, 
that  there  seems  to  be  no  other  collection  of  similar  docu- 
ments bearing  upon  one  of  the  great  episodes  of  the  great 
war. 

The  material  was  in  hand,  for  the  most  part,  a  year 
ago.  It  was  collected  at  a  period  of  the  war  when  the 
censorship  on  news  and  on  European  publications  was 
especially  severe.  The  fortunate  possessor  of  a  Manchester 
Guardian  was  besieged  by  inquiries  as  to  how^  he  got  it. 
It  was  a  period  when  the  arrival  from  time  to  time  of 
the  Nene  Ziircher  Zeitung  at  the  New  York  Public  Li- 
brary was  not  talked  about,  for  fear  the  subscription  might 
be  cancelled. 

The  main  sources  of  the  material  were:  The  New  York 
Times,  The  Times'  Current  History,  The  Manchester 
Guardian,  The  London  Times,  the  Neue  Ziircher  Zeitung, 
the  New  Yorker  Volkszeitung,  the  New  Europe;  publica- 
tions of  the  World  Peace  Foundation  and  the  American 
Association  for  International  Conciliation,  and,  in  estab- 
lishing the  chronology  and  in  verifying  statements,  the 
London  Nation,  the  Netv  Statesman,  and  the  Cambridge 
Magazine,  were  often  helpful.  The  speech  of  Trotzky  on 
February    14,    was    taken    from    his    recently    published, 


4U5916 


**From  October  to  Brest-Litovsk, "  and  Lenin's  speech 
of  March  14,  was  taken  from  the  booklet,  ''The  Soviets  at 
Work." 

No  guarantee  can  be  given  for  the  correctness  of  any 
document,  inasmuch  as  I  have  not  had  the  originals  be- 
fore me.  Moreover  the  translations  are  of  very  uneven 
quality.  It  was  simple  enough  to  translate  a  German 
text  now  and  again,  but  it  was  not  so  simple  to  choose 
between  two  or  more  poor  English  translations  of  a  text, 
or  to  "English"  an  English  translation  a  bit  without  at 
the  same  time  changing  the  text  of  a  document, 

A  sincere  effort  has  been  made  to  be  entirely  objective 
and  impartial,  insofar  as  this  is  at  all  possible  in  a  work 
dealing  with  history  and  with  politics.  No  judgments  are 
expressed  and  no  conclusions  are  drawn,  despite  the  temp- 
tation at  almost  every  step.  Men  and  peoples  follow  each 
other  on  and  off  this  great  stage  and  speak  but  for  a  mo- 
ment. Yet  for  all  the  brevity  of  their  lines,  their  voices 
are  authentic,  and  it  does  not  seem  an  altogether  impos- 
sible task  to  evaluate  personalities  and  events.  Some  day 
the  original  documents  will  be  available  and  "scientific" 
judgments  will  be  possible.  It  is  hoped  that  the  material 
here  presented  may  be  of  some  aid  in  establishing  truth. 

J.  L.  Magnes. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     The  Soviet  Peace  Proposals 7 

II.     The  Attitude  of  the  Belligerents 14 

III.  Negotiations    for   a   Preliminary    Truce 

and  Armistice   19 

IV.  The  Formal  Armistice  Negotiations 25 

V.     Negotiations    for    a    General    European 

Peace     29 

VI.     The  Interval  to  permit  Allied  Participa- 
tion           40 

VII.  The  Separate  Peace  Negotiations.  Rus- 
sia's Stand  for  No  Annexations  and 
for  Self -Determination   50 

VIII.     The  Second  Interval 96 

IX.     The  Separate  Peace  Negotiations.      The 

Ukraine     105 

X.     No  War  and  No  Peace 133 

XI.     The  New  German  War 148 

XII.     The  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk.    ''A  Tilsit 

Peace" 165 

XIII.  After  Brest-Litovsk 179 

XIV.  Table  of  Items 188 


I.     THE  SOVIET  PEACE  PROPOSALS 

November  6-7.  The  Kerensky  Government  was  over- 
thrown by  the  Revolutionary  Military  Committee  of  the 
Petrograd  Soviet  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates. 
In  a  proclamation  addressed  to  the  army,  to  all  Soviets 
and  to  the  garrison  and  proletariat  of  Petrograd,  the  Com- 
mittee proclaimed  its  authority,  "until  the  creation  of  a 
Government  by  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates." 
The  Committee  considered  the  first  point  in  the  "program 
of  the  new  authority"  to  be  "the  offer  of  an  immediate 
democratic  peace."  The  proclamation  closed  with  the 
words :  ' '  Soldiers !  for  Peace,  for  Bread,  for  Land,  and  v" 
for  the  Power  of  the  People ! ' ' 

November  7-8.  The  Second  All-Russian  Congress  of 
Soviets  began  its  sessions  on  November  7,  and  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  it  proclaimed  that  "All  power  lies  in  the  Work- 
men's and  Soldiers'  Delegates." 

The  Congress  addressed  an  appeal  to  the  workmen,  sol- 
diers and  peasants  of  Russia,  declaring  that 

it  will  propose  to  all  peoples  an  immediate  demo- 
cratic peace  and  an  armistice,  to  come  into  force  at 
once  at  all  points.  .  .  .  The  Congress  calls  the  soldiers 
in  the  trenches  to  vigilance  and  firmness,  and  it  is 
persuaded  that  the  Revolutionary  Army  will  be  able 
to  protect  the  Revolution  against  all  Imperialist  efforts 
until  the  moment  when  the  new  Government  shall  have 
obtained  the  democratic  peace  which  it  will  propose 
direct  to  all  peoples.  .  .  . 

November  10.  The  Congress  passed  its  first  peace  resolu- 
tions, suggesting  an  immediate  armistice  of  three  months 
and  proposing  that  the  representatives  of  "all  the  nations 
of  the  war  or  its  victims"  participate  in  the  negotiations, 


8  ,N.EfiOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

after  which  a  Conference  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world 
should  be  called  to  give  final  sanction  to  the  peace  terms 
thus  drafted. 

The  Government  considers  a  peace  to  be  democratic 
and  equitable  which  is  aspired  to  by  a  majority  of 
the  working  classes  of  all  the  belligerent  countries. 
...  It  should  be  an  immediate  peace,  without  an- 
nexation, (that  is  to  say,  without  usurpation  of  for- 
eign territory,  and  without  violent  conquest  of  nation- 
alities,) and  without  indemnities!  .  .  . 

If  any  population  be  kept  by  force  under  the  control 
of  any  state,  and  if,  contrary  to  its  will  expressed  in 
the  press  or  in  national  assembly,  or  to  decisions  of 
parties,  or  in  opposition  to  rebellions  and  uprisings 
against  an  oppressor,  the  population  is  refused  the 
right  of  universal  suffrage,  of  driving  out  an  army 
of  occupation  and  organizing  its  own  political  regime, 
such  a  state  of  things  is  annexation  or  violent  usurpa- 
tion. The  Government  considers  that  the  active  pro- 
longation of  the  war  in  order  to  partition  weak  na- 
tionalities, which  have  been  conquered,  among  rich  and 
powerful  nations,  is  a  great  crime  against  humanity. 

4  November  11.  The  first  peace  proclamation  of  the  Soviet 
Government  was  published  in  Izvestia,  the  official  organ  of 
the  Petrograd  Soviet: 

Immediate  democratic  peace,  this  is  one  of  the  great 
world  problems  of  the  Russian  revolution.  But  only 
a  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government  is  capable 
.  of  realizing  this  program,  since  only  such  a  government 
expresses  the  will  of  the  whole  Russian  people  and  will 
inflexibly  carry  out  that  will.  Thus,  for  the  first  time 
in  the  course  of  the  seven  months  of  the  Revolution, 
the  fate  of  the  masses  of  the  people  is  in  their  own 
hands.  ... 

It  has  established  the  question  of  peace  on  simple, 
unshakable  ground.  It  raises  high  the  red  flag  of 
international  Socialism,  and  demands  peace  without 
annexations^  or  contributions,  in  principle  condemning 
all  annexations,  no  matter  when  they  were  made.  .  .  . 

It  demands  an  immediate  truce  on  all  fronts,  an- 
nounces  its   willingness   to   consider   calmly   and   ob- 


SOVIET  PEACE  PROPOSALS  9 

jectively  all  peace  proposals,  and  sets  a  period  of  three 
months  for  the  consideration  of  these  proposals. 

While  demanding  a  truce  on  all  fronts,  the  Work- 
men's and  Peasants'  Government  spurns  the  base  in- 
sinuation that  it  is  striving  after  a  separate  peace.  It 
is  not  at  .alL_se(?Jdng-ta  break,  with,  its  AllieSj^  but  i^L 
has  taken  a  defensive  position,  thanks  to  which  is. 
all  Allied  countries  the  true  workmen's  democracy  will, 
have  the  decisive  voice.  -  v- 

And  the  fact  that,  in  Russia,  power  and  the  nego- 
tiation of  peace  are  in  the  hands  not  of  a  traitor,  but 
of  the  real  representatives  of  the  workmen,  soldiers 
and  peasants,  will  strengthen  the  movement  in  favor 
of  peace  in  Allied  countries  also  as  well  as  in  Germany 
and  Austria.  This  open  advance  with  the  demand 
for  peace,  Avith  its  condemnation  of  secret  diplomacy, 
will  find  an  echo  not  only  in  the  world's  proletariat, 
but  also  among  the  great  masses  of  the  countries 
forced  and  dragged  into  the  war — Poland,  Roumania, 
Bulgaria,  Belgium  and  the  Colonies. 

By  this  means  the  Governments  of  the  warring  im- 
perialistic countries  are  placed  in  a  position  in  which 
the  beginning  of  immediate  peace  negotiations  will  be 
irresistibly  forced  upon  them.  .  .  . 

November  20.  Leon  Trotzky,  Russian  Commissar  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  sent  to  the  Entente  and  American  Em- 
bassies at  Petrograd  a  Note,  announcing  that  "the  Con- 
gress of  Workmen's,  Soldiers'  and  Peasants'  Delegates  of 
All  the  Russias,  instituted  on  November  8  a  new  ^  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  All  the  Russias,"  and  tliat  the 
Congress  had  approved  ''proposals  for  a  truce  and  for  a 
democratic  peace  without  annexation  and  without  indem- 
nities, based  on  the  principle  of  the  independence  of  na- 
tions and  of  their  right  to  determine  for  themselves  the 
nature  of  their  own  development. ' '  Trotzky  asked  further 
that  his  Note  be  considered  "in  the  light  of  an  official  pro- 
posal for  an  immediate  truce  upon  all  the  fronts,  and  to 
take  immediate  steps  to  set  on  foot  negotiations  for  peace." 
He  added  that  his  Government  "is  addressing  the  same 
proposal  to  all  the  nations  and  their  Governments." 

On  the  same  day  a  general  notice  of  the  armistice  offer 
was  sent  to  Russian  representatives  abroad,  and  iustruc- 


10  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

tions  were  issued  to  Dukhonin,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Russian  armies,  for  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars 
by  Lenin,  Trotzky,  Krylenko,  Boneh-Bruevitch  and  Gor- 
bunov,  informing  him  of  their  "obligation  to  offer  to  all 
the  peoples  and  their  respective  governments  an  imme- 
diate armistice  on  all  fronts,  with  the  purpose  of  imme- 
diately opening  pourparlers  for  the  conclusion  of  a  demo- 
cratic peace  ...  an  armistice  to  all  the  nations  involved 
in  the  war,  to  the  Allies  and  also  to  the  nations  at  war  with 
us."  They  ordered  him  upon  receipt  of  the  message  to 
' '  approach  the  commanding  authorities  of  the  enemy  armies 
with  an  offer  of  a  cessation  of  all  hostile  activities  for  the 
purpose  of  opening  peace  pourparlers.  In  charging  you 
with  the  conduct  of  these  preliminary  peace  pourparlers 
the  Soviet  .  .  .  orders  you  ...  to  sign  the  preliminary 
act  only  after  approval  by  the  Council  of  the  People's 
Commissars. ' ' 

The  Ukrainian  Rada  adopted  on  the  same  day,  the  text 
of  a  general  proclamation  known  as  the  ''Universal." 
Ukrainian  People  and  Peoples  of  the  Ukraine!  .  .  . 

We,  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada,  by  your  will,  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  order,  for  the  sake  of  cre- 
ating order  in  our  country,  and  for  the  sake  of  saving 
the  whole  of  Russia,  announce  that  henceforth  Ukrainia 
becomes  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic.  Without 
separating  from  the  Russian  Republic  and  while  pre- 
serving its  unitj^  we  take  our  stand  firmly  on  our 
lands,  in  order  that  with  our  strength  we  may  help  the 
whole  of  Russia,  and  the  whole  Russian  Republic  may 
become  a  Federation  of  free  and  equal  Peoples.  .  .  . 
Until  the  Ukrainian  Constituent  Assembly  meets,  the 
whole  power  of  establishing  order  in  our  lands,  of 
issuing  laws  and  of  governing,  rests  in  us,  the  Ukrain- 
ian Central  Rada  and  in  our  Government — the  General 
Secretariat  of  the  Ukraine. 

After  outlining  the  frontiers  of  the  National  Ukrainian 
Republic,  the  "Universal"  abolishes  "the  existing  rights 
of  ownership  to  the  lands  of  large  proprietors  and  other 
lands  not  worked  by  the  owners.  ..." 

It  fixes  an  eight-hour  working  day  in  factories  and  work- 
shops, and  it  establishes  state  control  of  production. 

It  insists  upon  ' '  peace  as  soon  as  possible, ' '  making  reso- 


SOVIET  PEACE  PROPOSALS  11 

lute  efforts  to  compel  "both  Allies  and  enemies  to  enter 
immediately  upon  peace  negotiations." 

It  abolishes  the  death  penalty,  grants  a  full  amnesty  to 
all  political  prisoners,  and  guarantees  "all  the  liberties  won 
by  the  Russian  Revolution,"  namely, 

freedom  of  the  press,  of  speech,  of  religion,  of  as- 
sembly, of  union,  of  strikes,  inviolability  of  person 
and  of  habitation,  the  right  and  the  possibility  of 
using  local  dialects  in  dealing  with  all  authorities. 
.  .  ,  We  announce  to  the  Great  Russian,  Jewish,  Polish 
and  other  peoples  of  the  Ukraine,  that  we  recognize 
national  personal  autonomy  for  the  security  of  their 
rights,  and  freedom  of  self-government  in  questions 
of  their  national  life.  ,  .  .  The  working  out  of  these 
reforms  must  be  effected  at  the  Ukrainian  and  AU- 
Russian  Constituent  Assemblies.  The  date  for  the 
election  of  the  Ukrainian  Constituent  Assembly  is  fixed 
for  January  9,  1918,  and  the  date  of  its  summoning, 
January  22,  1918.  .  .  . 

November  22.  A  statement  was  issued  for  the  Soviet 
by  Lenin,  President,  and  Krylenko,  People's  Commissar 
of  War,  to  "all  Committees  of  regiments,  divisions,  corps, 
armies ;  to  all  the  soldiers  of  the  revolutionary  army ;  and 
to  all  the  sailors  of  the  revolutionary  navy,"  informing 
them  that  Dukhoiiin  liarl  rpfngpf^  fn  n,h(^y  flie  jp^tructions^ 
of  the  Government,  that_he  had  been  deposed,  and  that 
Kryjenko  had  T)eerrappointe7rtlie~new  CommandeF-'irFt^hief r 
The  soldiers  were  tola  that~"the  question  of  peace  is'noW 
in  your  hands.  You  must  not  permit  the  counter-revolu- 
tionary generals  to  destroy  the  great  work  of  peace.  .  .  . 
Let  the  regiments  which  are  on  the  frontal  positions  elect 
immediately  plenipotentiaries  who  shall  formally  begin  the 
peace  pourparlers  with  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Only  the  Council 
of  the  People's  Commissars  has  the  right  to  sign  the  final 
agreement  of  armistice.  .  .  .  Have  watchfulness,  tenacity, 
energy,  and  the  will  for  peace  will  win."  ^ 

The  same  message  declared  that  the  preliminary  pourpar- 
lers had  actually  "been  in  progress  since  4:30  A.  M.  to- 
day. ' ' 

November  23.      The  People's  Commissars  at  Petrograd  is- 
sued a  decree  confirming  the  right  to  freedom  and  self- 


'      12  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

determination  on  the  part  of  the  various  nationalities  of 
Russia  and  expressly  stating  that  "this  right  of  the  Rus- 
sian peoples  to  their  self-determination  is  to  be  extended 
even  as  far  as  separation  and  the  formation  of  independent 

States." 

10  On  the  same  day  Trotzky  began  the  publication  of  the 
diplomatic  documents  (the  "secret  treaties")  which  he 
found  in  the  archives  of  the  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

The  previous  day  he  had  announced  to  the  Central 
Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets  that  "All  the  secret 
treaties  of  Russia  are  now  in  my  hands.  These  docu- 
ments which  are  more  cynical  in  their  provisions  than  we 
had  supposed  will  soon  be  published.  German  diplomacy 
will  prove  to  have  been  no  less  cynical  than  that  of  the 
Allies.  .  .  .  An  appeal  to  all  nations  is  being  printed  and 
will  be  distributed  everywhere  with  the  decree.  We  do 
not  imitate  Kereusky  who  addressed  supplications  to  the 
Allies.  His  letter  will  be  published.  We  confront  all 
the  Governments  with  facts  showing  that  we  wish  to  end 
the  war.     We  sweep  all  secret  treaties  into  the  dust  bin." 

Accompanying  the  first  publication,  he  issued  a  state- 
ment outlining  the  attitude  of  the  Soviet  Government  to 
secret  diplomacy,  which,  he  declared, 

is  a  necessary  weapon  in  the  hands  of  a  propertied 
minority,  which  is  compelled  to  deceive  the  majority 
in  order  to  make  the  latter  serve  its  interests.  Im- 
perialism, with  its  world-wide  plans  of  annexation 
and  its  rapacious  alliances  and  arrangements,  has  de- 
veloped to  the  highest  extent  the  system  of  secret 
diplomacy.  .  .  .  The  Russian  people,  as  well  as  the 
peoples  of  Europe  and  of  the  whole  world,  must  know 
the  documentary  proof  about  those  plots  which  were 
hatched  in  secret  by  financiers  and  industrialists,  to- 
gether with  their  parliamentary  and  diplomatic  agents. 
...  To  abolish  secret  diplomacy  is  the  first  condition 
of  an  honorable,  popular,  and  really  democratic  foreign 
policy.  ,  .  .  For  this  reason,  while  openly  offering  to 
all  the  belligerent  peoples  and  their  governments  an 
immediate  armistice,  we  publish  simultaneously  those 
treaties  and  agreements  which  have  lost  all  their  ob- 
ligatory force  for  the  Russian  workmen,  soldiers  and 
peasants.  .  .  .  When  the  German  proletariat,  by  revo- 


SOVIET  PEACE  PEOPOSALS  13 

lutionary  means,  gets  access  to  the  secrets  of  its  Gov- 
ernment chancellories,  it  will  produce  documents  from 
them  of  just  the  same  nature  as  those  which  we  are 
now  publishing.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  will  hap- 
pen as  soon  as  possible.  .  .  .  "We  desire  a  speedy  peace 
so  that  the  peoples  may  honorably  live  and  work  to- 
gether. We  desire  a  speedy  dethronement  of  the  su- 
premacy of  capital.  In  revealing  to  the  whole  world 
the  work  of  the  governing  classes  as  it  is  expressed 
in  the  secret  documents  of  diplomacy,  we  turn  to  the 
workers  with  that  appeal  which  will  always  form  the 
basis  of  our  foreign  policy:  "Proletarians  of  all  coun- 
tries, unite ! ' '  "^      '"'^ 


II.  THE  ATTITUDE  OF  THE  BELLIGERENTS 

11  On  the  same  day  the  English  Government  through  Lord 
Robert  Cecil  made  a  hostile  reply  to  the  Russian  proposal 
for  an  armistice. 

The  action  just  taken  by  the  extremists  in  Petrograd 
.  .  .  would  of  course  be  a  direct  breach  of  the  agree- 
ment of  September  5,  1914,  and  ...  if  approved  and 
adopted  by  the  Russian  nation  would  put  them  prac- 
tically outside  the  pale  of  the  ordinary  councils  of 
Europe.  But  I  do  not  believe  that  the  Russian  people 
will  confirm  this  action  or  approve  a  proclamation 
...  to  open  all  along  the  line  peace  negotiations  with 
the  enemy  across  the  trenches.  .  .  .  There  is  no  inten- 
tion of  recognizing  such  a  Government. 

12  The  British  Ambassador,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  while 
awaiting  final  instructions  from  his  Government,  published 
a  declaration  in  which  he  said  that  Trotzky's  note  had  been 
delivered  to  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  Powers  19 
hours  after  the  order  had  been  given  to  Commander-in- 
Chief  Dukhonin  to  offer  an  armistice.  "The  Allied  Gov- 
ernments thus  find  themselves  in  the  presence  of  a  fait 
accompli  on  a  subject  concerning  which  they  have  not  been 
consulted.  It  is  furthermore  impossible  for  the  Embassy 
to  reply  to  the  notes  of  a  Government  which  his  own  Gov- 
ernment has  not  recognized." 

13  November  25.  Trotzky  sent  a  Note  to  the  diplomatic 
representatives  of  neutral  powers  in  Petrograd,  informing 
them  of  the  proposed  armistice  and  adding  that  "the  con- 
summation of  an  immediate  peace  is  demanded  in  all  coun- 
tries, both  belligerent  and  neutral.  The  Russian  Govern- 
ment counts  on  the  firm  support  of  workmen  in  all  coun- 
tries in  the  struggle  for  peace." 

14  November  27.  At  a  meeting  of  Ambassadors  at  the 
United  States  Embassy,  Petrograd,  it  was  decided  to  ignore, 
Trotzky's  note  which  "will  be  met  with  a  fin  de  non  re- 
cevoir."  Nevertheless,  it  was  decided  to  address  a  protest 
to  General  Dukhonin,  who  had  already  been  deposed  as 


I 


ATTITUDE  OF  BELLIGERENTS  15 

Russian  Commander-in-Chief.  The  Entente  protest  was 
filed  by  General  Lavergne,  head  of  the  French  mission  at 
the  Russian  Staff  Headquarters : 

The  Premier  and  War  Minister  of  France  have 
charged  me  to  make  the  following  declaration  to  you : 
"France  does  not  recognize  the  power  of  the  People's 
Commissars.  Trusting  in  the  patriotism  of  the  Rus- 
sian High  Command  it  counts  upon  the  firm  resolu- 
tion of  the  military  leaders  to  repel  every  criminal 
pourparler  and  to  keep  the  Russian  army  facing  the 
common  enemy."  Besides,  I  am  charged  to  call  your 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  question  of  an  armistice 
is  a  governmental  question,  whose  discussion  cannot 
be  taken  up  without  previous  consent  of  the  Allied 
Governments.  No  Government  has  the  right  to  dis- 
cuss separately  the  question  of  an  armistice  or  of 
peace. 

)  The  protest  of  the  United  States  was  made  separately 
to  General  Dukhonin  by  Major  Kerth,  Military  Attache 
at  Petrograd.  The  failure  to  join  the  protest  entered  by 
the  other  Allied  Ministers  was  due,  according  to  a  Petro- 
grad despatch  of  December  2,  "to  the  fact  that  it  was 
based  upon  the  London  agreement  against  a  separate  peace 
to  which  America  is  not  a  signatory."  Major  Kerth 's 
protest  was  as  follows : 

Acting  by  virtue  of  instructions  received  from  my 
Government  and  transmitted  through  the  Ambassador 
of  the  United  States  at  Petrograd,  I  have  the  honor 
to  bring  to  your  knowledge  the  fact  that  the  United 
States,  an  ally  of  Russia,  pursuing  with  her  the  war 
which  is  the  struggle  of  democracy  against  autocracy, 
protests  energetically  and  categorically  against  any 
separate  armistice  that  might  be  concluded  by  Russia. 

6  November  28.  The  Russian  Government  sent  out  a  wire- 
less "TO  ALL"  signed  by  Trotzky  and  Lenin,  and  "de- 
claring its  willingness  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations  with 
the  belligerent  powers." 

7  Krylenko  ordered  "firing  to  cease  immediately  and  frat- 
ernization to  begin  on  all  fronts.     Great  vigilance  is  neces- 


16  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

sary  regarding  the  enemy.  ...  Our  army  is  starving.  It 
is  without  clothes  and  boots.  ...  In  a  short  time  we  shall 
obtain  a  general  peace." 

He  announced  that  ' '  our  envoys  have  returned,  bringing 
an  official  reply  from  the  German  Commander-in-Chief', 
signifying  his  assent  to  the  proposal  to  inaugurate  nego- 
tiations for  an  armistice  on  all  fronts.  The  first  meeting 
of  the  negotiators  is  fixed  for  December  2. ' ' 

November  29.  The  German  Chancellor,  von  Hertling, 
declared  in  his  first  speech  before  the  German  Reichstag, 
"that  in  the  proposals  of  the  Russian  Government,  which 
have  so  far  become  known,  a  discussable  basis  for  the  open- 
ing of  negotiations  may  be  found,  and  that  I  am  prepared 
to  enter  into  such  negotiations  as  soon  as  the  Russian 
Government  sends  authorized  representatives  for  this  pur- 
pose. ...  As  regards  the  countries  of  Poland,  Lithuania, 
and  Courland,  which  were  formerly  under  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Czar,  we  consider  that  the  peoples  living  in. those 
countries  have  the  right  to  determine  their  own  fate." 

Count  Czernin,  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government,  wired  the  Russian  Government  that 
"the  guiding  lines  announced  by  the  Russian  Government 
for  negotiations  for  an  armistice  and  a  treaty  of  peace, 
counter  proposals  to  which  are  awaited  by  the  Russian 
Government,  are,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government,  a  suitable  basis  for  entering  into  these  nego- 
tiations .  ,  .  regarding  an  immediate  armistice  and  gen- 
eral peace." 

The  first  plenary  session  of  the  Interallied  Conference 
was  held  in  Paris.  Sixteen  nations  were  represented  by 
their  Premiers  or  High  Commissioners.  Despite  the  over- 
throw of  the  Kerensky  Government,  Russia  was  represented 
by  two  appointees  of  that  Government :  Sevastopoulo,  Coun- 
cillor of  the  Embassy  at  Paris,  and  Maklakov,  "Ambassa- 
dor to  France  (by  special  invitation  and  unofficially,  as  he 
has  not  yet  presented  his  letters)." 

November  30.  Maklakov  was  dismissed  by  Trotzky  as 
Russian  Ambassador  to  France  because  he  attended  the 
session  of  the  Inter-Allied  Conference. 


ATTITUDE  OF  BELLIGERENTS  17 

The  German  Foreign  Secretary,  von  Kuehlmann,  in  ad- 
dressing the  Main  Committee  of  the  Reichstag,  said : 

Russia  has  set  the  world  ablaze.  ,  .  .  Russia  has 
swept  away  the  culprits,  and  she  is  laboring  to  find 
through  an  armistice  and  peace  an  opportunity  for 
her  internal  reconstruction.  .  .  .  The  principles  an- 
nounced to  the  world  by  the  present  rulers  in  Petro- 
grad  appear  to  be  entirely  acceptable  as  a  basis  for 
the  reorganization  of  affairs  in  the  East — a  re- 
organization which,  while  fully  taking  into  account 
the  right  of  nations  to  determine  their  own  destinies, 
is  calculated  permanently  to  safeguard  the  essential 
interests  of  the  two  great  neighboring  nations,  Ger- 
many and  Russia. 

Trotzky  informed  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  Gov- 
ernments in  Petrograd  "that  the  German  High  Command 
in  reply  to  the  formal  proposal  of  the  People's  Commis- 
sars has  agreed  to  open  negotiations  on  all  fronts  .  .  .  that 
military  operations  on  the  Russian  front  have  been  stopped, 
and  asks  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  Allies  in 
Russia  to  state  in  reply  whether  they  desire  to  participate 
in  the  negotiations  which  will  be  opened  on  Sunday  eve- 
ning, December  2,  at  5  o'clock." 

On  the  same  day  Trotzky  issued  a  warning  respecting 
the  letters  addressed  by  the  heads  of  the  French  and 
American  military  missions  at  Russian  headquarters  to 
General  Dukhonin,  who  had  protested  against  Russia's  con- 
cluding either  a  separate  peace  or  armistice :  ' '  The  Gov- 
ernment cannot  permit  Allied  diplomatic  and  military 
agents  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  our  country 
and  attempt  to  incite  civil  war." 

On  the  same  day,  addressing  the  Petrograd  Soviet, 
Trotzky  announced  Austria-Hungary's  acceptance  of  the 
offer  of  an  armistice.     He  said : 

In  no  case  shall  we  allow  a  wrong  interpretation  of 
our  principles  for  a  general  peace.  We  shall  confront 
our  enemies  with  questions  which  will  admit  of  no 
ambiguous  answers.  Every  word  spoken  by  us  or  by 
them  will  be  written  down  and  sent  by  wireless  to 


18  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

all  nations,  who  will  be  the  judges  of  our  negotiations. 
Under  the  influence  of  the  lower  classes,  the  German 
and  Austrian  Governments  have  agreed  to  place  them- 
selves in  the  dock.  Be  assured,  comrades,  that  the 
prosecutor  in  the  person  of  the  Russian  Revolutionary- 
Delegation  will  speak  with  thunderous  accusation 
against  the  diplomacy  of  all  Imperialists.  It  is  all 
the  same  to  us  how  the  Allied  and  enemy  Imperialists 
treat  us.  We.  shall  carry  on  our  independent  class 
policy,  whatever  they  do. 


III.     NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  A  PRELIMINARY 
TRUCE  AND  ARMISTICE 

The  preliminary  negotiations  for  a  formal  truce  were 
begun  on  November  29. 

Second  Lieutenant  Senneur,  Army  Doctor  Sagalovitch 
and  Volunteer  Meren,  envoys  of  the  Committee  of  the  Rus- 
sian 5th  Army  before  Dvinsk,  were  empowered  to  open 
negotiations,  and  at  5  A.  M.  they  crossed  the  German  lines 
blindfolded.  The  report  rendered  to  Commander-in-Chief 
Krylenko  continues : 

We  handed  over  our  written  authorization  from  the 
People's  Commissars  to  two  officers  of  the  German 
General  Staff  who  had  been  sent  for  the  purpose.  The 
negotiations  were  conducted  in  the  French  language. 
Our  proposal  to  carry  on  negotiations  for  an  armistice 
on  all  the  fronts  of  belligerent  countries,  in  order  later 
to  make  peace,  was  immediately  handed  over  to  the 
staff  of  the  division,  whence  it  was  sent  by  direct 
wire  to  the  staff  commander  of  the  German  armies 
(Hindenburg).  ...  At  midnight  a  written  answer  to 
our  proposal  was  given  to  us  by  General  von  Hofmeis- 
ter :  .  .  .  '  The  chief  of  the  German  eastern  front  is  au- 
thorized by  the  German  Commander-in-Chief  to  carry 
on  negotiations  for  an  armistice.  The  chief  of  the 
Russian  armies  is  requested  to  appoint  a  commission 
with  written  authority  to  be  sent  to  the  headquarters 
of  the  commander  of  the  German  East  front  (Brest- 
Litovsk).  On  his  side  the  German  commander  will 
name  a  commission  with  special  authorization.  The 
day  and  hour  of  the  meeting  are  to  be  fixed  by 
the  Russian  Commander-in-Chief.  .  .  .  'The  time  ap- 
pointed is  mid-day  of  December  2.'  At  the  same  time 
we  were  informed  that  no  firing  would  occur  unless 
prompted,  and  that  enemy  fraternization  would  be 
stopped.  We  were  blindfolded  again  and  conducted 
to  our  lines. 

December  1.      A  Delegation  of  Russian  officers  and  sol- 
diers called  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Austro-German  com- 


20  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

mand  at  Czernowitz  where  they  were  in  consultation  one 
and  one-half  hours. 

The  situation  during  these  days  is  thus  described 'in  an 
official  Vienna  communication  of  December  3 : 

During  the  last  few  days  an  armistice  has  been  an- 
nounced on  many  sectors  of  the  Russian  front,  from 
division  to  division  and  from  corps  to  corps.  In  the 
Pripet  region  the  Russian  army  concluded  an  official 
armistice  with  the  opposing  command  of  the  allied 
[Central]  troops. 

28  Trotzky  informed  the  American  Military  Attache,  Gen- 
eral Judson,  who  visited  him  unofficially  on  Dec.  1,  that 
every  stage  of  the  negotiations  would  be  made  public,  that 
every  detail  would  be  discussed  in  the  Soviet,  and  that  '  *  the 
Allies,  if  they  thought  it  advisable,  might  intervene  at  a 
later  stage  of  the  negotiations." 

29  December  2.  On  the  morning  of  Sunday,  December  2, 
the  Russian  Delegation,  which  consisted  of  Kamenev,  So- 
kolnikov,  Mme.  Bizenko,  Captain  Metislavsky  and  a  work- 
man, a  soldier,  a  sailor  and  a  peasant,  together  with  two 
military  experts  of  the  General  Staff,  arrived  at  Dvinsk  on 
their  way  to  Brest-Litovsk,  and  addressed  the  Extraor- 
dinary Congress  of  the  Fifth  Army  before  Dvinsk. 

They  were  received  with  rounds  of  applause  which 
developed  into  a  long  ovation.  The  Congress  gave  a 
solemn  promise  in  the  name  of  the  army  that  it  would 
destroy  all  the  wasp  nests  of  the  counter-revolution. 

At  5  :30  P.  M.  they  were  received  in  the  neutral  zone  by 
the  German  Delegates. 

30  December  3.  A  temporary  truce  for  48  hours  (up  to  De- 
cember 5)  was  signed  at  Brest-Litovsk  between  Russia  and 
Germany.  This  was  to  be  regarded  as  "merely  a  prelim- 
inary arrangement"  in  order  to  permit  the  formal  nego- 
tiations for  a  general  armistice  to  be  begun  without  inter- 
ference. 

31  The  formal  negotiations  for  a  general  armistice  were 
opened  at  Brest-Litovsk  in  the  presence  of  representatives 
of  Russia,  and  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey  and 


TRUCE  NEGOTIATIONS  21 

Bulgaria.  The  Delegation  of  the  Central  Powers  was  ex- 
clusively military  and  was  under  the  leadership  of  General 
Hoffmann.  An  account  of  the  negotiations  is  given  in  the 
official  Russian  Report. 

The  Russian  Delegates  opened  with  a  declaration  con- 
cerning their  peace  aims,  with  a  view  to  which  the  armistice 
had  been  proposed. 

The  Central  Delegates  replied  that  their  credentials 
authorized  them  solely  to  begin  negotiations  for  an 
armistice  and  not  for  peace;  that  they  were  soldiers 
and  could  add  nothing  to  the  political  declarations  of 
Count  Czernin  and  Baron  von  Kuehlmann ;  nor  were 
Russia's  Delegates  authorized  to  speak  for  Russia's 
Allies.  The  Russian  Delegates,  taking  due  note  of 
this  evasive  declaration,  proposed  that  they  should 
immediately  address  to  all  countries  involved  in  the 
war,  including  Germany  and  her  Allies  and  all  States 
not  represented  at  the  Conference,  a  proposal  to  take 
part  in  the  drawing  up  of  an  armistice  on  all  fronts. 

The  Central  Delegation  again  replied  evasively  that  they 
had  no  such  authority.  They  accepted  the  proposal  of 
the  Russian  Delegation  that  they  ask  their  Governments 
for  such  additional  powers.  This  power  was  not  accorded 
them. 

December  4.  At  the  second  day's  sitting,  the  Russian 
Delegation  submitted  their  armistice  proposals  whose  prin- 
cipal points  were : 

a.  An  armistice  of  six  months'  duration. 

b.  Evacuation  by  the  German  troops  of  the  islands  of 

the  Moon  Sound  in  the  Gulf  of  Riga. 

c.  Interdiction  against  sending  German  forces  from 
the  Eastern  front  to  other  fronts,  or  even  their 
transference  to  rest  quarters. 

The  Central  Delegation  regarded  these  conditions  as  "in 
part  quite  astonishingly  far-reaching  in  view  of  the  Rus- 
sian military  situation."  The  Central  Delegation  proposed 
an  armistice : 

a.  Of  28  days'  duration,  which  is  to  be  automatically 
prolonged  save  upon  seven  days'  notice. 

b.  Along  the  whole  front  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the 
Black  Sea,  the  Riga  Islands  not  to  be  evacuated. 


22  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

c.  Without  acceptance  of  the  interdiction  against 
transference  of  troops,  since  "such  demands  could 
be  addressed  only  to  a  conquered  country." 

33  At  this  point  attention  should  be  called  to  President 
Wilson's  address  to  Congress  on  this  day,  asking  for  a 
declaration  of  war  against  Austria-Hungary.  He  made 
here  his  first  reference  to  the  Russian  revolutionary  peace 
formula  which  had  been  current  since  April,  1917 : 

You  catch  with  me  the  voices  of  humanity  that  are 
in  the  air.  They  grow  daily  more  audible,  more  articu- 
late, more  persuasive,  and  they  come  from  the  hearts 
of  men  everywhere.  They  insist  that  war  shall  not 
end  in  vindictive  action  of  any  kind;  that  no  nation 
or  people  shall  be  robbed  or  punished  because  the  ir- 
responsible rulers  of  a  single  country  have  themselves 
done  deep  and  abominable  wrong.  It  is  this  thought 
that  has  been  expressed  in  the  formula,  No  annexa- 
tions, no  contributions,  no  punitive  indemnities. 

Just  because  this  crude  formula  expresses  the  in- 
stinctive judgment  as  to  the  right  of  plain  men  every- 
where it  has  been  made  diligent  use  of  by  the  masters 
of  German  intrigue  to  lead  the  people  of  Russia 
astray,  and  the  people  of  every  country  their  agents 
could  reach,  in  order  that  a  premature  peace  might 
be  brought  about  before  autocracy  has  been  taught  its 
final  and  convincing  lesson  and  the  people  of  the  world 
put  in  control  of  their  own  destinies. 

But  the  fact  that  a  wrong  use  has  been  made  of  a 
just  idea  is  no  reason  why  a  right  use  should  not  be 
made  of  it.  It  ought  to  be  brought  under  the  pat- 
ronage of  its  leal  friends. 

34  December  5.  At  the  third  day's  sitting  the  Russian  Dele- 
gation made  the  categorical  declaration  that  they  "were 
treating  for  an  armistice  on  all  fronts  with  the  view  to  the 
conclusion  of  a  general  peace  on  the  basis  established  by 
the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets." 

Although  authorized  to  negotiate  at  the  present  only 
•with  the  Russian  Delegation,  in  view  of  the  absence  of  the 
Allies  of  Russia  from  the  Conference,  the  Central  Delega- 
tion promised  "to  transmit  to  their  respective  Governments 


TRUCE  NEGOTIATIONS  23 

the  proposal  made  by  the  Russian  Delegation  to  invite  all 
the  belligerent  countries  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations." 

Under  the  circumstances,  "the  Russian  Delegation  re- 
fused to  sign  at  this  stage  of  the  negotiations  a  formal 
armistice." 

It  was  thereupon  agreed : 

a.  To  interrupt  the  negotiations  for  an  armistice  for 
one  week  to  December  12,  and 

b.  To  suspend  hostilities  (Waffenruhe)  for  ten  days 
beginning  on  December  7  and  ending  December  17 
at  noon. 

c.  During  the  truce  troops  numbering  a  division  or 
more  may  be  moved  only  if  orders  therefor  had 

been  given  prior  to  December  5. 

December  6.  Some  of  the  Russian  Delegates  returned  to 
Petrograd.  The  remaining  members  of  the  Russian  Dele- 
gation and  representatives  of  the  Quadruple  Powers  "held 
Committee  sittings  at  which  the  drawing  up  of  protocols 
in  respect  of  the  previous  sittings  and  the  preliminary 
work  for  the  future  full  sittings  was  concluded." 

Trotzky  sent  a  note  to  all  the  Allied  Embassies  and  Lega- 
tions in  Petrograd,  informing  them  of  the  course  of  the 
negotiations  up  to  that  date  and  stating  that  the  negotia- 
tions had  been  interrupted  for  a  week, 

with  the  purpose  of  providing  the  opportunity  during 
"^  this  period  of  informing  the  peoples  and  Governments 
of  the  Allied  countries  of  the  existence  of  such  negotia- 
tions and  of  their  tendency.  ...  As  a  result  a  period  of 
over  one  month  will  exist  between  the  first  peace  de- 
cree of  the  Soviets  on  November  8  and  the  moment 
of  the  continuation  of  the  peace  negotiations  on  De- 
cember 12,  This  period  is  even  for  the  present  dis- 
turbed state  of  international  communications  amply 
sufficient  to  afford  the  Allied  Governments  the  oppor- 
tunity to  define  their  attitude  towards  the  peace  ne- 
gotiations— that  is,  their  willingness  or  their  refusal 
to  take  part  in  the  negotiations  for  an  armistice  and 
peace.     In  ease  of  a  refusal  they  must  declare  clearly 


24  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

and  definitely  before  all  mankind  the  aims  for  which 
the  peoples  of  Europe  may  have  to  lose  their  blood 
during  a  fourth  year  of  war. 

37  Pravda,  a  leading  Bolshevik  organ,  declared  that  the 
Soviet  Government  may  have  to  resort  to  a  repudiation  of 
Kussia's  debts  as  a  means  of  forcing  the  Allies  to  partici- 
pate in  the  coming  negotiations. 

t,:  ,b''   ■' 

38  December  7.  The  independence  of  Finland  was  pro- 
claimed. This  was  unanimously  confirmed  by  the  Central 
Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets  on  January  9. 

39  The  Ukrainian  Parliament  authorized  the  sending  of 
Delegations  to  Brest-Litovsk  and  Roumania.  It  also  called 
upon  all  belligerents  to  participate  in  the  peace  negotia- 
tions and  it  notified  neutrals  that  it  had  taken  these  steps. 
It  also  declared  that  it  was  preparing  a  peace  program 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  recognition  of  the  Ukraine 
as  a  part  of  the  Russian  Federative  Republic. 

40  It  was  announced  from  Petrograd  that  on  that  day  for 
the  first  time  since  the  war  not  a  shot  had  been  fired  on 
the  Russian  front  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Baltic. 

41  It  was  announced  from  Jassy  that  the  Roumanian  troops 
had  decided  to  associate  themselves  with  the  Russians  in 
the  proposed  armistice,  and  on  December  8  a  truce  agree- 
ment with  Roumania  was  signed  by  General  Tcherbatchev 
■at  Focsani. 


IV.     THE  FORMAL  ARMISTICE  NEGOTIATIONS 

December  11.  The  Russian  Delegation,  consisting  of 
thirteen  members — including  General  Skalok,  five  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Russian  armies  of  all  the  Eastern  fronts, 
the  naval  representative,  Altflater,  and  five  political  Dele- 
gates— started  for  Brest-Litovsk. 

December  12.      Trotzky  issued  a  declaration, 

throwing  the  responsibility  for  Russia  concluding  a 

separate  armistice  on  the  Governments  which  refuse 

to  present  conditions  for  an  armistice  and  peace.     A 

separate  armistice  is  not  yet  a  separate  peace,  but  it 

means   the    danger   of   a   separate    peace.      Only   the 

peoples  themselves  can  avert  this  danger. 

Trotzky  added  that   in   the   negotiations   the   Commissars 

do  not  consider  themselves  bound  by  a  single  one  of  the 

old  treaties.     As  the  basis  of  peace  negotiations  he  put 

forward : 

1.  No  forcible  annexations. 

2.  The  right  of  all  peoples  to  decide  by  referendum 
whether  they  will  belong  to  one  or  another  State 
as  a  whole,  or  whether  they  will  retain  their  inde- 
pendence. Before  such  decisions,  refugees  should 
be  enabled  to  return  and  foreign  troops  be  removed. 
This  principle  was  applicable  to  colonies  as  well  as 
to  parent  States. 

December  13.  The  negotiations  for  an  armistice  to  replace 
the  existing  truce  were  begun  at  Brest-Litovsk. 

At   the   first   day's   sittings   three   questions   were   con- 
sidered : 

1.  Troop   transfers — concerning   which   the    Germans 
insisted  upon  their  own  view. 

2.  Naval  matters  in  relation  to  which  the  Germans 
made  concessions. 

3.  Conditions    for    fraternization    between    the    two 
armies. 

December  14.  The  conditions  and  draft  of  an  armistice 
treaty  were  finally  formulated,  the  Russian  Delegates,  how- 


26  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

ever,  desiring  to  obtain  supplementary  instructions  on  some 
points  from  their  Government. 

46  On  this  day  Lloyd  George  made  a  number  of  references 
to  Russia  in  an  address  before  Grey's  Inn  Benchers: 

Russia  threatens  to  retire  out  of  the  war  and  leave 
the  French  Democracy,  whose  loyalty  to  the  word  they 
passed  to  Russia  brought  on  them  the  horrors  of  this 
war,  to  shift  for  themselves.  I  do  not  wish  to  mini- 
mize in  the  least  the  gravity  of  this  decision.  Had 
Russia  been  in  a  condition  to  exert  her  strength  this 
year  we  might  now  be  in  a  position  to  impose  fair 
and  rational  terms  of  peace.  By  her  retirement  she 
strengthens  the  Hohenzollerns  and  weakens  the  forces 
of  democracy.  Her  action  will  not  lead,  as  she  im- 
agines, to  universal  peace.  It  will  simply  prolong 
the  world's  agony,  and  inevitably  put  her  in  bondage 
to  the  military  dominance  of  Prussia,  ...  If  the  Rus- 
sian democracy  has  decided  to  abandon  the  struggle 
•  against  military  autocracy,  the  American  democracy 
is  taking  it  up.  .  .  .  The  Russians  are  a  great-hearted 
people,  and  valiantly  have  they  fought  in  this  war,  but 
they  have  always  been — certainly  throughout  this  war 
— the  worst  organized  State  in  Europe. 

47  December  15.  The  armistice  between  Russia  and  all  the 
Central  Powers  was  signed.  It  is  to  begin  at  noon  on. 
Monday,  December  17,  and  remains  in  force  until  January 
14,  1918.  Unless  seven  days'  notice  is  given  it  continues 
in  force  automatically. 

The  agreement  contains  ten  articles  together  with  a 
supplement : 

Article  I  gives  the  duration  of  the  agreement. 

Article  II  extends  it  to  all  the  land  and  air  forces 
of  the  common  fronts.  The  contracting  parties  "un- 
dertake that  until  January  14,  1918,  they  will  not  put 
into  operation  the  removal  of  troops  from  the  front 
between  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic,  that  is  to  say, 
such  removals  as  had  not  been  commenced  before  the 
time  when  the  armistice  agreement  was  signed." 

Article  III  specifies  how  the  lines  of  demarcation 
and  the  neutral  zones  between  the  two  sides  shall  be 
determined. 

Article  IV  provides  the  conditions  under  which, 
"for  the  development  and  strengthening  of  friendly 


ARMISTICE  NEGOTIATIONS  27 

relations  between  the  nations  of  the  contracting  par- 
ties, organized  intercourse  between  troops  shall  be  per- 
mitted." Intercourse  is  permitted  for  pourparlers 
and  to  armistice  commissions;  also  at  the  two  or  three 
intercourse  centers  on  every  sector  of  a  Russian  divi- 
sion, "there  must  not  be  present  at  any  one  time  more 
than  25  unarmed  persons  from  each  side.  The  ex- 
change of  views  and  newspapers  is  to  be  permitted. 
Open  letters  may  be  handed  in  for  despatch.  The 
sale  and  exchange  of  wares  of  everyday  use  is  to  be 
permitted  at  the  intercourse  centers." 

Article  V  extends  the  armistice  to  all  of  the  naval 
and  aerial  forces  in  the  Black  Sea  and  in  the  eastern 
Baltic  and  other  waters,  and  it  provides  for  the  regu- 
lation of  trade  and  mercantile  shipping. 

Article  VI  seeks  "to  prevent  unrest  and  accidents 
at  the  front"  by  regulating  infantry  exercise,  artil- 
lery practice,  land  mining,  captive  ballooning,  work 
on  positions. 

Articles  VII  and  VIII  provide  for  armistice  com- 
missions to  meet  in  eight  places  along  the  v»'hole  front 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  stipulations  of 
the  armistice. 

Article  IX  provides  that  "the  contracting  parties, 
immediately  upon  signing  this  treaty,  for  the  armis- 
tice, will  commence  negotiations  for  peace." 

irticle  X  reads:  "Based  upon  the  principle  of  the 
freedom  and  independence  and  territorial  inviolability 
f  the  neutral  portion  of  the  Persian  Empire,  the 
Turkish  and  Russian  High  Administrations  are  both 
prepared  to  withdraw  their  troops  from  Persia.  They 
will  immediately  enter  into  communication  with  the 
Persian  Government  in  order  to  arrange  details  for 
their  evacuation  and  also  for  the  guaranteeing  of  the 
above-mentioned  principle  and  for  the  establishment  of 
other  necessary  measures." 

A  Supplement  to  the  armistice  agreement  provides  for 
the  immediate  exchange  of  civil  prisoners  and  of  pris- 
oners of  war  unfit  for  further  military  service  .  .  . 
the  sending  back  to  their  homes  of  women  and  of  chil- 


% 


28  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

dren  under  14  years  of  age  .  .  .  and  the  amelioration 
of  the  condition  of  prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides.  .  .  . 
In  furtherance  of  negotiations  for  peace  and  in  order 
to  heal  civilization  of  the  wounds  caused  by  the  war, 
measures  will  be  devised  for  the  re-establishment  of 
cultural  and  economic  relations  between  the  contract- 
ing parties.  .  .  .  For  the  settlement  of  details  a  mixed 
commission  is  to  meet  shortly  in  Petrograd. 

48  December  17.  Trotzky  is  reported  to  have  "notified  the 
Allied  Embassies  that  the  armistice  has  reached  definite 
results  and  that  peace  negotiations  will  begin,  and  asking 
them  to  participate,  or  to  state  whether  they  wish  peace 
or  not." 

49  The  Petrograd  Telegraph  Agency  issued  a  declaration 
to  "the  Socialists  of  all  countries,  especially  the  Socialists 
of  Germany"  who  "must  understand  that  between  the 
program  of  the  Russian  workmen  and  peasants  and  the 
program  of  the  German  capitalists,  landowners  and  gen- 
erals there  is  an  irreconcilable  contradiction  ,  .  ,  the  work- 
ers of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey 
must  substitute  for  the  Imperialist  program  of  their  ruling 
classes  their  own  revolutionary  program  of  solidarity  and 
collaboration  between  the  workers  of  all  countries." 

50  The  Soviet  Government  delivered  an  ultimatum  to  the 
Ukrainian  Rada  stating  that  "in  case  a  satisfactory  reply 
has  not  been  received  within  twenty-four  hours,  the  Council 
of  the  People's  Commissars  will  consider  the  Rada  in  a 
state  of  war  against  the  influence  of  the  Soviets  in  Russia 
and  in  the  Ukraine. ' '  In  the  ultimatum  the  *  *  independent 
national  rights  of  all  the  nationalities  that  were  oppressed 
by  the  Czarist  Great  Russian  bourgeoisie,  even  to  the  point 
of  recognizing  the  right  of  these  nationalities  to  separate 
themselves  from  Russia, ' '  are  once  more  confirmed.  Never- 
theless, the  Rada  is  accused  "under  cover  of  phrases  and 
declarations  regarding  national  independence,"  of  having 
given  itself  over  to  a  "systematic  bourgeois  policy"  and  of 
giving  assistance  to  the  "counter-revolutionary  forces  of 
the  Cadets  and  of  Kaledin."  This  ultimatum  was  ignored 
at  Kiev,  and  war  between  the  two  Republics  was  formally 
begun  on  December  18. 


V.  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  A  GENERAL 
EUROPEAN  PEACE 

Von  Kuehlmann  and  Czernin  notified  Trotzky  that  they 
would  arrive  in  Brest  on  December  18  to  begin  negotiations 
for  a  general  European  peace.  Czernin  added  that  the 
meeting  place  for  a  general  European  Conference  would 
also  be  discussed, 

December  18.  A  Preliminary  Conference  was  held  be- 
tween the  representatives  of  Russia  and  of  the  Central 
Powers  to  consider  who  would  participate  in  the  forth- 
coming formal  negotiations  and  what  would  be  the  basis  of 
the  negotiations.  The  Germans  considered  it  necessary  to 
know  the  replies  of  the  Allies  before  opening  formal  nego- 
tiations. The  Germans  were  reported  as  "disposed  to  ac- 
cept the  principle  of  no  annexations  or  indemnities,  but 
they  have  made  express  reservations  with  regard  to  the 
right  of  nationalities  to  dispose  of  themselves," 

December  20.  Lloyd  George  in  discussing  the  military 
situation  before  the  House  of  Commons  said : 

It  would  be  idle  to  pretend  that  the  hopes  we  had 
formed  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  have  been  re- 
alized, and  our  disappointment  is  attributable  entirely, 
in  my  judgment,  to  the  Russian  collapse.  The  Russian 
army  has  been  practically  quiescent  throughout  the 
yeaj"-  •  •  •  The  Russian  situation  has  changed  within 
the  last  few  weeks.  Russia  was  at  any  rate  before 
nominally  at  war  with  Germany.  Her  army  occupied 
a  very  long  line  of  trenches,  and  that  compelled  the 
Germans  and  the  Austrians  to  keep  in  front  of  that 
army  a  very  considerable  number  of  troops. 

There  is  an  armistice  and  peace  is  being  negotiated. 
It  is  perfectly  true  that  there  are  conditions  which 
impose  upon  Germany  the  obligation  not  to  move  any 
troops  from  the  eastern  front  to  the  west,  "Well,  we 
have  heard  of  scraps  of  paper  before.  .  .  . 

Since  Russia  has  entered  into  separate  negotiations 
she  of  course  must  alone  be  responsible  for  the  terms 
in  respect  of  her  own  territories.  .  ,  . 


30  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

54  December  22.  The  formal  negotiations  for  a  general 
peace  were  begun.  The  meeting  was  attended  by  the  fol- 
lowing Delegates: 

Germany — Foreign  Minister  von  Kuehlmann,  Chair- 
man, and  von  Rosenberg,  Baron  von  Hock,  General 
Hoffmann,  Major  Brinekmann. 

Austria-Hungary — Foreign  Minister  Czemin,  Chair- 
man, and  von  Merey,  Freiherr  von  Wisser,  Count  Col- 
lerda.  Count  Osaky,  Field  Marshal  von  Cziezericz, 
Lieutenant  Polarny,  Major  von  Gluise. 

Bulgaria — Minister  of  Justice  Popov,  Chairman, 
and  Gossev,  Postmaster  General  Stoyanovich,  Colonel 
Ganchev,  Dr.  Anastasov. 

Turkey — Former  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Nezim 
Bey,  Chairman,  and  the  Ambassador  to  Germany, 
Hakki  Pasha,  Under  Foreign  Secretary  Hekmit  Bey, 
General  Zekki  (Izzet)  Pasha. 

Russia — Joffe,  Chairman,  and  Kamenev,  Mme.  Bi- 
zenko,  Petrovsky,  Karaghan,  Lubinski,  Weltman,  Pav- 
lovich.  Admiral  Altvater,  General  Tumorrl,  Colonel 
Zeplett,  Captain  Lipsky. 

After  introductory  remarks  by  Prince  Leopold  of  Ba- 
varia and  Hakki  Pasha,  v.  Kuehlmann  was  unanimously 
chosen  first  President  of  the  negotiations.  He  declared 
among  other  things  that 

there  can  be  no  question  of  preparing  an  instrument 
of  peace  elaborated  in  its  smallest  details.  What  I 
have  in  mind  is  fixing  the  most  important  principles 
and  conditions  on  which  neighbourly  intercourse,  espe- 
cially in  cultural  and  economic  respects,  can  speedily 
be  re-established,  and  deciding  upon  the  best  means 
to  heal  the  wounds  caused  by  the  war.  .  .  .  Our  nego- 
tiations .  .  .  must  take  into  account  on  the  one  hand 
what  has  become  historical  in  order  not  to  lose  our 
footing  on  the  firm  ground  of  facts;  but  on  the  other 
hand  they  must  also  be  inspired  by  that  new  great 
leading  motive  of  peace  that  has  brought  us  here  to- 
gether. 

The  Russian  Delegation  demanded  and  obtained  publicity 
for  the  sittings  and  the  right  to  publish  protocols.  After 
additional  rules  of  order  were  adopted,  Joffe  declared  that 
the  Russian  Delegation  based  itself  upon  the  clearly  ex- 


GENEEAL  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  31 

pressed  will  of  the  people  of  Russia  to  attain  as  soon  as 
possible  a  general  and  just  peace.  He  appealed  to  the 
resolutions  of  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Workmen  and 
Soldiers'  Deputies  and  the  All-Russian  Peasants'  Congress, 
and  he  declared  the  war  a  crime  "if  continued  for  the  sake 
of  annexations."  Starting  from  these  principles,  the  Rus- 
sian Delegation  proposed  that  peace  negotiations  be  based 
upon  the  following  six  points : 

1.  No  forcible  union  of  territories  conquered  during 
the  war  shall  be  permitted.  Troops  occupying  such 
territories  shall  be  withdrawn  within  the  shortest  pe- 
riod. 

2.  The  political  independence  of  peoples  that  have 
lost  their  independence  during  the  war  shall  be  re- 
stored to  its  fullest  extent. 

3.  National  groups  which  before  the  war  were  not 
politically  independent  shall  be  guaranteed  the  possi- 
bility of  deciding  by  referendum  the  question  of  be- 
longing to  one  State  or  another,  or  enjoying  their 
political  independence.  This  referendum  must  be  ar- 
ranged in  such  a  manner  that  complete  independence 
of  voting  is  guaranteed  for  the  entire  population  of 
the  region  in  question,  including  emigrants  and  ref- 
ugees. 

4.  In  regard  to  territory  of  mixed  nationality,  the 
right  of  a  minority  shall  be  protected  by  special  laws 
givinlg  it  independence  of  national  culture,  and,  if 
practical,  autonomous  administration. 

5.  None  of  the  belligerent  countries  shall  be  obliged 
to  pay  another  country  any  so-called  war  costs.  Con- 
tributions already  levied  are  to  be  paid  back.  Re- 
garding the  indemnification  of  losses  suffered  by  pri- 
vate persons  in  consequence  of  the  war,  these  shall 
be  met  out  of  a  special  fund  to  which  belligerents  shall 
proportionately  contribute. 

6.  Colonial  questions  shall  be  decided  in  conformity 
with  the  principles  laid  down  in  points  1  to  4. 

The  Russian  Delegation  also  regards  as  intolerable 
any  restriction  of  the  liberty  of  weaker  nations  by  the 
stronger,  such  as  through  an  economic  boycott,  the  sub- 
jection of  one  country  to  another  by  the  imposition  of 


32  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

commercial  treaties,  and  separate  customs  conventions, 
hindering  the  freedom  of  commerce  with  a  third  coun- 
try. 

After  this  declaration  v.  Kuehlmann  stated  that  the 
Central  Delegations  required  an  interval  to  consider  their 
reply. 

55  December  25.  Count  Czernin,  who  presided,  declared  in 
the  name  of  the  Delegates  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  that 
the  main  lines  of  the  Russian  proposals  form  a 
discussable  basis  for  .  ,  .  an  immediate  general  peace 
without  forcible  acquisitions  of  territory  and  without 
war  indemnities.  .  .  .  The  statesmen  of  the  Allied 
[Central]  Governments,  in  their  programs,  have 
repeatedly  emphasized  that  the  Allies  [Central]  would 
not  prolong  the  war  a  day  in  order  to  make  conquests. 
.  .  .  They  solemnly  declare  their  determination  to 
sign  without  delay  a  peace  that  will  end  this  war  on 
the  foregoing  basis  without  exception  and  with  the 
same  just  conditions  for  all  belligerent  powers. 

Czernin  expressly  pointed  out,  however,  that  this  accept- 
ance of  the  Russian  terms  was  to  be  binding  upon  the 
Central  Powers  only  on  condition  that 

all  the  powers  now  participating  in  the  war  must, 
within  a  suitable  period,  without  exception  and  with- 
out any  reserve,  bind  themselves  to  the  most  precise 
adherence  to  the  terms  binding  every  other  nation. 
.  .  .  For,  it  would  not  do  for  the  Powers  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  negotiating  with  Russia,  one- 
sidedly  to  tie  themselves  to  these  conditions  without 
a  guarantee  that  Russia's  Allies  will  recognize  and 
carry  out  these  conditions  honestly  and  without  reserve 
as  regards  the  Quadruple  Alliance  as  well. 

Ha\dng  made  this  prior  condition,  Czernin  proceeded  to 
reply  to  the  six  terms  of  the  Russian  proposal : 

1.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  Allied  [Central] 
Governments  to  appropriate  forcibly  the  territories 
which  are  at  present  occupied.  The  question  of  the 
troops  in  occupied  territories  must  be  settled  in  the 
sense  of  the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  specifically  des- 
ignated places.     If  no  such  agreement  can  be  reached 


GENERAL  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  3S 

beforehand  there  must  be  stipulations   in  the  peace 
treaty  regarding  the  evacuation  of  such  places. 

2.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  Allies  [Central]  to 
deprive  of  its  political  independence  any  of  the  na- 
tions which  have  lost  it  in  the  course  of  this  war. 

3.  The  question  of  the  State  allegiance  of  national 
groups  which  possess  no  State  independence  cannot, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  be  solved 
internationally,  but  is,  if  required,  to  be  solved  by 
every  State  independently  with  its  peoples  in  a  con- 
stitutional manner. 

4.  Likewise,  in  accordance  with  declarations  of 
statesmen  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  the  protection 
of  the  right  of  minorities  forms  an  essential  and  com- 
ponent part  of  the  constitutional  right  of  peoples  tO' 
self-determination.  The  Allied  (Central)  Govern- 
ments also  grant  validity  to  this  principle  everywhere, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  practically  realizable. 

5.  The  Allied  [Central]  Powers  have  frequently  em- 
phasized the  possibility  that  both  sides  might  renounce 
not  only  indemnification  for  war  costs,  but  also  indem- 
nification for  war  damages.  In  these  circumstances, 
every  belligerent  power  would  have  only  to  make  in- 
demnification for  expenditures  for  its  nationals  who 
have  become  prisoners  of  war,  as  well  as  for  damage 
done  in  its  own  territory  by  illegal  acts  of  force  com- 
mitted against  civilian  nationals  belonging  to  the  en- 
emy. The  Russian  Government's  proposal  for  the  cre- 
ation of  a  special  fund  for  this  purpose  could  be  taken 
into  consideration  only  if  the  other  belligerent  powers 
were  to  join  in  the  peace  negotiations  within  a  suitable 
period. 

6.  Of  the  four  Allied  [Central]  Powers  Germany 
alone  possesses  colonies.  The  German  Delegation,  in 
complete  accord  with  the  Russian  proposals  regarding 
colonies,  adds  that  the  return  of  the  German  colonies 
taken  by  force  during  the  war  constitutes  an  essential 
part  of  the  German  demands  from  which  Germany 
will  never  desist ;  just  as  the  Russian  demand  for  the 
evacuation  of  territory  occupied  by  an  adversary  cor- 
responds with  Germany's  intentions. 

As  to  self-determination  for  the  German  colonies 
now  proposed  by  the  Russian  Delegation,  Czernin  de- 


34  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

clared  that  "the  nature  of  the  German  colonial  terri- 
tories" makes  that  "at  present  impossible."  More- 
over, the  natives  have  given  "proof  of  their  attach- 
ment and  their  resolve  by  all  means  to  preserve  al- 
legiance to  Germany,  proof  which,  by  its  significance 
and  weight,  is  far  superior  to  any  expression  of  popu- 
lar will." 

Finally,  the  principles  to  govern  the  economic  relations 
between  nations,  as  proposed  by  the  Russian  Delegation, 
are  approved  wholly  by  the  Delegations  of  the  Allied 
[Central]  Powers,  who  always  have  denied  any  eco- 
nomic restrictions  and  who  see  in  the  re-establishment 
of  regulated  economic  relations,  which  are  in  accord 
with  the  interests  of  all  peoples  concerned,  one  of  the 
most  important  conditions  for  bringing  about  friendly 
relations  between  the  powers  now  engaged  in  war. 

Having  heard  the  reply  of  the  Central  Delegations,  the 
Russian  Delegation,  through  Chairman  Joffe, 

expresses  its  satisfaction  that  .  .  .  Germany  and  her 
Allies  so  far  from  having  plans  of  territorial  annexa- 
tion and  conquest,  do  not  aim  at  the  destruction  of 
the  political  independence  of  any  people  whatsoever. 
The  abolition  of  annexation  is  the  logical  consequence 
of  the  general  principle  of  the  right  of  peoples  to 
regulate  their  own  destinies.  This  right  is  recognized 
in  existing  constitutions  only  in  a  minor  degree,  and 
consequently  to  speak  of  constitutional  channels  as  the 
sure  means  to  achieve  this  right  is  to  nullify  this  prin- 
ciple. It  must  be  said  that  the  four  Allied  (Central) 
Powers,  while  they  agree  not  to  apply  the  right  of 
the  strongest  in  the  territories  occupied  during  the 
war,  do  nothing  for  small  nationalities  in  their  own 
territory.  The  war  cannot  come  to  an  end  without 
the  restoration  of  independence  to  small  nationalities. 
The  Russian  Delegation  as  heretofore  insists  on  the 
rights  of  these  nationalities  being  protected  in  the 
peace  treaty.  Historical  prescription  does  not  justify 
one  people's  subservience  to  another.  The  Russian 
Delegation  further  attaches  importance  to  the  indem- 
nification from  an  international  fund  of  private  per- 
sons who  have  suffered  from  acts  of  war.  The  Russian 
Delegation  sees  no  contradiction  with  its  principles 
...  in  the  annulment  of  the  Entente  regime  insti- 


GENERAL  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  35 

tuted  during  the  war  in  the  German  colonies,  as  show- 
ing that  the  peoples  who  have  taken  part  in  the  war 
are  entitled  to  express  a  will  of  their  own.    Any  diffi- 
culties arising  therefrom  can  be  adjusted  by  Commis- 
sions to  be  officially  appointed.     Seeing  that  the  dec- 
laration of  Germany  and  her  Allies  admits  the  possi- 
bility of  peace  pourparlers,  the  Russian  Delegation  de- 
clares at  the  same  time  that,  in  spite  of  the  differences 
already   mentioned,    the   main   points   of   the   Allies' 
[Central]  declaration  are  not  aggressive  and  it  enters 
into  pourparlers  for  general  peace  between  belligerents. 
The  Russian  Delegation  proposes  the  suspension  of 
hostilities  during  a  period  of  ten  days,  beginning  at 
10  P.  M.  on  December  23,  1917,  to  10  P.  M.  on  Janu- 
ary 4,  1918,  so  that  the  peoples,  whose  Governments 
have  not  joined  in  the  pourparlers,  may  have  the  op- 
portunity of  becoming  acquainted  with  the  new  prin- 
ciple  of   peace.     After   this   period,   the   pourparlers 
will  be  resumed,  even  if  other  peoples  do  not  take  part 
in  them. 
The   next   plenary   sitting   of   the   Delegations   for   the 
discussion  of  the   terms  of   a  general  peace  between   all 
) belligerents  was  then  tixed  for  Friday,  January  9,  1918, 
at  9  A.  M. — five  days  after  the  expiration  of  the  period 
fixed  for  the  susp&sion  of  hostilities  and  for  communicat- 
ing the  "new  principle  of  peace"  to  all  the  belligerents. 

Before  the  adjournment  of  the  Conference  on  December 
25,  Czernin  asked  the  Russian  Delegation  to  present  its 
answer  in  writing,  and  he  proposed  an  immediate  start 
with  negotiations  on  those  special  points  which  in  any 
case  would  have  to  be  settled  between  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Governments  of  the  Central  Powers.  The 
head  of  the  Russian  Delegation  expressed  his  readiness 
immediately  to  enter  upon  the  discussion  of  those  specific 
points,  which  even  in  the  event  of  general  European  peace 
negotiations,  would  have  to  form  the  subject  of  special 
discussions  between  Russia  and  the  Quadruple  Allies. 
Upon  motion  of  von  Kuehlmann,  it  was  unanimously  de- 
cided, with  a  view  to  avoiding  all  loss  of  time,  and  having 
regard  to  the  importance  of  the  task  to  be  fulfilled,  to 
begin  these  special  negotiations  on  the  next  day,  Wednes- 
day morning,  December  26. 

December  26-28.      The  available  record  of  these  sessions 
is  somewhat  confused.     It  would  appear  that  on  Decem- 


36  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

ber  26  the  Russian  Delegation  presented  a  draft  of  two 
Articles  of  an  agreement  concerning  the  treatment  of  oc- 
cupied territories  as  follows: 

I.  In  full  accord  with  the  public  declarations  of  both 
contracting  parties  that  they  cherish  no  bellicose  plans, 
and  that  they  desire  to  conclude  peace  without  forcible 
annexations,  Russia  will  withdraw  her  troops  from  all 
parts  of  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  and  Persia,  occu- 
pied by  her,  while  the  Powers  of  the  Quadruple  Alli- 
ance will  withdraw  theirs  from  Poland,  Lithuania, 
Courland  and  other  regions  of  Russia. 

II.  In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  Russian 
Government,  which  has  declared  the  right  of  all  peoples 
living  in  Russia  to  self-determination,  including  even 
separation  from  Russia,  the  populations  in  these  dis- 
tricts v/ill  be  given  an  opportunity  within  the  shortest 
possible  period  of  deciding  entirely  and  freely  the 
question  of  their  union  with  one  or  the  other  Empire, 
or  of  their  formation  into  separate  States.  In  this 
connection  the  presence  of  any  troops,  apart  from  the 
national  or  local  militia  in  the  territories  which  are 
voting,  is  not  permissible.  Until  this  question  is  de- 
cided the  government  of  these  regions  will  remain  in 
the  hands  of  representatives  of  the  local  population 
elected  democratically.  The  date  of  evacuation  and 
other  circumstances  and  the  commencement  of  the  de- 
mobilization of  the  army  is  to  be  fixed  by  a  special 
military  commission. 


57  We  have  not  found  a  record  of  the  discussion  following 
this  proposed  draft.  The  German  Delegation  proposed  as 
a  substitute  the  first  two  Articles  of  a  preliminary  peace 
treaty.  At  the  same  time,  they  brought  forward  the  draft 
of  the  remaining  Articles  of  a  complete  preliminary  peace 
treaty  containing,  in  all,  sixteen  Articles : 

Article  I.  "Russia  and  Germany  are  to  declare  the 
state  of  war  at  an  end.  Both  nations  are  resolved  to 
live  together  in  the  future  in  peace  and  friendship. 
On  the  condition  of  complete  reciprocity,  vis-a-vis 
her  allies,  Germany  would  be  ready  as  soon  as  peace 
is  concluded  with  Russia  and  the  demobilization  of 
the  Russian  armies  has  been  accomplished,  to  evacuate 


GENERAL  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS         37 

her  present  positions  in  occupied  Russian  territory  in 
so  far  as  no  different  inferences  result  from  Article 
IL" 

Article  II.  ' '  The  Russian  Government  having,  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  principles,  proclaimed  for  all  peoples 
without  exception  living  within  the  Russian  Empire 
the  right  of  self-determination,  including  complete  sep- 
aration, takes  cognizance  of  the  decisions  expressing 
the  will  of  the  people  demanding  full  State  independ- 
ence and  separation  from  the  Russian  Empire,  for  Po- 
land, Lithuania,  Courland,  and  portions  of  Esthonia 
and  Livonia.  The  Russian  Government  recognizes  that 
in  the  present  circumstances  these  manifestations  must 
be  regarded  as  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  people, 
and  is  ready  to  draw  conclusions  therefrom.  As  in 
those  districts  to  which  the  foregoing  stipulations  ap- 
ply, the  question  of  evacuation  is  not  such  as  is  pro- 
vided for  in  Article  I,  a  special  commission  shall  dis- 
cuss and  fix  the  time  and  other  details  in  conformity 
and  in  accordance  with  the  Russian  idea  of  the  neces- 
sary ratification — by  a  plebiscite  on  broad  lines  and 
without  any  military  pressure  whatever — of  the  al- 
ready existing  proclamations  of  separation." 

Article  III  concerns  treaties  and  agreements  in  force 
before  the  war.  i 

Articles  IV,  V,  YI  and  VII.  No  discrimination 
against  the  subjects,  merchant  ships  or  goods  of  either 
party ;  no  economic  war ;  no  burdensome  import  duties ; 
the  exchange  of  goods  to  be  organized  through  mixed 
commissions;  new  commercial  treaty  of  navigation  to 
replace  treaty  of  1894-1904 ;  most  favored  nation  rights 
in  commerce  and  navigation  for  twenty  years. 

Article  VIII.  "Russia  agrees  that  the  administra- 
tion of  the  mouth  of  the  Danube  be  entrusted  to  a 
European  Danube  Commission,  with  a  membership 
from  the  countries  bordering  upon  the  Danube  and 
the  Black  Sea.  Above  Braila  the  administration  is 
to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  countries  bordering  upon 
the  river." 

Article  IX.  "Military  laws  limiting  the  private 
rights  of  Germans  in  Russia  and  of  Russians  in  Ger- 
many are  abolished." 

Article  X.  "The  contracting  parties  are  not  to  de- 
mand the  payment  of  war  expenditures  nor  for  dam- 


38  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

ages  suffered  during  the  war,  this  provision  including 
requisitions. ' ' 

Article  XI.  "Each  party  is  to  pay  for  damage  done 
within  its  own  limits  during  the  war  by  acts  against 
international  law  with  regard  to  the  subjects  of  other 
parties,  in  particular  their  diplomatic  and  consular 
representatives,  as  affecting  their  life,  health,  or  prop- 
erty. The  amount  is  to  be  fixed  by  mixed  commis- 
sions with  neutral  chairmen. ' ' 

Article  XII.  "Prisoners  of  war  who  are  invalids 
are  to  be  immediately  repatriated.  The  exchange  of 
other  prisoners  is  to  be  made  as  soon  as  possible,  the 
dates  to  be  fixed  by  a  German-Russian  commission. ' ' 

Article  XIII.  "Civilian  subjects  interned  or  exiled 
are  to  be  immediately  released  and  sent  home  without 
cost  to  them." 

Article  XIV  provides  for  the  emigration  to  Germany 
of  Russian  subjects  of  German  descent. 

Article  XV.  The  return  by  each  party  of  merchant 
ships. 

Article  XVI.  "Diplomatic  and  consular  relations 
are  to  be  resumed  as  soon  as  possible." 

In  the  discussions  of  December  26,  27,  28,  of  which  we 
have  but  a  scant  record,  substantial  agreement  seems  to 
have  been  arrived  at  on  all  points  with  the  exception  of 
the  crucial  Articles  I  and  II,  which  form  the  basis  of  all 
the  further  negotiations.  In  relation  to  these  two  Articles, 
the  Russian  Delegation  defined  its  position  as  follows: 

Our  standpoint  is,  that  only  such  manifestation  of 
will  can  be  regarded  as  de  facto  the  expression  of  the 
will  of  the  people  as  results  from  a  free  vote  taken 
in  the  districts  in  question  with  the  complete  absence 
of  foreign  troops.  We  therefore  must  insist  upon  a 
clearer  and  more  precise  formulation  of  this  point. 
We,  however,  consent  to  a  special  commission  being 
appointed  to  examine  the  technique  of  such  a  referen- 
dum and  fix  the  definite  date  for  evacuation.  In  view 
of  the  course  which  the  negotiations  have  hitherto 
taken,  it  can  be  stated  with  satisfaction  that  as  regards 
the  settlement  of  the  most  important  questions  the 
views  of  the  represented  powers  tally  on  many  points, 


GENEEAL  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  39 

while  as  regards  others  they  approach  each  other,  so 
that  regarding  the  latter  points  also,  the  hope  of  ar- 
riving at  an  agreement  is  well  founded. 

On  December  28  at  the  third  and  last  sitting  before  ad- 
journment to  January  9,  Popov,  Bulgarian  Minister  of. 
Justice,  referred  "to  the  significance  of  the  peace  nego-1 
tiations  as  promising  a  basis  for  a  new  era  in  the  devel-1 
opment  of  international  law. ' '  He  then  asked  Joffe,  leader 
of  the  Russian  Delegation,  to  preside  over  the  session. 
Hakki  Pasha  pointed  out  that  the  approaching  practical 
solution  of  the  different  questions  raised  during  three  and 
a  half  years  of  war  "was  greatly  due  to  the  Russian  Dele- 
gation, which  had  shown  sincerity,  justice  and  common 
sense,  and  proved  to  be  good  diplomats  and  statesmen." 
Joffe,  in  closing  the  sitting,  "expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  negotiations  had  well  begun  and  allowed  the  expecta- 
tion of  a  speedy  termination  to  a  devastating  war." 


VI.     THE  INTERVAL  TO  PERMIT  ALLIED 
PARTICIPATION 

59  December  27.  Trotzky  informed  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Soviets  that  he  would  officially  ask  the 
Entente  Powers  whether  they  intended  to  support  the 
Russian  or  the  German  peace  proposals,  or  whether  they 
would  propose  some  alternative  terms.  If  the  Entente 
Allies  refused  to  join  in  the  negotiations  within  ten  days, 
Russia  would  be  forced  to  conclude  a  separate  peace. 

60  December  28.  M.  Pichon,  in  his  first  speech  as  Foreign 
Minister,  said  in  the  French  Chamber: 

Germany  is  trying  to  involve  us  in  her  Maximalist 
negotiations.  After  suffering  as  we  have,  we  cannot 
accept  peace  based  on  the  status  quo.  By  agreement 
with  our  Allies,  we  are  ready  to  discuss  direct  prop- 
ositions regarding  peace,  but  this  is  indirect. 

Russia  may  treat  for  a  separate  peace  with  our 
enemies  or  not.  In  either  case  the  war  will  continue 
for  us.  An  Ally  has  failed  us.  .  .  .  But  another  Ally 
has  come  from  the  other  end  of  the  world.  .  .  . 

The  secret  treaties  published  by  the  Bolsheviki  had 
not  compromised  France.  .  .  . 

All  the  Allies  through  their  representatives  made 
the  same  declaration  at  Petrograd,  that  on  the  day 
when  a  regularly  constituted  government  founded  on 
the  national  will  existed  in  Russia,  we  would  be  ready 
to  examine  with  it  our  war  aims,  and  the  conditions 
of  a  just  and  durable  peace.  The  Allies'  representa- 
tives are  all  unable  to  recognize  a  Government  which 
concluded  an  armistice  without  consulting  its  Allies, 
opened  negotiations  for  an  immediate  peace,  summon- 
ing all  belligerents  to  reply  immediately  whether  they 
accepted  these  negotiations,  and  threatened  to  declare 
void  all  foreign  financial  obligations  created  by  pre- 
vious Governments.  Trotzky  declared  he  did  not  need 
to  be  recognized  by  capitalistic  Governments  and  that 
he  was  addressing  the  people  directly,  proposing  a 
democratic  peace.  .  .  . 


FIEST  INTEEVAL  41 

By  the  acts  of  the  Bolsheviki,  Russia  is  completely- 
disorganized.  .  .  .  Amid  the  general  disorganization, 
we  ought  to  unite  with  them  [the  sane  elements 
of  Russia],  whether  they  be  Socialists,  Liberals  or 
Revolutionaries.  .  .  .  We  are  not  intervening  in  the 
internal  policy  of  Russia,  but  we  are  taking  the  neces- 
sary measures  to  safeguard  the  considerable  interests 
in  the  country  to  which  we  have  been  attached  by 
alliance  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  In  conformity 
with  the  principles  of  the  Maximalists,  we  are  replying 
favorably  to  the  populations  which  wish  to  maintain 
relations  with  us.  We  are  not  working  for  the  break- 
up of  Russia,  but  we  wish  to  serve  a  policy  which 
will  regenerate  Russia. 

December  29.  The  Petrograd  Telegraph  Agency  issued 
the  following  message  to  the  ''Peoples  and  Governments 
of  Allied  countries :  The  Peace  pourparlers  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  .  .  .  have  been  interrupted  for  ten  days  until 
January  8  in  order  to  give  a  last  chance  to  the  Allied 
countries  to  take  part  in  the  further  pourparlers  and  thus 
so  safeguard  themselves  from  all  consequences  of  a  separate 
peace  between  Russia^aa.d  enemy  countries." 

January  1,  1918.  A  U.  S.  Government  wireless  picked  up 
"Russian  peace  terms,  in  which  she  is  asking  the  Entente 
to  join."  A  detailed  account  of  the  Russian  peace  terms 
is  given.  "The  Russian  Delegation  makes  known  its  de- 
termination to  append  their  signatures  to  these  conditions 
for  peace,  which  they  claim  will  end  the  war  upon  the 
foundation  of  the  principles  of  just  conditions  for  all  peo- 
ples in  like  manner  without  exception." 

January  2.  The  Central  Executive  Committee  of  Soviets 
met  to  consider  the  situation. 

After  Kamenev,  one  of  the  Brest-Litovsk  Delegates,  had 
reported  on  the  peace  pourparlers,  representatives  from  all 
the  fronts  were  summoned  by  telegraph  to  Petrograd. 
Without  concealing  the  distressing  situation  on  the  fronts, 
they  declared  that  the  front  would  defend  the  Russian  revo- 
lution, but  that  it  demands  bread  and  boots. 

Trotzky,uajthe^ame_ollhf^  Commissnrs^ikilJmnce^Gre]:: 
Tngjiy's  "hypocritical  ppapp  prnpnsfil ' '  and  he  declared  tkat 
if  Poles  and  Letts  and  other  nationalities  were  not  given 


42  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

the  right  of  self-determination,  it  would  becomejirgantly 
necessary  ciJurageousixlOLs^^tl  the  revolution. 

After  Trotzky's  speech  a  joint  Assembly  was  held  of 
the  Central  Executive  of  the  Soviets,  the  Workmen's,  Sol- 
diers' and  Peasants'  Delegates,  the  Petrograd  Soviet,  and 
the  Congress  of  the  whole  Army,  which  had  been  appointed 
to  consider  the  question  of  demobilization. 

The  Assembly  passed  the  following  resolution: 

This  Assembly  confirms  the  fact  that  the  program    | 

proclaimed  by  the  representatives  of  the  Quadruple 

Alliance  at  Brest-Litovsk  recognizes  in  principle  the 

conclusion  of  peace  without  annexations  or  indemni- 

/  ties.     This  recognition  established  a  basis  for  further 

I  pourparlers  with  a  view  to  a  general  and  democratic 

i  peace. 

However,   already   in   this   declaration,   the_repre-  _ 
RPTitf^fivPs  of  tliP  (^prman  r^nvprnment  refused  to  admit 
tEefree  right  of  the  oppressed  nations  and  colonies, '  ^ 
seized  before  the  beginning,  of  war  in  1914,  to  dis-_  * 
pose  of  their  own  destiny.     Already  this  restriction,     | 
which  was  immediately  reported  by  the  Russian  Dele- 
gation,  signified  that   the   dominant   parties   in    Ger- 
many, compelled  by  the  pressure  of  the  popular  move- 
ment to  grant  concessions  to  the  principles  of  a  demo- 
cratic  peace,  nevertheless  are  trying  to   distort  this 
idea  in  the  sense  of  their  old  annexationist  policy. 

The  Austro-German  Delegation,  in  setting  out  the 
practical  conditions  of  peace  in  the  East,  alters  still 
further  the  idea  of  a  just  democratic  peace.  This 
declaration  is  made  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Ger- 
man and  Austrian  Governments  refuse  to  guarantee 
immediately  and  irrevocably  the  removal  of  their 
troops  in  the  occupied  countries  of  Poland,  Lithuania, 
Courland,  and  parts  of  Livonia  and  Esthonia.  In 
fact,  a  free  affirmation  of  their  will  by  the  popula- 
tions of  Poland,  Lithuania,  Courland,  and  all  other 
countries  occupied  by  the  troops  of  other  States  is 
impossible  until  the  moment  of  the  return  of  the  na- 
tive population  to  the  places  they  have  evacuated. 

The  allegation  of  the  German  Delegation  that  the 
will  of  the  people  of  these  countries  has  already  been 
manifested  is  devoid  of  all  foundation.     Under  martial 


FIRST  INTERVAL  43 

law  and  under  the  yoke  of  the  military  censorship 
the  peoples  of  the  occupied  countries  could  not  ex- 
press their  will.  The  documents  on  which  the  Ger- 
man Government  at  best  could  base  their  allegation 
only  prove  a  manifestation  of  the  will  of  a  few  iso- 
lated and  privileged  groups,  but  in  no  way  the  will 
of  the  masses  in  these  territories. 

We  now  declare  that  the  Russian  Revolution  remains 
faithful  to  the  rQJ.iry  ^^  \J^t^,rriat^m^n^\^rln  We  de- 
fend the  right  of  Poland,  Lithuania,  and  Courland 
to  dispose  of  their  own  destiny,  really,  freely.  Never 
will  we  recognize  the  justice  of  imposing  the  will  of 
a  foreign  nation  on  any  other  nation  whatsoever. 

This  joint  session  insists  that  the  peace  pourparlers 

instructs  the  Soviets  and  Commissars  to  take  measures 
to  realize  this. 

We  say  to  the  peoples  of  Germany,  Austria,  Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey:  "Under  your  pressure 
your  Governments  have  been  obliged  to  accept  our 
motto  of  no  annexations  and  no  indemnities,  but  re- 
cently they  have  been  trying  to  carry  out  their  old 
policy  of  evasions.  Remember  that  the  conclusion  of 
an  immediate  democratic  peace  will  depend  actually 
and  above  all  on  you.  All  the  peoples  of  Europe 
look  to  you.  Exhausted  and  bled  by  a  war  such  as 
there  has  never  been  before,  you  will  not  permit 
the  German  and  Austrian  Imperialists  to  make  war 
against  revolutionary  Russia  for  the  subjection  of 
Poland,  Lithuania,  Courland,  and  Livonia." 

Chairman  Joffe  of  the  Russian  Delegation,  under  instruc- 
tions of  the  Central  Executive,  telegraphed  on  January  2 
to  General  Hoffmann  ' '  that  the  Government  of  the  Russian 
Republic  considers  it  necessary  to  conduct  the  further  ne- 
gotiations regarding  peace  on  neutral  territory  and  pro- 
poses on  its  part  to  transfer  the  negotiations  to  Stock- 
holm. ' '  Articles  I  and  II  of  the  German  draft  of  a  treaty 
were  declared  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with  the  principle 
of  the  self-determination  of  nations  insisted  upon  by  the 
Russian  Republic. 

On  the  same  day  Izvestia,  the  official  Soviet  organ,  de- 
nounced the  Germans  as  ' '  wolves  in  sheeps '  clothing. ' ' 


44  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

65  The  same  day  also  a  pamphlet  was  circulated  within  the 
German  lines  declaring  that  the  German  peace  conditions 
show  their  promises  of  a  democratic  peace  to  be  "uncon- 
scionable lies."  After  describing  the  actions  of  the  Ger- 
mans in  Poland  and  Lithuania  in  recruiting  forced  labor 
and  shooting  hunger  strikers,  the  pamphlet  continues: 
' '  The  German  Government  only  found  support  in  Courland 
from  the  hated  slave-ov/ners,  the  German  Barons,  who  have 
their  prototypes  in  the  Polish  landowners. ' '  The  pamphlet 
declares  that  Germany  desires  to  bring  the  peoples  on 
Eussia's  western  frontier  beyond  the  range  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  in  order  to  subjugate  them  with  German  cap- 
ital, impose  an  Austrian  monarchy  on  Poland,  and  make 
Lithuania  and  Courland  German  duchies.  It  concludes : 
"On  such  a  basis  the  Russian  Workmen's  Government  can 
never  enter  negotiations." 

66  On  this  day  also  the  Ambassador  of  the  United  States  at 
Petrograd,  David  R.  Francis,  issued  to  Colonel  Raymond 
Robins  of  the  Red  Cross  Mission,  the  following  ' '  Suggested 
Communication  to  the  Commissar  of  Foreign  Affairs ' ' : 

At  the  hour  the  Russian  people  shall  require  as- 
sistance from  the  United  States  to  repel  the  action  of 
Germany  and  her  allies  you  may  be  assured  that  I 
will  recommend  to  the  American  Government  that  it 
render  them  all  aid  and  assistance  within  its  power. 
if  upon  the  termination  of  the  present  armistice  Rus- 
sia fails  to  conclude  a  deiiiocratic  peace  through  the 
fault  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  is  compelled  to  con- 
tinue the  war,  I  shall  urge  upon  my  Government  the 
fullest  assistance  to  Russia  possible,  including  the  ship- 
ment of  supplies  and  munitions  for  the  Russian  armies, 
the  extension  of  credits,  the  giving  of  such  advice 
and  technical  assistance  as  may  be  welcome  to  the 
Russian  people  in  the  service  of  the  common  purpose 
to  obtain  through  the  defeat  of  the  German  autocracy 
the  effective  guarantee  of  a  lasting  and  democratic 
peace. 

I  am  not  authorized  to  speak  for  my  Government 
on  the  question  of  recognition,  but  that  is  a  question 
which  will  of  necessity  be  decided  by  actual  future 
events.  I  may  add,  however,  that  if  the  Russian 
armies  now  under  command  of  the  People's  Com- 
missars   commence    and   seriously    conduct   hostilities 


FIEST  INTERVAL  45 

against  the  forces  of  Germany  and  her  allies,  I  will 
recommend  to  my  Government  the  formal  recognition 
of  the  de  facto  Government  of  the  People's  Commis- 
sars. .  .  . 

"The  circumstances  of  the  preparation,  0.  K.-ing  and 
initialing  of  this  document,"  Colonel  Robins  stated  before 
the  U.  S.  Senate  Committee  on  March  10,  1919,  were  as 
follows : 

For  some  days  I  had  been  working  under  the  ver-  , 
bal  instructions  of  the  Ambassador  of  the  United 
States,  in  conferences  with  Lenin  and  Trotzky  and 
other  officers  of  the  Soviet  Government,  seeking  to 
prevent  the  signing  of  a  German  peace  at  Brest- 
Litovsk.  To  provide  against  the  possibility  of  error 
in  statement  and  subsequent  refutation  of  my  author- 
ization to  represent  the  Ambassador  in  the  manner 
indicated  by  his  verbal  instructions,  this  document 
was  prepared  by  me  and  submitted  to  him  as  a  cor- 
rect statement  of  his  verbal  instructions  to  me  and 
was  0.  K.'d  by  him. 

Document,  filed  as  "Robins  Document  No.  2,"  is 
an  actual  copy  of  an  original  in  my  possession,  the 
notations  on  this  document  being  in  the  handwriting 
of  the  American  Ambassador,  written  therein  in  my 
presence  in  his  private  office  in  the  American  Em- 
bassy at  Petrograd  on  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  Jan- 
uary, 1918. 

The  document  is  as  follows : 

(Note  in  lead  pencil  "To  Colonel  Robins:  This 
is  substance  of  cable  I  shall  send  to  Department  on 
being  advised  by  you  that  peace  negotiations  are  ter- 
minated and  Soviet  Government  decided  to  prosecute 
war  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. — D.  R. 
F.") 

'From  sources  which  I  regard  as  reliable  I  have 
received  information  to  the  effect  that  Bolshevist  lead- 
ers fear  complete  failure  of  peace  negotiations  because 
of  probable  demands  by  Germany  of  impossible  terms. 

'Desire  for  peace  is  so  fundamental  and  widespread 
that  it  is  impossible  to  foretell  the  results  of  the 
abrupt  termination  of  these  negotiations,  with  only 
alternatives  a  disgraceful  peace  or  continuance  of  war. 


46  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

'Bolshevist  leaders  will  welcome  information  as  to 
what  assistance  may  be  expected  from  our  Govern- 
ment if  continuance  of  war  is  decided  upon.  Assur- 
ances of  American  support  in  such  event  may  de- 
cidedly influence  their  decision. 

'Under  these  circumstances  and  notwithstanding 
previous  cables  I  have  considered  it  my  duty  to  instruct 
General  Judson  to  informally  communicate  to  the 
Bolshevist  leaders  the  assurance  that  in  case  the  pres- 
ent armistice  is  terminated  and  Russia  continues  the 
war  against  the  Central  Powers  I  will  recommend  to 
the  American  Government  that  it  render  all  aid  and 
assistance  possible.  I  have  also  told  Robins  of  Red 
Cross  to  continue  his  relations  with  Bolshevist  Govern- 
ment, which  are  necessary  for  the  present. 

'Present  situation  is  so  uncertain  and  liable  to  sud- 
den change  that  immediate  action  upon  my  own  re- 
sponsibility is  necessary,  otherwise  the  opportunity  for 
all  action  may  be  lost. 

'  Nothing  that  I  shall  do  will  in  any  event  give  formal 
recognition  to  the  Bolshevist  Government  until  I  have 
explicit  instructions,  but  the  necessity  for  informal 
intercourse  in  the  present  hour  is  so  vital  that  I  should 
be  remiss  if  I  failed  to  take  the  responsibility  of  ac- 
tion. ' 

This  document  was  prepared  by  me  and  submitted 
to  the  Ambassador  and  0.  K.'d  by  him,  for  the  same 
reasons  and  purposes  stated  in  the  circumstances  of 
Document  1. 

67  In  accordance  with  Petrograd  despatches,  this  attitude 
of  the  Russians  came  as  a  great  surprise  to  the  Germans. 
On  January  2,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  received  in  joint  audience 
Chancellor  von  Hertling,  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg, 
General  von  Ludendorff,  Finance  Minister  von  Roedern 
and  Foreign  Secretary  von  Kuehlmann.  Furthermore,  the- 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Bundesrath,  under  the 
presidency  of  Count  von  Dancl,  discussed  the  Russian 
situation  at  the  Chancellor's  palace.  Von  Hertling  had 
a  long  talk  also  with  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  former  Minister 
of  Marine;  and  Kaiser  Karl  of  Austria-Hungary  received 
in  audience  Professor  Kucharzevski,  the  Polish  Premier. 


FIRST  INTERVAL  47 

Von  Hertling  addressed  the  Main  Committee  of  the 
Reichstag  and  stated  that  the  German  Government  must 
return  a  negative  reply  to  the  Russian  proposal  to  transfer 
the  conference  to  Stockholm.  Further,  he  declared,  tliat 
von  Kuehlmann,  who  had  left  again  for  Brest-Litovsk,  had 
been  instructed  to  inform  the  Russian  Delegates  that  Ar- 
ticles I  and  II  of  the  draft  of  a  treaty  as  proposed  by 
the  Russians  could  not  be  accepted  by  Germany. 

The  Council  of  the  People's  Commissars  at  Petrograd 
tried  to  enter  into  fresh  negotiations  with  the  Ukrainian 
Rada,  sending  a  formal  document  signed  by  Gubunov,  Sec- 
retary, suggesting  pourparlers  at  Smolensk  or  Vitebsk; 
but  like  the  ultimatum  of  December  17  this  was  ignored. 

A  note  was  issued  at  Petrograd  giving  the  text  of  von 
Kuehlmann 's  answer  to  the  Russian  Peace  Delegation 
which  had  protested  against  the  refusal  of  passports  to 
German  Independent  Socialists  for  a  visit  to  Russia.  Von 
Kuehlmann  said  that  ''the  discussion  of  unofficial  ques- 
tions could  not  assist  in  achieving  a  treaty  of  peace  and 
j  a  suspension  of  hostilities.  The  attitude  of  the  German 
I  Government  could  not  be  interpreted  as  a  lack  of  desire  for 
universal  peace,  but  as  arising  out  of  a  desire  on  its  part 
to  avoid  pitfalls  which  might  arise  on  the  way  to  peace. ' ' 

January  5.     Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  British  Prime  Minis- 
ter, in  outlining  before  British  Labor  leaders  "the  char- 
acter and  purpose  of  our  war  aims  and  peace  conditions," 
!   said  as  to  Russia: 

j  I  will  not  attempt  to  deal  with  the  question  of  the 

[  Russian  territories  now  in  German  occupation.     The 

I  Russian  policy  since  the  Revolution  has  passed  so  rap- 

idly through  so  many  phases  that  it  is  difficult  to  speak 
without  some  suspension  of  judgment  as  to  what  the 
situation  will  be  when  the  final  terms  of  European 
peace  come  to  be  discussed.  .  .  .  The  present  rulers  of 
Russia  are  now  engaged  without  any  reference  to  the 
countries  whom  Russia  brought  into  the  war,  in  sep- 
arate negotiations  with  their  common  enemy.  I  am 
indulging  in  no  reproaches ;  I  am  merely  stating  facts 
with  a  view  to  making  it  clear  why  Britain  'cannot  be 
held  accountable  for  decisions  taken  in  her  absence, 
and  concerning  which  she  has  not  been  consulted  or 


48  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

her  aid  invoked.  No  one  who  knows  Prussia  and  her 
designs  upon  Kussia  can  for  a  moment  doubt  her  ulti- 
mate intention.  Whatever  phrases  she  may  use  to 
delude  Russia  she  does  not  mean  to  surrender  one  of 
the  fair  provinces  or  cities  of  Russia  now  occupied  by 
her  forces.  Under  one  name  or  another — and  the  name 
hardly  matters — these  Russian  provinces  will  hence- 
forth be  in  reality  part  of  the  dominions  of  Prussia. 
They  will  be  ruled  by  the  Prussian  sword  in  the  in- 
terests of  Prussian  autocracy,  and  the  rest  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Russia  will  be  partly  enticed  by  specious  phrases 
and  partly  bullied  by  the  threat  of  continued  war 
against  an  impotent  army  into  a  condition  of  complete 
economic  and  ultimate  political  enslavement  to  Ger- 
many. We  all  deplore  the  prospect.  The  democracy 
of  this  country  means  to  stand  to  the  last  by  the 
democracy  of  France  and  Italy  and  all  our  other 
Allies.  We  shall  be  proud  to  fight  to  the  end  side  by 
side  by  the  new  democracy  of  Russia,  so  will  America 
and  so  will  France  and  Italy.  But  if  the  present 
rulers  of  Russia  take  action  which  is  independent  of 
their  Allies,  we  have  no  means  of  intervening  to  arrest 
the  catastrophe  which  is  assuredly  befalling  their 
country.     Russia  can  be  saved  only  by  her  own  people. 

72  The  Delegations  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  circulated 
by  wireless  a  "mutual  decision,"  declaring  that  on  De- 
cember 25  they  had  outlined  "certain  guiding  principles 
for  the  conclusion  of  an  immediate  general  peace.  In 
order,  however,  to  avoid  any  one-sided  commitment  they 
expressly  made  the  validity  of  these  guiding  principles  an 
obligation  upon  all  powers  engaged  in  the  war  without 
exception.  .  .  .  The  Russian  Delegation  then  fixed  the  term 
of  ten  days  within  which  other  belligerents  should  .  _.  . 
decide  as  to  whether  they  would  join  in  peace  negotia- 
tions or  not.  The  Delegations  of  the  Allied  [Central] 
Powers  now  place  on  record  the  fact  that  the  ten  days' 
term  agreed  upon  lapsed  on  January  4,  and  that  no  dec- 
laration regarding  the  participation  in  these  peace  nego- 
tiations has  so  far  been  received  from  any  of  the  other 
belligerents. ' ' 

73  January  6.  The  French  Government  recognized  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Finnish  Republic. 


FIRST  INTERVAL  49 

Meanwhile  at  Petrograd  and  Odessa  joint  commissions 
were  meeting  to  consider  the  cessation  of  naval  warfare, 
conditions  in  the  Black  Sea,  the  future  of  the  Dardanelles, 
the  naval  position  in  the  White  Sea  and  on  the  Murman 
Coast.  The  head  of  the  German  Naval  Commission  was 
Baron  Kaiserling. 

Another  Russo-German  Commission  began  its  sessions  at  ^ 
Petrograd  on  December  31  to  consider  the  exchange  of 
prisoners  and  the  resumption  of  commercial  relations.  The 
head  of  the  German  Delegation  was  Count  Mirbach,  and 
the  head  of  the  Russian  Delegation  was  Radek,  who  at 
the  outset  declared  that  "a  successful  start  with  our  hu- 
manitarian work  will  be  made  infinitely  more  difficult"  be- 
cause of  information  that  German  Social  Democrats  and 
Independents  had  been  jailed  and  because  many  Russian 
citizens — Poles  and  Letts  among  them — "have  been  de- 
prived of  their  liberty  by  the  German  Government  for 
conducting  peace  propaganda."  Radek  declared  that  "the 
situation  in  regard  to  peace  conditions  created  by  the 
Germans  did  not  at  present  permit  the  discussion  of  eco- 
nomic relations  except  in  so  far  as  an  improvement  in  the 
condition  of  prisoners  of  war  was  concerned."  Accord- 
ingly but  three  committees  were  chosen  to  deal  respectively 
with  telegraphs,  posts  and  railways.  The  Russian  Dele- 
gation demanded  the  right  to  send  any  publications  they 
desired  to  prisoners  of  war  in  Germany  and  to  Socialists 
of  the  Central  Powers,  Considerable  difference  of  opinion 
seems  to  have  characterized  most  of  the  deliberations  of 
the  Commission. 


VII.     THE   SEPARATE  PEACE   NEGOTIATIONS- 
RUSSIA'S  STAND  FOR  NO  ANNEXATIONS 
AND  FOR  SELF-DETERMINATION 

75  January  7.  The  Russian  Delegation,  headed  now  by 
Trotzky,  reached  an  agreement  at  Brest-Litovsk  with  a 
Delegation  of  the  Ukrainian  Rada  who  had  stated  a  few 
days  before  that  "their  Government  is  preparing  to  con- 
duct their  own  international  relations.  They  declare  their 
wish  for  a  speedy  democratic  peace  and  say  they  hope 
to  be  able  to  act  together  with  the  Bolshevik  representa- 
tives at  the  peace  negotiations." 

76  January  8.  A  "preliminary  discussion"  took  place  be- 
tween the  Chairmen  of  the  various  Delegations,  Trotzky, 
von  Kuehlmann,  Czernin  and  Talaat  Pasha.  Trotzky, 
speaking  for  more  than  an  hour,  declared  that  he  had  not 
eome  as  the  representative  of  a  defeated  nation.  He  was 
there  to  act  as  a  true  revolutionary. 

"We  shall  contend  for  a  free,  independent  Russia  and 
for  the  future  of  the  great  masses  of  the  workers.  .  .  . 
The  working  democracies  of  the  Central  Powers  .  .  . 
will  not  suffer  Young  Russia  to  be  wiped  off  the  face 
of  the  earth  and  enslaved  by  conquering  imperialists. 

He  insisted  upon  a  transfer  of  the  negotiations  to  Stock- 
holm. Questions  of  procedure  were  also  discussed.  After 
a  half  hour's  pause  for  deliberation,  the  Germans  declared 
their  willingness  to  go  on  with  the  negotiations. 

77  President  Wilson  addressed  Congress  and  made  the  pro- 
ceedings at  Brest-Litovsk  the  occasion  for  outlining 
his  own  "program  of  the  world's  peace  .  .  .  the  only  pos- 
sible program,"  based  upon  his  fourteen  points: 

Gentlemen  of  the  Congress: 

Once  more,  as  repeatedly  before,  the  spokesmen  of 
the  Central  Empires  have  indicated  their  desire  to  dis- 
cuss the  objects  of  the  war  and  the  possible  basis  of  a 
general  peace.     Parleys  have  been  in  progress  at  Brest- 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  51 

Litovsk  between  Eussian  representatives  and  represen- 
tatives of  the  Central  Powers,  to  which  the  attention 
of  all  the  belligerents  has  been  invited,  for  the  purpose 
of  ascertaining  whether  it  may  be  possible  to  extend 
these  parleys  into  a  general  conference  with  regard  to 
terms  of  peace  and  settlement.  The  Russian  represen- 
tatives presented  not  only  a  perfectly  definite  statement 
of  the  principles  upon  which  they  would  be  willing  to 
conclude  peace,  but  also  an  equally  definite  program 
for  the  concrete  application  of  those  principles.  The 
representatives  of  the  Central  Powers,  on  their  part, 
presented  an  outline  of  settlement  which,  if  much  less 
definite,  seemed  susceptible  of  liberal  interpretation 
until  their  specific  program  of  practical  terms  was 
added.  That  program  proposed  no  concessions  at  all, 
either  to  the  sovereignty  of  Russia  or  to  the  preferences 
of  the  population  with  whose  fortunes  it  dealt,  but 
meant,  in  a  word,  that  the  Central  Empires  were  to 
keep  every  foot  of  territory  their  armed  forces  had 
occupied — every  province,  every  city,  every  point  of 
vantage — as  a  permanent  addition  to  their  territories 
and  their  power.  It  is  a  reasonable  conjecture  that  the 
general  principles  of  settlement  which  they  at  first 
suggested  originated  with  the  more  liberal  statesmen 
of  Germany  and  Austria,  the  men  who  have  begun  to 
feel  the  force  of  their  own  peoples'  thought  and  pur- 
pose, while  the  concrete  terms  of  actual  settlement  came 
from  the  military  leaders  who  have  no  thought  but  to 
keep  what  they  have  got.  The  negotiations  have  been 
broken  off.  The  Russian  representatives  were  sincere 
and  in  earnest.  They  cannot  entertain  such  proposals 
of  conquest  and  domination. 

The  whole  incident  is  full  of  significance.  It  is  also 
full  of  perplexity.  With  whom  are  the  Russian  rep- 
resentatives dealing?  For  whom  are  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Central  Empires  speaking?  Are  they 
speaking  for  the  majorities  of  their  respective  Parlia- 
ments or  for  the  minority  parties,  that  military  and 
imperialistic  minority  which  has  so  far  dominated  their 
whole  policy  and  controlled  the  affairs  of  Turkey  and 


NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

of  the  Balkan  States,  which  have  felt  obliged  to  become 
their  associates  in  this  war?  The  Russian  representa- 
tives have  insisted,  very  justly,  very  wisely,  and  in  the 
true  spirit  of  modern  democracy,  that  the  conferences 
they  have  been  holding  with  the  Teutonic  and  Turkish 
statesmen  should  be  held  with  open,  not  closed,  doors, 
and  all  the  world  has  been  audience,  as  was  desired. 
To  whom  have  we  been  listening,  then  ?  To  those  who 
speak  the  spirit  and  intention  of  the  resolutions  of  the 
German  Reichstag  of  the  9th  of  July  last,  the  spirit 
and  intention  of  the  liberal  leaders  and  parties  of  Ger- 
many, or  to  those  who  resist  and  defy  that  spirit  and 
intention  and  insist  upon  conquest  and  subjugation? 
Or  are  we  listening,  in  fact,  to  both,  unreconciled  and 
in  open  and  hopeless  contradiction?  These  are  very 
serious  and  pregnant  questions.  Upon  the  answer  to 
them  depends  the  peace  of  the  world. 

But  whatever  the  results  of  the  parleys  at  Brest- 
Litovsk,  whatever  the  confusions  of  counsel  and  of  pur- 
pose in  the  utterances  of  the  spokesmen  of  the  Central 
Empires,  they  have  again  attempted  to  acquaint  the 
world  with  their  objects  in  the  war  and  have  again 
challenged  their  adversaries  to  say  what  their  objects 
are  and  what  sort  of  settlement  they  would  deem  just 
and  satisfactory.  There  is  no  good  reason  why  that 
challenge  should  not  be  responded  to,  and  responded 
to  with  the  utmost  candor.  We  did  not  wait  for  it. 
Not  once,  but  again  and  again  we  have  laid  our  whole 
thought  and  purpose  before  the  world,  not  in  general 
terms  only,  but  each  time  with  sufficient  definition  to 
make  it  clear  what  sort  of  definite  terms  of  settlement 
must  necessarily  spring  out  of  them.  Within  the  last 
week  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  spoken  with  admirable 
candor  and  in  admirable  spirit  for  the  people  and  Gov- 
ernment of  Great  Britain.  There  is  no  confusion  of 
counsel  among  the  adversaries  of  the  Central  Powers, 
no  uncertainty  of  principle,  no  vagueness  of  detail. 
The  only  secrecy  of  counsel,  the  only  lack  of  fearless 
frankness,  the  only  failure  to  make  definite  statement 
of  the  objects  of  the  war,  lies  with  Germany  and  her 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  53 

allies.  The  issues  of  life  and  death  hang  upon  these 
definitions.  No  statesman  who  has  the  least  concep- 
tion of  his  responsibility  ought  for  a  moment  to  per- 
mit himself  to  continue  this  tragical  and  appalling  out- 
pouring of  blood  and  treasure  unless  he  is  sure  beyond 
a  peradventure  that  the  objects  of  the  vital  sacrifice 
are  part  and  parcel  of  the  very  life  of  society  and  that 
the  people  for  whom  he  speaks  think  them  right  and 
imperative  as  he  does. 

There  is,  moreover,  a  voice  calling  for  the  definitions 
of  principle  and  of  purpose  which  is,  it  seems  to  me, 
more  thrilling  and  more  compelling  than  any  of  the 
many  moving  voices  with  which  the  troubled  air  of  the 
world  is  filled.  It  is  the  voice  of  the  Russian  people. 
They  are  prostrate  and  all  but  helpless,  it  would  seem, 
before  the  grim  power  of  Germany,  which  has  hitherto 
known  no  relenting  and  no  pity.  Their  power  appar- 
ently is  shattered.  And  yet  their  soul  is  not  subser- 
vient. They  will  not  yield  either  in  principle  or  in 
action.  Their  conception  of  what  is  right,  of  what  is 
humane  and  honorable  for  them  to  accept,  has  been 
stated  with  a  frankness,  a  largeness  of  view,  a  gener- 
osity of  spirit,  and  a  universal  human  sympathy  which 
must  challenge  the  admiration  of  every  friend  of  man- 
kind ;  and  they  have  refused  to  compound  their  ideals 
or  desert  others  that  they  themselves  may  be  safe. 
They  call  to  us  to  say  what  it  is  that  we  desire,  in 
what,  if  in  anything,  our  purpose  and  our  spirit  differ 
from  theirs ;  and  I  believe  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  wish  me  to  respond  with  utter  simplicity 
and  frankness.  Whether  their  present  leaders  believe 
it  or  not,  it  is  our  heartfelt  desire  and  hope  that  some 
way  be  opened  whereby  we  may  be  privileged  to  assist 
the  people  of  Russia  to  attain  their  utmost  hope  of  lib- 
erty and  ordered  peace. 

It  will  be  our  wish  and  purpose  that  the  processes  of 
peace,  when  they  are  begun,  shall  be  absolutely  open, 
and  that  they  shall  involve  and  permit  henceforth  no 


54  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

secret  understandings  of  any  kind.  The  day  of  eon- 
quest  and  aggrandizement  is  gone  by ;  so  is  also  the  day 
of  secret  covenants  entered  into  in  the  interest  of  par- 
ticular Governments  and  likely  at  some  unlooked-for 
moment  to  upset  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  this 
happy  fact,  now  clear  to  the  view  of  every  public  man 
whose  thoughts  do  not  still  linger  in  an  age  that  is 
dead  and  gone,  which  makes  it  possible  for  every  nation 
whose  purposes  are  consistent  with  justice  and  the 
peace  of  the  world  to  avow  now  or  at  any  other  time 
the  objects  it  has  in  view. 

"We  entered  this  war  because  violations  of  right  had 
occurred  which  touched  us  to  the  quick  and  made  the 
life  of  our  own  people  impossible  unless  they  were  cor- 
rected and  the  world  secured  once  for  all  against  their 
recurrence.  What  we  demand  in  this  war,  therefore, 
is  nothing  peculiar  to  ourselves.  It  is  that  the  world 
be  made  fit  and  safe  to  live  in;  and  particularly  that 
it  be  made  safe  for  every  peace-loving  nation  which, 
like  our  own,  wishes  to  live  its  own  life,  determine  its 
own  institutions,  be  assured  of  justice  and  fair  deal- 
ings by  the  other  peoples  of  the  world,  as  against  force 
and  selfish  aggression.  All  the  peoples  of  the  world 
are  in  effect  partners  in  this  interest  and  for  our  own 
part  we  see  very  clearly  that  unless  justice  be  done  to 
others  it  will  not  be  done  to  us. 

The  program  of  the  world's  peace,  therefore,  is  our 
program,  and  that  program,  the  only  possible  program, 
as  we  see  it,  is  this : 

1.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after 
which  there  shall  be  no  private  international  under- 
standings of  any  kind,  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed 
always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view.  .  .  . 

6.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such 
a  settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will 
secure  the  best  and  freest  co-operation  of  the  other 
nations  of  the  world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unham- 
pered and  unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the  inde- 
pendent determination  of  her  own  political  develop- 
ment and  national  policy,  and  assure  her  of  a  sincere 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  55 

welcome  into  the  society  of  free  nations  under  institu- 
tions of  her  own  choosing ;  and,  more  than  a  welcome, 
assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she  may  need  and 
may  herself  desire.  The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by 
her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the 
acid  test  of  their  good-will,  of  their  comprehension  of 
her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their  own  interests, 
and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy.  .  .  . 

January  9.  The  plenary  session  of  the  Delegations  at 
Brest-Litovsk  that  had  been  adjourned  from  December  25 
was  opened  by  Talaat  Pasha,  who  gave  over  the  chairman- 
ship to  von  Kuehlmann,  The  Ukrainian  representatives 
also  participated.  Among  the  Russians  were  Trotzky,  \^/ 
Mme.  Bizenko,  Joffe,  Kamenev,  Petrovsky  and  three  coun- 
sellors. 

Von  Kuehlmann  made  an  extended  statement.  He  first 
gave  a  review  of  the  negotiations  from  the  original  Russian 
offer  of  peace  on  November  22,  1917,  up  to  the  wireless  dec- 
laration of  the  Central  Powers  on  January  5  that  no  answer 
had  been  received  from  any  of  the  Entente  belligerents 
concerning  participation  in  the  peace  negotiations.  He 
added : 

Their  non-participation  in  those  conditions  has  the 
result,  in  keeping  with  the  contents  of  the  declaration 
and  the  expiration  of  the  period  fixed,  that  the  docu- 
ment (of  December  25)  has  become  void. 

As  to  the  transfer  of  negotiations  to  Stockliolm  or  some 
other  neutral  country  he 

would  like  to  express  at  once  the  determined  and  unal- 
terable decision  of  the  four  Allied  [Central]  Powers 
that  they  are  not  in  a  position  to  continue  in  any  other 
place  the  negotiations  for  a  preliminary  peace  which 
have  been  commenced  here.  .  .  .  They  were,  out  of 
courtesy,  quite  willing  to  undertake  the  formal  final 
negotiations  and  the  signature  of  the  preliminaries  at 
a  place  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  Russian  Delegation 
and  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  regarding  the  selection 
of  this  place. 

Moreover,  in  the  interval  between  negotiations,  much  had 
happened,  "to  cause  doubt  as  to  the  candid  intentions  of 
the  Russian  Government  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  of  a 


56  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

rapid  peace  with  the  Powers  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance." 
He  referred  here  to  the  Petrograd  Telegraph  Agency  re- 
port— "invented  in  every  particular" — of  the  reply  of 
Chairman  Joffe  in  the  sitting  of  December  28.  Never- 
theless 

in  so  far  as  a  conclusion  may  be  drawn  from  the  nego- 
tiations which  preceded  the  interval  in  our  labors,  I 
do  not  think  the  difficulties  of  a  material  nature  are 
so  great  as  to  justify  the  wrecking  of  our  peace  efforts 
and  therewith  presumably  the  recommencement  of  war 
in  the  East  with  its  incalculable  consequences. 
Czernin  then  said  that  the  reasons  for  the  refusal  to 
transfer  negotiations  at  the  present  time  were  of  a  two- 
fold nature.  First,  both  parties  have  direct  wires  and 
a  daily  exchange  of  views  takes  place  by  you  with  Pet- 
rograd and  Kiev  and  by  us  with  our  official  centers. 
.  .  .  Even  more  important  is  the  second  point.  You, 
gentlemen,  had  sent  us  an  invitation  for  general  peace 
negotiations.  We  have  accepted  it  and  we  have  come 
to  an  agreement  regarding  the  basis  for  a  general 
peace.  On  this  basis  you  have  put  to  your  Allies  a 
ten  days'  ultimatum.  Your  Allies  have  not  answered 
you,  and  today  it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  negotia- 
tions for  bringing  about  a  general  peace,  but  rather  of 
a  separate  peace  between  Russia  and  the  Quadruple 
Alliance.  The  transfer  of  negotiations  to  a  neutral 
country  would  give  .  .  .  the  longed-for  opportunity 
...  to  the  Governments  of  France  and  England,  be- 
fore as  well  as  behind  the  scenes,  to  do  everything  pos- 
sible to  prevent  the  realization  of  this  separate  peace. 
We  refuse  to  give  the  Western  Powers  this  opportu- 
nity. But  we  are  prepared  to  undertake  the  official 
final  negotiations  and  the  signature  of  the  peace  treaty 
at  a  place  yet  to  be^determined.  As  regards  the  terri- 
torial part  of  the  negotiations,  in  which  no  agreement 
has  as  yet  been  arrived  at  .  .  .  all  four  Allies  [Cen- 
tral] are  completely  agreed  to  conduct  the  negotiations 
to  the  end  upon  the  basis  explained  by  Dr.  von  Kuehl- 
mann  and  myself  and  agreed  upon  with  the  Russians. 
If  the  Russian  Delegation  is  not  animated  by  the  same 
intentions  .  .  .  responsibility  for  war  will  fall  exclu- 
sively on  the  Russian  Delegation. 
Talaat  Pasha  for  Turkey  and  Minister  of  Justice  Popov 
for  Bulgaria  associated  themselves  with  these  remarks. 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  57 

Thereupon  General  Hoffmann  of  the  German  Delegation 
made  the  following  declaration: 

There  are  lying  before  me  a  number  of  wireless  mes- 
sages and  appeals  signed  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Russian  Government  and  by  the  Russian  main  army 
administration,   which    are   partly   abuse   of   German 
army  institutions  and  partly  appeals  of  a  revolutionary 
character  to  our  troops.     These  wireless  messages  and 
appeals  without   doubt  transgress   the  spirit  of   the 
armistice  concluded  between  the  two  armies.     In  the 
name  of  the  German  army  administration  I  protest 
most  emphatically  against  the  form  and  contents  of 
these  wireless  messages  and  appeals. 
Field  Marshal  von  Cziezericz,  Colonel  Ganchev  and  Gen- 
eral Izzet  Pasha  joined  in  this  protest  in  the  name  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian,  the  Bulgarian  and  the  Ottoman  army 
administrations. 

Upon  motion  of  Trotzky  the  sitting  was  then  adjourned 
until  the  next  day. 

Announcement  was  made  in  Paris  of  the  appointment  of 
General  Tabouille,  Chief  of  the  French  Military  Mission  to 
the  Southwestern  front,  as  Representative  of  France  to  the 
Ukrainian  Republic.  It  was  also  reported  that  the  French 
Government  had  made  a  loan  to  the  Ukrainian  Government, 
some  reports  placing  the  figure  at  180,000,000  francs.  The 
French  mint  was  also  reported  to  have  printed  a  large 
quantity  of  Ukrainian  paper  money.  General  Vinne- 
chenko,  President  of  the  Ukrainian  Secretariat,  in  the 
course  of  a  long  report  to  the  Rada,  is  said  to  have  declared 
that  France,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  Belgium  and 
Roumania  were  interested  greatly  in  the  organization  of  the 
Ukrainian  Republic.     He  added: 

As  circumspect  people  they  hesitate  to  recognize  the 
Republic  completely.  But  when  they  find  it  expe- 
dient they  will  extend  us  their  hands  which  we  will 
accept  if  we  think  it  necessary.  .  .  . 

One  constantly  hears  that  the  regeneration  of  the 
Moscovite    monarchy     is     impossible.       Perhaps    the 
Ukraine,  therefore,  will  appear  as  an  oasis  of  revolu- 
tionary achievement. 
As  an  indication  of  the  hopes  placed  upon  the  Ukrainians 
at  this  period  in  Allied  countries,  it  may  not  be  out  of 


58  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

place  to  refer  to  an  editorial  in  the  New  York  Times  of 
January  4,  headed,  ' '  The  Ukrainians  to  the  Rescue. ' ' 

The  Ukrainians,  not  the  Bolsheviki,  have  saved  Rus- 
sia for  the  time  being  from  the  calamity  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany.  .  .  .  The  intervention  of  the 
Ukrainians  put  a  stop  to  the  infamous  proceedings  and 
for  the  moment  there  is  some  hope  that  separate  peace 
negotiations  will  not  be  resumed  on  the  original  Bol- 
shevist basis.  .  .  . 

80  January  10.  The  sitting  was  begun  by  a  statement  from 
Trotzky.  Answering  von  Kuehlmann,  he  declared  that  the 
report  of  the  sitting  of  December  28  as  published  by  the 
semi-ofScial  German  Wolff  Bureau  wa^'accurate  and  that 
the  Russian  Delegation  was  ignorant  of  any  real  or  ficti- 
tious telegrams  of  the  Petrograd  Agency.  Answering 
General  Hoffmann's  protest  against  Russian  wireless  ap- 
peals of  a  revolutionary  character  to  the  German  troops, 
he  stated  that  neither  the  conditions  of  the  armistice  nor 
the  character  of  the  peace  negotiations  limited  freedom 
of  press  or  speech. 

He  then  reaffirmed  Russia's  refusal  to  accept  the  Ger- 
man view  of  self-determination  for  the  people  of  occupied 
territories, 

by  which  the  will  of  the  people  was  in  reality  replaced 
by  the  will  of  a  privileged  group  acting  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  authorities  administering  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories. .  .  .  We  confirm  .  .  .  our  former  resolution 
...  to  continue  the  peace  negotiations  regardless  of 
the  adhesion  or  otherwise  of  the  Entente  Governments 
therein.  Taking  cognisance  -of  the  declaration  of  the 
Quadruple  [Central]  Powers  that  the  bases  for  a  gen- 
eral peace  as  formulated  on  December  25  have  become 
null  and  void — the  Entente  Powers  not  having  ad- 
hered thereto  in  the  course  of  the  ten  days'  suspension 
of  negotiations — we  now  declare  for  our  part  that  with- 
out taking  into  account  any  delays  whatever,  we  shall 
continue  to  defend  the  principles  of  a  democratic 
peace  as  proclaimed  by  us. 

As  to  the  transfer  of  the  Conference  to  a  neutral  country 
he  explained  that  by  this  proposal  they  sought  to  place 
both  sides  in  analogous  positions. 

We  share  the  view  of  the  President  of  the  German 
Delegation  that  the  atmosphere  in  which  the  negotia- 


SEP  ABATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS         5» 

tions  are  conducted  is  of  the  greatest  importance. 
.  .  .  For  the  Russian  Delegation  to  stay  in  the  fort- 
ress of  Brest-Litovsk  at  the  headquarters  of  the  enemy- 
armies  under  the  control  of  the  German  authorities 
creates  all  the  disadvantages  of  an  artificial  isolation 
in  no  way  compensated  for  by  the  enjoyment  of  a 
direct  telegraph  wire.  This  isolation  ...  is  at  the 
same  time  causing  alarm  and  uneasiness  to  the  public 
opinion  of  our  country.  .  .  .  All  these  considerations 
acquired  the  more  importance  as,  precisely  during  the 
recent  sittings,  there  had  arisen  profound  divergences 
of  view  on  the  subject  of  the  political  future  of  the 
Polish,  Lithuanian,  Lettish  and  other  peoples.  There- 
fore we  consider  it  very  undesirable  to  continue  these 
labors  in  conditions  which  might  justify  the  allegation 
that  we  are  taking  part  in  the  settlement  of  the  future 
of  existing  peoples  isolated  from  all  sources  of  infor- 
mation regarding  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  and 
without  any  guarantee  that  our  opinions  and  declara- 
tions reach  the  peoples  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

Replying  to  the  fears  of  Count  Czernin  concerning  pos- 
sible intrigues  of  Entente  agents  in  a  neutral  country,  the 
Russian  Delegation  pointed  out  that  the  Russian  revolu- 
tionary power  had  sufficiently  shown  its  independence  in 
regard  to  diplomatic  intrigues  tending  to  the  oppression 
of  the  laboring  masses. 

"VYe  replied  and  we  continue  to  reply  by  severe  re- 
pression to  all  counter-revolutionary  manoeuvres  and 
intrigues  of  the  Allied  diplomatic  agents  in  Russia, 
seeking  to  render  abortive  the  cause  of  peace.  We  do 
not  believe  that  Allied  diplomacy  can  operate  on  neu- 
tral territory  with  greater  success  than  at  Petrograd. 
The  sincerity  of  our  aspirations  for  peace  is  sufficiently 
proved  by  our  attitude  in  regard  to  the  right  of  free 
development  for  Finland,  Armenia  and  the  Ukraine. 
The  opposing  side  has,  therefore,  only  to  show  an  anal- 
ogous attitude  to  the  regions  occupied  by  it.  We  can- 
not pass  over  in  silence  the  argument  advanced  yes- 
terday by  the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire, 
namely,  his  statement  with  regard  to  the  powerful  po- 
sition {Maclitstellung)  of  Germany.  The  Russian  Del- 
egation cannot  deny  that  its  country,  owing  to  the 
policy  of  the  classes  until  recently  in  power,  has  been 


60  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

weakened.  But  the  position  of  a  country  in  the  world 
is  determined  not  only  by  its  present  status,  by  its 
technical  apparatus,  but  by  its  internal  resources 
which,  once  recalled  to  life,  manifest  their  power 
sooner  or  later.  Our  Government  has  placed  at  the 
head  of  its  program  the  word  "Peace,"  but  it  has  en- 
gaged itself  at  the  same  time  before  its  people  to  sign 
only  a  democratic  and  just  peace. 

The  Russian  Delegation  then  spoke  of  the  sympathies  of 
the  Russian  people  for  the  working  people  of  Germany  and 
her  Allies,  and  showed  that  years  of  war  had  not  hardened 
the  hearts  of  the  Russian  soldiers  who,  moved  by  the  senti- 
ment of  fraternity,  had  stretched  out  their  hands  to  the 
peoples  on  the  other  side  of  the  trenches.  The  refusal  of 
the  Delegations  of  the  Central  Powers  to  transfer  the  Con- 
ference to  a  neutral  country  is  only  explicable  by  the  de- 
sire of  their  Governments  and  their  powerful  annexation- 
ists for  a  peace,  based  not  on  principles  tending  to  the  rec- 
onciliation of  all  nations,  but  on  the  war  map.  But  war 
maps  disappear  while  peoples  remain. 

An  ultimatum  was  delivered  to  us — pourparlers  at 
Brest-Litovsk  or  no  pourparlers.  This  ultimatum  is  a 
proof  that  the  elements  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance 
which  pursue  a  policy  of  annexation,  regard  as  more 
favorable  to  that  policy  a  rupture  of  pourparlers  on 
technical  grounds  than  a  settlement  of  the  political 
future  of  Poland,  Lithuania,  Courland  and  Armenia. 
A  rupture  of  pourparlers  on  technical  grounds  would 
make  it  more  difficult  for  the  working  masses  of  Ger- 
many and  her  Allies  to  understand  the  causes  of  the 
dispute,  and  would  facilitate  the  efforts  of  the  semi- 
official annexationist  agitators  who  are  seeking  to  make 
the  German  people  believe  that  behind  the  open  and 
frank  policy  of  Russia  is  to  be  found  a  British  or  other 
stage  manager.  In  view  of  these  considerations,  we 
think  it  necessary  to  declare  that  we  accept  the  ulti- 
matum handed  to  us.  We  remain,  therefore,  here  at 
Brest-Litovsk,  so  that  the  slightest  possibility  of  peace 
may  not  be  left  unexliausted.  Notwithstanding  the 
extraordinary  attitude  of  the  Delegates  of  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance,  we  think  it  our  duty  to  the  peoples  and 
armies  of  all  countries,  to  make  a  fresh  effort  to  estab- 
lish clearly  and  distinctly  here  at  the  Headquarters 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  61 

of  the  Eastern  front,  whether  immediate  peace  with 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  is  possible  without  violence  to 
the  Poles,  Lithuanians,  Letts,  Esthonians,  Armenians 
and  other  nationalities  to  whom  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion, as  far  as  it  is  concerned,  assures  the  full  right  to 
free  development  without  reservation,  without  restric- 
tion, without  arriere  pensee. 
The  Ukrainian  delegate,  Holubovich,  then  announced  that 
the  Ukrainian  Republic,  having  resumed  its  international 
existence,  which  it  lost  250  years  ago,  had  decided  to  adopt 
an  independent  attitude  towards  the  negotiations  and  that 
the  General  Secretariat  had  instructed  him  to  hand  the  fol- 
lowing note  to  the  Powers  represented  at  the  Conference: 
The  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  brings  the  follow- 
ing to  the  knowledge  of  all  belligerents  and  neutral 
States :  The  Central  Rada  on  November  20  proclaimed 
a  People's  Republic,  and  by  this  act  an  international 
status  was  determined.     Striving  for  the  creation  of 
a  Confederation  of  all  the  Republics  which  have  arisen 
in  the  territory  of  the  former  Russian  Empire,  the 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  through  its  General  Sec- 
retariat, proceeds  to  enter  into  independent  relations, 
pending  the  formation  of  a  Federal  Government  in 
Russia  and  until  the  relations  of  the  Ukraine  with  the 
future  Federation  are  established. 
Von  Kuehlmann,  with  the  assent  of  the  meeting,  declared 
that  the  question  of  separate  representation  for  the  Ukraine 
would  first  be  discussed  at  private  conferences  between  the 
Delegations  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  on  the  one 
hand,  and  of  Russia  on  the  other,  and  that  further  consid- 
eration would  be  reserved  for  a  plenary  sitting  of  all  the 
Delegations. 

It  was  then  agreed  by  the  Delegates  of  Russia,  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  to  form  a  Committee  to  discuss  polit- 
ical and  territorial  questions,  as  also  a  second  Committee 
of  experts  for  the  preliminary  discussion  of  economic  and 
legal  questions. 

A  meeting  of  the  Committee  on  Political  and  Territorial 
Questions  was  forthwith  held.  The  Ukrainian  question 
was  taken  up.  Holubovitch  elaborated  the  Ukrainian  peace 
policy,  and  presented  a  Note  containing  nine  clauses : 

The  General  Secretariat  declares  in  the  name  of  the 
Ukrainian  People 's  Republic  as  follows : 


62  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

1.  The  whole  of  the  democracy  of  the  Ukrainian  State 
strives  for  the  termination  of  the  war  in  the  whole 
world,  for  peace  between  all  nations  at  present  at  war, 
a  general  peace. 

2.  The  peace  to  be  concluded  between  all  the  Powers  must 
be  democratic,  and  must  guarantee  to  every  nationality 
or  people,  even  the  very  smallest  nation  of  any  State, 
the  complete,  unlimited  right  of  national  self-determi- 
nation. 

3.  In  order  to  render  possible  a  real  expression  of  will  on 
the  part  of  the  peoples,  corresponding  guarantees  must 
be  created. 

4.  Accordingly,  annexation  of  any  kind,  that  is  to  say, 
any  forcible  annexation  or  cession  of  any  part  of  a 
country  whatever  without  the  agreement  of  its  popula- 
tion, is  inadmissible. 

5.  Equally  inadmissible,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  inter- 
ests of  the  working  classes,  is  any  war  indemnity  of  any 
kind,  no  matter  what  form  may  be  given  to  such  in- 
demnity. 

6.  Small  nations  and  states  which  have  suffered  consid- 
erable damage  or  ravages  owing  to  the  war  must  be 
given  material  assistance  in  accordance  with  rules  which 
will  have  to  be  worked  out  during  the  Peace  Congresses. 

7.  The  Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  which  at  the  present 
moment  is  holding  the  Ukrainian  front  on  its  territory, 
and  which  is  appearing  independently  in  international 
affairs,  through  its  Government,  charged  with  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Ukrainian  national  interests,  must,  like 
the  other  Powers,  be  enabled  to  participate  in  all  peace 
negotiations,  Conferences,  and  Congresses. 

8.  The  power  of  the  Council  of  the  National  Commissars 
does  not  extend  over  the  whole  of  Russia,  and  does  not 
apply  to  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic.  Therefore 
the  peace,  which  may  eventually  result  from  the  nego- 
tiations with  the  Powers  waging  war  against  Russia, 
can  only  then  be  binding  for  Ukrainia  when  the  con- 
ditions of  such  a  peace  are  accepted  and  signed  by  the 
Government  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic. 

9.  In  the  name  of  the  whole  of  Russia  only  such  a  Govern- 
ment (and  indeed  exclusively  a  Federal  Government) 
can  conclude  peace,  which  has  been  recognized  by  all 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  63 

the  Republics  and  organized  States  of  Russia.  If,  how- 
ever, it  should  not  be  possible  to  form  such  a  Govern- 
ment in  the  near  future,  such  a  peace  can  only  be  con- 
cluded by  the  united  representatives  of  these  Republics 
and  territories. 

Strictly  adhering  to  the  principle  of  a  democratic 
peace,  the  General  Secretariat  strives  at  the  same  time 
for  the  quickest  possible  realization  of  this  general 
peace,  and  attaches  the  greatest  importance  to  all  at- 
tempts which  may  bring  its  realization  nearer.     The 
General   Secretariat   therefore   considers  it  necessary 
to  maintain  representation  at  the  Conference  in  Brest- 
Litovsk,  hoping  at  the  same  time  that  the  final  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  of  peace  will  be  found  at  an  Inter- 
national  Congress,  to  the  preparation  of  which  the 
Government  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  in- 
vites all  belligerents. 
Von  Kuehlmann  proposed  that  the  Ukrainian  Note  be 
placed  on  the  records  of  the  Conference  as  "an  important 
historical  document."    He  added  that  the  Allies  [Central] 
welcomed  the  Ukrainian  representatives,  but  reserved  their 
attitude  toward  their  proposals.     He  then  asked  the  Chair- 
man of  the  Russian  Delegation  whether  his  Delegation  in- 
tended in  the  future  to  represent  the  affairs  of  all  Russia. 
Trotzky  replied  that  his  Delegation  was  in  full  accord 
with  the  fundamental  recognition  of  the  right  of  self-deter- 
mination for  every  nation,  even  to  complete  severance,  and 
he  saw  no  obstacle  to  the  participation  of  the  Ukrainian 
Delegation  in  the  negotiations  acting  as  an  independent 
body  which  had  been  recognized  by  the  Russian  Delegation. 

A  number  of  "peace  riots"  took  place  in  Germany.  On 
that  day  the  Independent  Socialist  group  in  the  Reichstag 
issued  a  manifesto  of  protest  and  appeal  to  the  working 
class : 

.  .  .  We  have  reached  a  turning  point  in  history. 
The  war  aims  of  tlie  Government  have  been  openly  laid 
down  at  Brest-Litovsk,  "We  were  assured  over  and 
over  again  in  the  past  that  the  German  Government 
wanted  only  to  protect  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire  and 
that  it  did  not  intend  to  make  annexations.  No  think- 
ing person  can  believe  this  assertion  any  longer. 

Germany  wants  the  annexation  of  Russian  territory. 
...  If  Germany  should  have  success  in  making  a  peace 


64  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

of  conquests  against  the  Eussian  people,  it  would  be  a 
misfortune  for  Russia,  the  Poles,  Lithuanians  and 
Letts.  But  it  would  be  an  even  greater  misfortune  for 
us  ourselves.  The  result  would  be  a  postponement  of 
general  peace,  new  threats  and  a  desire  for  revenge, 
increased  armaments  and  intensified  reaction  in  our 
land.     This  calamity  must  be  prevented. 

The  manifesto  then  goes  on  to  describe  the  almost  insu- 
perable difficulties  in  the  way  of  those  who  desire  to  advo- 
cate a  democratic  peace.  Peace  meetings  are  suppressed, 
many  persons  are  kept  from  speaking  and  many  are  thrown 
into  prison,  or  placed  under  military  control.  Factories 
are  being  militarized,  houses  searched,  and  severe  punish- 
ments meted  out  by  administrative  order  on  the  part  of 
the  police  and  judiciary.  On  the  other  hand,  the  annexa- 
tionist parties  are  given  every  right  and  privilege  to  advo- 
cate their  Machtpolitik.  One  of  these  political  parties  is 
about  to  get  up  ''storm-petitions"  on  behalf  of  their  an- 
nexationist program. 

If  the  workers  now  neglect  to  emphasize  their  posi- 
tion, that  will  most  likely  be  regarded  as  approval  of 
this  agitation.  Or,  as  though  the  masses  of  the  Ger- 
man people  were  not  yet  weary  of  this  terrible  war. 
Or,  that  they  are  ready  to  give  their  support  to  a  con- 
tinuation of  this  horrible  struggle  upon  an  even  vaster 
scale.  In  reality  the  masses  of  the  people  think  and 
feel  quite  differently.  .  .  . 

Men  and  women  of  the  working  class!  No  time  is 
to  be  lost.  After  all  the  horrors  and  sufferings  of  the 
past  there  is  threatening  a  new  and  more  horrible  ca- 
lamity for  our  people  and  all  mankind.  Only  a  peace 
without  annexations  and  indemnities  and  upon  the 
basis  of  the  self-determination  of  peoples  can  save  us. 
It  is  now  time  to  lift  your  voices  for  such  a  peace. 
Now  you  must  speak. 

83     January  11.     Commander-in-Chief  Krylenko  issued  a  re- 
cruiting appeal  on  behalf  of  the  People's  Revolutionary 
Guard.    After  declaring  that  peace  is  in  danger  he  pro- 
Is: 

The  Russian  Republic  and  its  Soviets  are  surrounded 
on  all  sides  by  enemies.  The  American  and  French 
financiers  are  lending  money  to  provide  war  material 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  65 

for  General  Kaledin.  The  German  bourgeoisie  is  quite 
prepared  to  use  them  as  allies  for  the  stifling  of  the 
Russian  Revolution. 

These  are  conditions  which  raise  for  the  Russian 
peasants  and  workmen  the  whole  question  of  all  the 
conquests  achieved  by  the  Revolution  and  of  a  holy- 
war  against  the  Russian  bourgeoisie  and  that  of  Ger- 
many, France  and  Great  Britain.  .  .  . 

It  may  be  that  a  holy  war  of  the  Revolution  at  the 
front  as  well  as  behind  the  lines  stands  before  us  as  a 
terrible  and  unavoidable  fate.  ...  A  People's  Rev- 
olutionary Guard  must  be  organized.  .  ,  . 

Comrades,  the  people  of  Italy,  Spain,  France,  Aus- 
tria and  Switzerland  look  to  you  with  hope  and  await 
the  call  to  battle  against  their  bourgeoisie.  The  sol- 
diers will  not  march  against  Revolutionary  Russia.  .  .  . 

The  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  gave  the  deci- 
sion of  the  Allies  in  relation  to  the  invitation  to  participate 
in  the  negotiations : 

I  telegraphed  to  our  Allies  and  inquired  whether 
they  did  not  think  it  opportune  to  agree  to  make  iden- 
tical combined  statements.  They  finally  decided  unan- 
imously that  it  was  preferable  to  keep  to  separate  dec- 
larations, leaving  to  each  country  full  latitude  as  to 
form,  since  there  was  no  disagreement  as  to  substance. 

January  11-12.  The  Committee  on  Political  and  Territorial 
Questions  held  three  long  sittings  at  Brest.  The  attempt 
was  made  at  these  sittings  to  arrive  at  a  text  for  Articles 
I  and  II  of  the  proposed  treaty  of  peace. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  first  point  of  Article  I  should  be 
a  declaration  that  the  state  of  w^ar  between  the  belligerents 
had  been  terminated. 

Point  2  of  the  German  draft  of  Article  I  reading: 
"Both  nations  are  resolved  to  live  together  in  future  in 
peace  and  friendship,"  was  objected  to  by  Trotzky,  who 
considered  this  to  be  a  decorative  phrase  which  does  not 
describe  the  sense  of  the  relations  which,  in  the  future,  will 
exist  between  the  Russian  and  the  German  peoples,  and  the 
peoples  of  Austria-Hungary.     He  hoped  quite  other  things 


0«  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

would  influence  the  relations  between  the  peoples.     After 
discussion,  it  was  decided  to  return  to  this  point  later. 

It  was  agreed  that  Point  3  of  Article  I  should  establish 
the  principle  of  the  evacuation  by  both  parties  of  occupied 
territory  on  a  basis  of  full  reciprocity,  so  that  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  Russian  territories  by  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  should  be  linked  with  the  evacuation  by  Russia 
of  the  occupied  regions  of  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey  and 
Persia.  At  a  further  stage  in  the  discussion  Persia  was 
stricken  out  in  this  context  as  not  being  a  belligerent  party. 
Trotzky  proposed  to  insert  at  the  end  of  Article  I  the  fol- 
lowing sentence:  "Russia  undertakes  to  remove  as  speed- 
ily as  possible  her  troops  from  the  occupied  territory  of 
neutral  Persia."  He  added  that  he  had  no  other  ground 
for  the  proposed  alteration  than  the  desire  to  emphasize  the 
crying  wrong  committed  by  the  former  Russian  Govern- 
ment against  a  neutral  country.  Von  Kuehlmann  then  said 
that  he  was  all  the  more  glad  to  hear  this  declaration,  as 
the  liveliest  sympathies  were  entertained  by  Germany  for 
the  old  Persian  Kultur  and  for  the  Persian  nation,  and 
they  wished  for  nothing  more  than  that  in  the  future  the 
Persians,  free  from  oppression,  should  be  able  to  devote 
themselves  to  their  national  Kultur. 

Point  4  of  Article  I  was  to  deal  with  the  date  for  the 
evacuation  of  the  occupied  districts.  The  Germans  pro- 
posed that  the  evacuation  take  place  after  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  when  Russia  would  have  demobilized.  Otherwise, 
there  was  the  danger  that  Russia,  before  demobilizing, 
might  be  able  to  carry  out  offensive  operations  owing  to 
future  changes  in  the  governmental  system  and  intentions. 
Trotzky  then  expressed  a  wish  that  the  evacuation  be  car- 
ried out  simultaneously  with  the  demobilization  of  both 
parties.  As  to  this,  a  further  agreement  could  be  reached. 
Von  Kuehlmann  pointed  out  that,  according  to  the  Russian 
proposal,  the  evacuation  of  the  occupied  districts  would  be 
prolonged  until  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace  among 
all  belligerents.  The  discussion  on  this  point  was  here 
broken  off. 

The  draft  of  the  text  of  Article  II  of  the  proposed  treaty 
of  peace  was  then  taken  up.  It  was  to  contain  provisions 
as  to  which  parts  of  the  occupied  territories  should  be  evac- 
uated and  as  to  the  method  by  which  the  principle  of  self- 
determination  should  be  applied. 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  67 

Von  Kuehlmann  gave  the  German  view  in  the  following 
Btatement : 

In  accordance  with  the  definition  of  the  word  evac- 
uation, it  can  only  extend  to  those  regions  wliich  are 
still  parts  of  the  State  territory  of  that  Power  with 
which  peace  is  concluded.  It  does  not  extend  to  such 
regions  which,  on  the  conclusion  of  peace,  no  longer 
form  part  of  this  State  territory.  It  would,  therefore, 
be  a  matter  for  investigation  as  to  whether  and  what 
portions  of  the  former  Russia  could,  on  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  be  regarded  as  still  belonging  to  Russian  ter- 
ritory. The  Russian  Government,  in  accordance  with 
its  principles,  had  proclaimed  for  all  peoples  without  ex- 
ception living  in  Russia  the  right  of  self-determination, 
even  going  as  far  as  complete  separation.  We  main- 
tain that,  in  the  exercise  of  this  right  of  self-deter- 
mination in  part  of  the  regions  now  occupied  by  us, 
the  de  facto  plenipotentiary  bodies  representing  the 
peoples  in  question  have  already  exercised  the  right  of 
self-determination  in  the  sense  of  separation  from  Rus- 
sia, so  that  in  our  view  these  regions  can  no  longer  be 
considered  as  belonging  to  the  Russian  empire  as  hith- 
erto constituted. 

The  Russian  view  was  presented  by  Trotzky  in  the  fol- 
lowing statement: 

We  fully  maintain  our  declaration  that  peoples  in- 
habiting   Russian    territory   have    the   right    of    self- 
determination  without  outside  influence,  even  to  the 
point  of  separation.     We  cannot,  however,  recognize 
the  application  of  this  principle  otherwise  than  in  re- 
gard to  peoples  themselves,  and  not  in  regard  to  cer- 
tain privileged  parts  of  them.     We  must  reject  the 
view  of  the   President  of  the   German  Delegation — 
that  the  will  of  the  occupied-  districts  has  been  ex- 
pressed by  de   facto  plenipotentiary  bodies — because 
these  de  facto  plenipotentiary  bodies  could  not  appeal 
to  the  principles  proclaimed  bj^s. 
Following  on  these  statements  of  principle,   a  lengthy 
debate  arose  on  the  question  as  to  what  conditions  and  at 
what  time  a  new  State  arises  by  the  separation  of  its  com- 
ponent parts  from  an  existing  State. 

In  summing  up  the  views  of  the  Central  Empires,  von 
Kuehlmann  said : 


68  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Our  view  is  that  State  individuality  emerges  and  is 
in  a  position  to  make  legally  binding  declarations  as 
to  the  bases  of  its  existence,  as  soon  as  any  representa- 
tive body  qualified  to  represent  and  to  act  as  a  mouth- 
piece announces,  as  the  expression  of  the  undoubted 
will  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people  in 
question,  a  decision  to  be  independent  and  to  exercise 
the  right  of  self-determination.  Our  view  appears  to 
me  to  approach  considerably  nearer  the  character  and 
fundamental  correctness  of  the  right  of  self-determina- 
tion than  the  view  laid  down  here  by  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Russian  Delegation,  The  latter  have  not 
yet  told  us  how  a  body  can  arise  or  be  created  which, 
in  a  national  entity  not  yet  formed,  is  to  organize  a 
vote  on  a  broad  basis ;  yet  it  is  this  which,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Russian  Chairman,  is  the  prerequisite  con- 
dition for  the  emergence  of  such  a  legal  entity. 

Von  Kuehlmann  referred  to  the  examples  of  Finland  and 
the  Ukraine,  which  had  constituted  themselves  in  the  sense 
of  the  principles  enunciated  by  Germany  and  whose  inde- 
pendence the  Petrograd  Government  had  recognized,  al- 
though these  new  States  had  not  arisen  according  to  the 
principles  now  presented  by  the  Russian  Delegation. 

Trotzky  adhered  to  his  own  view,  and  commented  upon 
the  examples  cited  by  the  German  Government : 

Finland  is  not  occupied  by  foreign  troops.  The  will 
of  the  Finnish  people  had  expressed  itself  in  a  fashion 
and  a  manner  which  could  and  must  be  designated  as 
democratic.  Not  the  slightest  objection  could  be  raised 
on  the  Russian  side  to  the  express  will  of  the  Finnish 
people  actually  being  put  into  effect.  Regarding 
the  Ukraine,  the  process  of  such  democratic  self-deter- 
mination had  not  yet  been  carried  through  there.  But 
as  the  Ukraine,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  occupied 
by  foreign  troops  and  the  Russians  were  also  of  opin- 
ion that  the  evacuation  of  Ukrainian  territory  by 
Russian  troops  could  not  produce  difficulties  of  any 
kind,  especially  as  this  was  purely  a  technical  and  not 
a  political  question,  the  Russian  Delegates  saw  no  hin- 
drance of  any  kind  to  the  self-determination  of  the 
Ukrainian  people  leading  to  the  recognition  of  the  in- 
dependent Ukrainian  Republic. 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  69 

The  outcome  of  the  statements  of  the  two  sides  on  this 
point  was  summed  up  by  von  Kuehlmann  as  follows : 

M.  Trotzky  proposes  the  establishment  of  representa- 
tive bodies  which  should  be  entrusted  with  organizing 
and  fixing  the  methods  of  procedure  under  which  pop- 
ular votes  or  popular  manifestations,  which  were,  for 
the  time  being,  purely  theoretically  conceded  by  us, 
shall  follow  on  a  broader  basis;  while  we  adopt  and 
must  adopt  the  standpoint  that,  in  the  absence  of  other 
representative  bodies,  the  existing  bodies  which  have 
become  historical,  are  the  presumptive  expression  of 
the  people's  will,  especially  in  the  vital  question  of  a 
nation's  will  to  be  a  nation. 

In  the  subsequent  debate  on  the  character  and  signif- 
icance of  the  representative  bodies  operating  in  occupied 
territories,  von  Kuehlmann  and  Czernin  said  that  their 
impression  was  that  in  the  December  negotiations  the  Rus- 
sian Delegation  was  inclined  to  recognize  the  existing  rep- 
resentative bodies  in  the  occupied  territories  as  de  facto 
representative  bodies. 

Joffe,  who  had  been  the  leader  of  the  Russian  Delegation 
in  the  December  negotiations,  replied  that  he  had  always 
accentuated  the  necessity  of  carrying  out  the  popular  vote 
with  no  occupying  troops  present,  but  he  did  not  desire  to 
deny  having  declared  in  conversation  that  in  one  or  two 
parts  of  Russia  the  existing  organs  might  play  a  certain 
part  in  establishing  the  necessary  popular  vote.  Trotzky 
hereupon  remarked  that  expressions  of  will  by  such  exist- 
ing Diets  of  course  possessed  great  political  importance, 
and  he  did  not  want  to  exclude  from  an  expression  of  their 
will  that  part  of  the  country's  population  represented  in 
these  Diets. 

Von  Kuehlmann  then  said  it  would  seem  from  Trotzky 's 
statement  that  the  latter  was  ready  to  recognize  the  exist- 
ing organs  of  popular  representation  in  occupied  territo- 
ries as  provisional  organs,  if  these  parts  of  the  country 
were  not  militarily  occupied,  and  that  he  would  also  attrib- 
ute to  them  competency  to  carry  out  the  referendum  de- 
manded by  him. 

Trotzky  hereupon  declared  that  the  utterances  of  Diets, 
municipal  bodies  and  similar  organs  might  be  regarded  as 
expressions  of  will  of  a  certain  influential  part  of  the  pop- 


70  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

ulation,  but  that  such  expressions  only  constituted  a  ground 
for  the  assumption  that  the  people  in  question  was  not  sat- 
isfied with  its  political  position.  The  conclusion  followed 
that  a  referendum  must  be  taken,  for  which,  however,  the 
preliminary  condition  was  the  creation  of  a  body  which 
could  guarantee  a  free  vote  of  the  population.  Trotzky 
further  asserted  that  there  was  a  contradiction  between 
the  declaration  of  the  Central  Powers  on  December  25  and 
the  formulation  of  Articles  I  and  II  on  December  27.  This 
was  shown  clearly  in  the  comment  of  the  German  press. 

Von  Kuehlmann  in  reply  said  that  both  documents  were 
emanations  of  the  same  spirit  and  policy  as  was  announced 
by  the  Chancellor  in  his  program  speech  (November  29) 
in  the  Reichstag.  This  speech  in  effect  already  contained 
the  Allies'  [Central]  declaration  of  December  25,  and  thus 
also  indicated  that  German  policy  intended  to  direct  its 
relations  towards  Poland,  Lithuania  and  Courland  with 
due  consideration  for  the  people's  right  of  self-determina- 
tion. He  contended  further  that  those  parts  of  Russia, 
striving  for  severance  (according  to  declarations  of  the  will 
of  the  institutions  already  existing),  were  even  now  justi- 
fied in  making  agreements  on  all  questions,  including  in- 
tended frontier  rectifications. 

Trotzky  could  not  but  see  in  this  conception  an  under- 
mining of  the  principle  of  self-determination.  He  asked 
why  these  organs  of  the  peoples  in  question  had  not  been 
invited  to  the  Brest-Litovsk  negotiations,  if  they  ought  to 
have  the  right  of  disposal  even  over  portions  of  their  ter- 
ritory. Such  participation  of  representatives  of  these  peo- 
ples in  the  negotiations  was  naturally  not  thought  of,  be- 
cause these  nations  were  regarded  not  as  subjects  but  as 
objects  of  the  negotiations. 

Von  Kuehlmann  replied : 

The  previous  speaker  has  complained  that  we  have 
here  no  representatives  of  the  nations  under  discussion. 
If,  by  that,  he  wished  to  express  the  opinion  that,  in 
his  view,  these  national  entities  have  now  been  created 
and  can  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  self-determina- 
tion undertake  foreign  relations,  I  on  my  part  am 
ready  fully  to  recognize  this  admission  of  the  Russian 
Delegation  and  discuss  the  idea  whether  and  in  what 
form  it  would  be  possible  for  representatives  of  the 
nations  in  question  to  take  part  in  our  negotiations. 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  71 

Thereupon  Trotzky,  having  regard  to  these  extraordinar- 
ily important  declarations  of  the  representatives  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  moved  the  adjournment  to  enable  the  Russian 
Delegation  to  consult  their  Government, 

January  12.  Upon  the  adjournment  of  the  Committee  on 
Political  and  Territorial  Questions  on  Saturday,  January 
12,  a  plenary  sitting  of  all  the  Delegations  was  held  under 
the  chairmanship  of  Count  Czernin,  who  in  the  name  of 
the  Delegations  of  the  four  Central  Powers  made  the  fol- 
lowing declaration : 

We  recognize  the  Ukrainian  Delegation  as  an  inde- 
pendent Delegation  of  plenipotentiaries  representing 
the  independent  Ukrainian  Republic.  The  formal  rec- 
ognition of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  as  an  independent 
State  by  the  four  Allied  [Central]  Powers  is  reserved 
for  the  peace  treaty. 
Trotzky  then  said : 

Such  conflicts  as  have  occurred  between  the  Russian 
Government  and  the  General  Sekretariat  of  the 
Ukraine  had  and  have  no  connection  with  the  question 
of  the  self-determination  of  the  Ukrainian  nation. 
They  arose  through  the  Ukrainian  opposition  to  the 
policy  of  the  Soviet  and  the  Peoples'  Commissars  as 
regards  the  self-determination  of  the  Ukraine,  now 
actually  expressed  there  in  the  form  of  the  People's 
Republic.  This  can  give  no  scope  for  a  conflict  of 
opinion  between  the  two  sister-Republics.  Consider- 
ing the  fact  that  there  are  no  troops  of  occupation  in 
the  Ukraine,  that  the  political  life  there  is  carried  on 
freely,  that  there  are  neither  medieval  organs  there 
which  desire  to  represent  the  country  nor  ministries 
which  are  appointed  from  above  on  the  ground  of 
power  and  position  and  which  act  within  the  limita- 
tions prescribed  for  them  from  above,  considering  that 
everywhere  in  the  territory  of  the  Ukraine  freely 
elected  Soviets  are  in  existence,  that  in  the  election  of 
all  organs  of  self-government  the  principle  of  a  gen- 
eral, equal,  direct  and  secret  suffrage  is  applied,  there 
is  and  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  power  of  self-deter- 
mination of  the  Ukraine,  within  the  geographical  lim- 
its and  political  forms  corresponding  to  the  will  of 
the  Ukrainian  State,  will  find  its  consummation.  In 
view  of  the  foregoing,  which  is  in  accord  with  the  dec- 


72  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

laration  made  during  the  sitting  of  January  10,  the 
Russian  Delegation  sees  no  hindrance  of  any  sort  to 
the  independent  participation  of  the  Delegation  of  the 
General  Sekretariat  in  the  peace  negotiations. 

Holubovitch,  the  Ukrainian  Secretary  of  State,  accepted 
the  statements  of  Czernin  and  Trotzky  and  announced  that 
his  Delegation  would  participate  in  the  peace  negotiations 
on  that  basis. 

General  Hoffmann,  the  German  Military  Delegate,  then 
protested  against  the  Russian  wireless  statements  issued 
during  the  recess  upon  Trotzky 's  instructions,  as  trans- 
gressing the  spirit  of  the  armistice,  Trotzky  desired  to 
know  in  what  particular  the  spirit  of  the  armistice  had 
been  transgressed  by  the  communications,  to  which  General 
Hoffmann  replied: 

At  the  head  of  the  armistice  treaty  stood  the  words 
''to  bring  about  a  lasting  peace."  Your  Russian  prop- 
aganda transgressed  this  intention  because  it  did  not 
strive  after  a  lasting  peace,  but  wished  to  carry  revo- 
lution and  civil  war  into  the  countries  of  the  Central 
Powers. 

Trotzky  answered  Hoffmann,  pointing  out  that  all  the 
German  newspapers  were  being  freely  admitted  into  Rus- 
sia, even  newspapers  which  were  supporting  the  views  of 
the  extreme  Russian  reactionaries.  Complete  equality  had 
been  observed  in  this  respect,  and  it  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  armistice  treaty.  Hoffmann  retorted  that  his  protest 
was  not  directed  against  the  Russian  press,  but  against 
official  Government  statements  and  statements  which  bore 
the  signature  of  Ensign  Krylenko,  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Bolshevist  forces.  Trotzky  replied  that  the  terms  of 
the  armistice  treaty  contained  and  could  contain  no  restric- 
tions on  the  expression  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  citizens 
of  the  Russian  Republic  or  their  governing  officials.  Von 
Kuehlmann  interrupted  Trotzky,  saying,  ''Non-interference 
in  Russian  affairs  is  the  fixed  principle  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, which  has  the  right  to  demand  complete  reci- 
procity in  this  respect."  Answering  von  Kuehlmann, 
Trotzky  replied:  "On  the  contrary,  the  Russians  will 
recognize  it  as  a  step  forward  if  the  Germans  freely  and 
frankly  express  their  views  regarding  internal  conditions 
in  Russia  in  so  far  as  they  think  this  necessary." 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  73 

Upon  the  adjournment  of  the  plenary  sitting  of  the  Dele- 
gations, the  meeting  of  the  Committee  of  German,  Austro- 
Hungarian  and  Russian  representatives  to  discuss  the  regu- 
lation of  Territorial  and  Political  Questions  was  resumed 
on  the  same  day. 

Von  Kuehlmann,  after  summarizing  the  result  of  the  pre- 
vious deliberations,  remarked: 

We  expressed  the  view  that  the  peoples  dwelling  on 
the  western  frontier  of  the  former  Russian  Empire 
had  already  expressed  their  will  in  a  manner  that  was 
adequate  and  that  was  for  us  authoritative.  On  the 
suggestion  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Russian  Delegation, 
we  also  declared  it  an  idea  quite  open  to  discussion 
whether  and  under  what  conditions  these  new  States 
might  participate  in  the  peace  negotiations.  We  have 
not  yet,  however,  been  clearly  informed  by  the  Russian 
Delegation  whether,  to  use  an  expression  employed  by 
the  Russian  Delegation,  they  can  participate  as  sub- 
jects at  the  discussion,  or  whether,  until  further  no- 
tice, they  are  to  be  regarded  as  objects  of  statesman- 
ship. I  should  be  grateful  if  the  Russian  Delegation 
would  answer  this  question  in  a  manner  excluding  all 
doubt. 

Trotzky  thereupon  asked  the  delegates  to  hear  Kamenev, 
who  proposed  for  the  Russian  Delegation  that  to  avoid  all 
misunderstandings,  both  parties  should  put  in  v^rriting  their 
views  as  unfolded  during  the  discussion.  The  Russian 
Delegation  thereupon  presented  a  written  statement  con- 
taining three  main  divisions,  and  in  the  third  division  the 
four  chief  issues  of  the  negotiations  were  formulated.  The 
Russian  Delegation  proposed  that  the  joint  replies  to  these 
four  points  "shall  constitute  in  the  treaty  of  peace  the 
paragraphs  that  are  to  take  the  place  of  Article  II  of  the 
German  draft  of  December  28,  1917." 

The  document  presented  by  Kamenev  for  the  Russian 
Delegation  reads: 

As  during  occupation,  nowhere,  either  in  Poland, 
Lithuania  or  Courland,  could  there  be  constituted,  or 
could  there  exist  any  democratically  elected  organs 
which  could  lay  claim  with  any  right  whatever  to  be 
considered  as  expressing  the  will  of  large  circles  of 


74  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

the  population  as  regards  .  .  .  any  effort  to  attain 
complete  State  independence,  the  Russian  Delegation 
declares : 

A.  From  the  fact  that  the  occupied  territories  be- 
long to  the  former  Russian  Empire,  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment draws  no  conclusions  which  would  impose  any 
constitutional  obligation  on  the  population  of  these 
regions  in  relation  to  the  Russian  Government.  The 
old  frontiers  of  the  former  Russian  Empire,  frontiers 
formed  by  acts  of  violence  and  crimes  against  peoples, 
especially  against  the  Polish  people,  have,  together  with 
Czarism,  vanished.  The  new  frontiers  of  the  Fra- 
ternal League  of  the  Peoples  of  the  Russian  Republic 
and  of  the  peoples  which  desire  to  remain  outside  its 
borders,  must  be  formed  by  free  resolution  of  the  peo- 
ples concerned. 

B.  The  main  task  of  the  present  negotiations  for 
the  Russian  Government  does  not  consist,  therefore, 
in  defending  in  any  way  whatever  a  further  forcible 
retention  of  the  territories  mentioned  within  the  bor- 
ders of  the  Russian  Empire,  but  in  safeguarding  real 
freedom  of  self-determination  as  to  the  internal  State 
organization  and  the  international  position  of  such  ter- 
ritories. The  Russian  Republic  will  feel  itself  secure 
against  being  dragged  into  any  territorial  disputes  and 
conflicts,  only  when  it  is  convinced  that  the  line  which 
separates  it  from  its  neighbors  has  been  formed  by  the 
free  will  of  the  peoples  themselves  and  not  by  violence 
from  above,  which  could  only  suppress  that  will  for  a 
short  time. 

C.  Our  task  thus  understood  presupposes  a  previous 
understanding  on  the  part  of  Germany  and  Austria  on 
the  one  hand  and  Russia  on  the  other,  of  four  main 
points : 

1.  The  extent-jif,^rr4Umf-  over  which  any  popula- 
tion will  be  "Sailed  upon  to  exercise  the  right  of  self- 
determination. 

The  right  to  territory  and  self-determination  be- 
longs to  nations  and  not,  as  provided  by  Article  II  of 
the  German  draft  of  December  28,  to  occupied  parts 
thereof. 

Accordingly,  the  Russian  Government,  on  its  own 
initiative,  grants  the  right  of  self-determination  simul- 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  75 

taneously  to  those  parts  of  nations  both  outside  [and 
within]  the  occupied  regions.  Russia  binds  herself 
not  to  compel  these  territories,  either  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, to  accept  this  or  any  other  State  organization, 
or  to  restrict  their  independence  through  tariffs  or  mili- 
tary conventions  that  might  be  concluded  before  the 
final  constitution  of  these  regions  on  the  basis  of  their 
right  to  self-determination. 

The  Governments  of  Germany  and  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  on  their  part,  categorically  confirm  the  ab- 
sence of  any  claims  whatever  either  to  the  annexation 
of  the  territories  of  the  former  Russian  Empire  now 
occupied  by  the  armies  of  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  or  to  so-called  frontier  rectifications  at  the 
cost  of  these  regions.  They  further  undertake  not  to 
compel  these  regions  to  accept  this  or  that  State  form, 
or  to  restrict  their  independence  by  any  tariff  or  mili- 
tary convention  which  might  be  concluded  before  the 
constitution  of  these  regions  on  the  basis  of  the  polit- 
ical right  to  self-determination  of  the  nations  inhabit- 
ing them. 

2.  The  general  pqJMj^alj^rerequidtes  governing  the 
solution  of  the  questioSTof  the  political  destinies  of  the 
territories  and  nations  concerned. 

The  solution  of  the  question  regarding  the  fate  of 
regions  determining  their  own  lot  must  take  place  un- 
der conditions  of  full  political  freedom  and  without 
external  pressure. 

The  voting  must,  therefore,  take  place  after  the  with- 
drawal of  foreign  armies  and  the  return  of  the  fugi- 
tives and  of  the  population  removed  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war. 

The  date  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  armies  will  be 
determined  by  a  special  commission  in  accordance  with 
the  situation  as  regards  transport  and  food  supplies. 

After  the  termination  of  the  world  war  the  protec- 
tion of  law  and  order  in  regions  undergoing  the  proc- 
ess of  self-determination  devolves  on  the  national 
armies  and  local  militia. 

Fugitives  and  those  removed  by  the  occupying  au- 
thorities since  the  beginning  of  the  war  will  be  given 
full  freedom  and  the  material  possibility  of  returning. 


76  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

3.  The  transitional  regime  Ihat  shall  exist  until  the 
moment  of  "the  final  political  constitution  of  these  ter- 
ritories. 

From  the  moment  of  the  signing  of  peace  until  the 
final  political  constitution  of  the  territories  named, 
their  internal  administration  and  the  direction  of  their 
local  affairs,  finances,  etc.,  pass  into  the  hands  of  the 
temporary  organ  formed  by  agreement  between  polit- 
ical parties  which  have  proved  their  vitality  in  the 
midst  of  their  people  before  and  during  the  war. 

The  main  task  of  these  temporary  organs  consists, 
simultaneously  with  the  maintenance  of  the  normal 
course  of  social  and  economic  life,  in  the  organization 
of  a  plebiscite. 

4.  The  way  in  which  the  population  of  these  terri- 
tories will  be  required  to  make  their  will  known. 

The  final  solution  of  the  question  of  the  State  posi- 
tion of  the  territories  in  question  and  the  form  of  their 
State  organization  will  follow  by  means  of  a  general 
referendum. 
After  declaring  that  the  joint  replies  to  the  above  four 
points  shall  constitute  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  the 
document  concludes  as  follows : 

With  a  view  to  expediting  the  work  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  the  Russian  Delegation  considers  it  ex- 
traordinarily important  to  receive  from  the  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  Delegations  a  complete  and  ex- 
act reply  to  all  the  questions  which  are  raised  in  this 
declaration.  As  regards  other  questions,  they  might 
be  so  treated  as  to  be  answered  in  connection  with  the 
exact  reply  to  these  points. 
The  reply  to  the  Russian  proposals  was  made  by  General 
Hoffmann  and  von  Kuehlmann.     General  Hoffmann  said: 

/I  must  first  protest  against  the  tone  of  these  pro- 
posals. The  Russian  Delegation  talks  to  us  as  if  it 
stood  victorious  in  our  countries  and  could  dictate  con- 
ditions to  us.  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  the  facts 
are  just  the  reverse  and  that  the  victorious  German 
army  stands  in  your  territory.  I  would  then  like  to 
state  that  the  Russian  Delegation  demands  for  the  oc- 
cupied territories  the  application  of  the  right  of  self- 
determination  of  peoples  in  a  manner  and  to  an  extent 
which  its  Government  does  not  apply  to  its  own  coun- 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  77 

try.  Its  Government  is  founded  purely  on  power,  and 
indeed,  on  power  which  rutlilessly  suppresses  by  force 
all  who  think  otherwise.  Every  one  with  different 
views  is  regarded  as  a  counter-revolutionary  and  bour- 
geois, and  simply  declared  an  outlaw. 

I  shall  only  substantiate  my  view  by  two  examples. 
During  the  night  of  December  30  the  first  White  Rus- 
sian Congress  at  Minsk,  which  desired  to  put  into  force 
the  right  of  the  White  Russian  people  to  self-deter- 
mination, was  broken  up  by  Maximalists  with  bayonets 
and  machine  guns.  When  the  Ukrainians  claimed 
their  right  of  self-determination,  the  Petrograd  Gov- 
ernment sent  an  ultimatum  and  endeavored  to  carry 
through  their  will  by  force  of  arms.  As  far  as  I  can 
make  out  from  wireless  messages  here  before  me,  civil 
war  is  still  in  progress.  Thus  do  the  Maximalists 
apply  in  practice  the  right  of  peoples  to  self-determi- 
nation. The  German  Supreme  Army  Command  must 
therefore  decline  to  interfere  in  the  occupied  terri- 
tories. 

As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  the  peoples  of  the  occu- 
pied territories  have  already  clearly  and  unmistakably 
expressed  the  wish  for  severance  from  Russia,  Among 
the  most  important  decisions  of  the  population,  I 
should  like  to  point  out  the  following :  On  September 
21,  1917,  the  Courland  Diet,  which  described  itself 
expressly  as  representing  the  entire  population  of 
Courland,  requested  the  protection  of  the  German 
Empire.  On  December  11,  1917,  the  Lithuanian  Diet, 
which  is  recognized  by  Lithuanians  at  home  and 
abroad  as  the  sole  authorized  representative  of  the 
Lithuanian  people,  proclaimed  its  desire  for  severance 
from  all  constitutional  connections  which  had  hitherto 
existed  with  other  peoples.  On  December  27,  the 
Municipal  Council  of  Riga  made  a  similar  request  of 
the  German  Empire.  This  request  was  supported  by 
the  Riga  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  great  Guilds,  rep- 
resentatives of  the  rural  population,  and  seventy  Riga 
societies.  Finally,  in  December,  1917,  representatives 
of  the  Orders  of  Knighthood,  the  rural,  urban,  and 
ecclesiastical  communities  on  the  Islands  of  Oesel, 
Dago  and  Moon  in  various  declarations  severed  them- 
selves from  their  previous  connections. 


78  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

For  technical  administrative  reasons,  too,  the  Su- 
preme German  Army  Command  must  refuse  to  evac- 
uate Courland,  Lithuania,  Riga  and  the  Islands  of  the 
Riga  Gulf.  None  of  these  regions  has  administrative 
organs,  legal  or  judicial  organs,  railways,  telegraphs 
or  posts.  All  is  in  German  possession,  under  German 
management.  They  are  also  unable,  within  measure- 
able  time,  owing  to  lack  of  the  appropriate  organs,  to 
establish  their  own  militia  or  soldiery. 

After  General  Hoffmann  had  concluded,  von  Kuehlmann 
said: 

I  should  like  to  point  out  that  it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  take  up  any  attitude  whatever  regarding  the 
written  declaration  just  read  by  the  Russian  Delega- 
tion. I  must  reserve  a  further  statement  of  our  posi- 
tion on  all  points.  But,  speaking  personally,  I  should 
like  to  say,  that  the  modus  procedendi  proposed'  by  the 
Russian  Delegation,  that  the  Delegations  should  each 
present  declarations  in  writing,  will  neither  be  condu- 
cive to  the  acceleration  of  the  negotiations  nor,  if  the 
documents  resemble  those  presented  today,  will  it  con- 
tribute in  the  least  to  placing  in  an  especially  rosy 
light  the  prospects  for  the  negotiations  which  we  are 
now  conducting.  Personally,  I  am  of  opinion  that  it 
would  have  been  better  to  continue  in  the  manner  be- 
gun yesterday  until  the  whole  material  had  been  dealt 
with  and,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  oral  discussion, 
lay  down  in  writing  the  result  of  such  discussion,  if 
necessary.  As,  however,  the  Russian  Delegation,  by 
its  proposal  of  today,  thinks  otherwise,  I  propose  to 
adjourn  for  the  purpose  of  consulting  our  Allies. 

Trotzky  then  said : 

Of  course,  it  is  not  our  object  to  put  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  progress  by  raising  technical  points.  If 
the  other  side  maintains  that  the  time  has  not  come  to 
present  a  written  statement,  then  our  proposals  of 
today  would  come  up  for  oral  discussion  and  we  would 
reserve  the  right  to  return,  in  the  course  of  the  further 
negotiations,  to  our  declaration  as  such,  or  to  single 
points  thereof,  without  in  any  way  desiring  to  force  a 
similar  treatment  of  the  subject  matter  upon  the  other 
side. 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  79 

Von  Kuehlmann  replied: 

I  cannot  accept  that  proposal.  It  would  be  highly 
undesirable  to  have  written  and  worked  out  proposi- 
tions on  the  one  side  with  no  corresponding  formula- 
tion from  the  other  side.  I  must,  therefore,  adhere  to 
my  opinion  that  before  taking  up  any  attitude  on  the 
new  situation,  a  fresh  consultation  with  our  Allies  is 
necessary. 

The  sitting  was  thereupon  adjourned  without  a  fixed  date 
for  the  next  meeting. 

January  14.  The  Committee  on  Political  and  Territorial 
Questions  held  its  fourth  sitting  January  14.  Von  Kuehl- 
mann presented  a  written  reply  to  the  formulated  proposals 
of  the  Russian  Delegation.  He  expressed  the  view  that  if 
they  really  wished  to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement,  it  would 
be  advisable  in  future  to  talk  matters  over  and  then  entrust 
their  draft  on  paper  to  an  editorial  committee  consisting 
of  one  representative  from  each  side. 

The  text  of  the  reply  of  the  Central  Powers  was  as  fol- 
lows: 

The  proposals  of  the  Russian  Delegation  ...  di- 
verge to  such  a  degree  from  the  views  of  the  Central 
Powers  that  in  their  present  form  they  must  be  char- 
acterized as  inacceptable.  .  .  .  They  do  not  possess  the 
character  of  an  attitude  of  compromise  for  which  the 
Central  Powers  have  striven,  but  rather  a  one-sided 
Russian  demand  which  precludes  all  consideration  of 
the  justice  of  the  views  of  the  opposing  side.  In  spite 
of  that,  the  Central  Powers  are  prepared  again  to  give 
a  clearly  formulated  expression  of  their  opinions.  .  .  . 

One  portion  of  the  territories  occupied  by  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  is  dealt  with  in  Article  I  of  the  German 
draft  .  .  .  and  requires  no  further  discussion. 

The  machinery  by  which  State-life  should  be  granted 
was  [thought  of  in  Article  II  as]  purely  temporary 
and  had  four  stages : 

(a)  The  period  of  time  between  the  conclusion  of 
peace  with  Russia  and  the  termination  of  Russian 
demobilization. 

(b)  The  period  of  time  between  a  Russian  and  a 
general  peace. 


NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

(c)  The  period  of  time  for  the  transition  stage  of 
the  new  peoples. 

(d)  The  finally  definitive  stage  which  the  new 
States  require  for  the  complete  installation  of  their 
State  organization. 

It  must  be  repeatedly  pointed  out  that  for  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  as  distinct  from  the  case  of  Kussia,  the 
conclusion  of  peace  with  Russia  has  no  connection 
whatever  with  a  general  peace,  and  that  the  Central 
Powers  are  compelled  to  continue  the  war  against  other 
enemies.  .  .  . 

Of  great  importance  for  the  question  of  the  individ- 
uality of  a  State  is  the  decision  come  to  by  the  Supreme 
Court  ...  in  Washington  in  the  year  1808  in  which 
it  was  stated,  "that  the  sovereign  right  of  the  United 
States  of  North  America  must  be  recognized  as  having 
fully  and  completely  existed  from  the  day  of  the  an- 
nouncement of  its  independence,  that  is  to  say,  as  from 
the  4th  of  July,  1776,  quite  independently  of  its  rec- 
ognition on  the  part  of  England  in  the  Treaty  of  the 
year  1783."  (Droit  International  Codifie,  page 
160.)  ...  I 

It  might  be  asked  from  what  system  of  law  the  pres- 
ent Russian  Government  deduces  its  right  and  duty  to 
assure  real  freedom  of  self-determination  to  these  ter- 
ritories to  the  uttermost,  that  is  to  say,  even,  under 
certain  circumstances,  to  a  continuation  of  the  war. 
If  the  fact  that  the  occupied  territories  belonged  to 
the  former  Russian  Empire  imposes  no  duty  at  all 
upon  the  population  of  these  territories  towards  the 
Russian  Republic,  then  it  is  not  obvious,  without  fur- 
ther explanation,  on  what  the  Russian  Republic  in- 
tends to  base  its  rights  and  duties  as  regards  that  pop- 
ulation. If,  however,  one  takes  the  stand,  as  the  Rus- 
sian Delegation  has  done,  that  the  Russian  Republic 
has  such  a  right,  then  indeed,  (1)  the  extent  of  the 
territory,  (2)  the  political  provisions  for  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  self-determination,  (3)  the  transitional 
regime,  and  (4)  the  form  of  expression  of  the  will  of 
the  people,  are  the  four  points  on  which  an  endeavor  to 
reach  an  adjustment  must  be  made. 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  81 

1.     Extent  of  Occupied  Territory 

The  assertion  that  the  right  of  self-determination  is  I 
an  attribute  of  nations  as  a  whole  and  not  of  parts  of  I 
nations  is  not  our  conception  of  the  right  of  self-deter-  I 
mination.  Parts  of  nations  can  justly  conclude  inde- 
pendence and  separation.  It  is  by  no  means  assumed, 
however,  that  the  limits  of  occupation  are  to  be  taken 
as  a  standard  for  the  fixing  of  the  boundaries  of  such 
parts.  Courland,  Lithuania  and  Poland  constitute, 
also,  national  units  from  an  historical  point  of  view. 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  have  no  intention  of 
incorporating  the  territories  now  occupied  by  them 
into  their  respective  countries.  They  do  not  intend  to 
compel  the  territories  in  dispute  to  accept  this  or  that 
form  of  State,  but  they  reserve  for  themselves  and  for 
the  peoples  of  the  occupied  territories  a  free  hand  for 
the  conclusion  of  treaties  of  every  kind. 

2.     Political  Provisions  for  Self -Determination 

As  to  the  Russian  declarations  in  this  respect,  they 
pass  over  the  fundamental  difference  which  the  con-  , 
stituted  Delegations  are  repeatedly  pointing  out.  The  / 
withdrawal  of  the  armies  is  impossible  as  long  as  the 
world  war  lasts.  However,  in  the  event  of  military 
conditions  permitting,  the  endeavor  may  be  made  to 
bring  about  a  reduction  of  the  occupying  troops  to 
such  a  number  as  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  main- 
tenance of  order  and  the  technical  requirements  of  the 
country.  The  setting  up  of  a  national  gendarmerie 
may  be  striven  for. 

As  regards  the  return  to  their  homes  of  the  refugees 
and  those  persons  evacuated  during  the  course  of  the 
war,  a  benevolent  examination  of  the  matter  may  take 
place  from  time  to  time.  This  question  could,  as  it  is 
not  of  outstanding  political  importance,  be  entrusted 
to  a  special  commission. 

3.     Transitional  Regime 

The  Russian  proposal  is  not  sufficiently  clear  in  its 
details  and  necessitates  further  explanation.  It  is, 
however,  admitted  without  further  argument  that,  with 
the  progressive  approach  of  a  general  peace,  the  chosen 


88  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

representatives  of  the  people  of  the  country  will  co- 
operate, to  an  ever  increasing  extent,  in  administrative 
tasks, 

4.    Referendum 

The  Allied  [Central]  Delegations  are  prepared  to 
agree  in  principle  that  a  people's  vote  on  broad  lines 
be  sanctioned  on  the  basis  of  citizenship.  The  setting 
up  of  a  referendum  appears  to  be  impracticable.  In 
the  opinion  of  the  Allied  [  CentrafiDelegations,  it 
would  suffice,  if  a  vote  on  a  wide  basis  were  taken 
from  an  elected  and  supplemented  representative  body. 
It  may  also  be  pointed  out  that  the  setting  up,  within 
the  former  Russian  Empire,  of  States  recognized  by 
the  Government  of  the  People's  Commissars,  such, 
for  instance,  as  the  Ukraine  and  Finland,  was  brought 
about,  not  in  the  way  of  a  referendum,  but  by  resolu- 
tions of  a  national  assembly  elected  on  a  wide  basis. 

Inspired  by  the  desire  to  endeavor  to  come  to  an 
understanding  with  the  Russian  Government,  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  have  made 
these  far-reaching  proposals,  and  at  the  same  time  add 
thereto  that  they  represent  the  most  extreme  limits 
within  which  they  still  hope  to  come  to  a  peaceful 
understanding.  In  developing  these  fundamental  prin- 
ciples, they  have  been  permeated,  as  in  duty  bound, 
by  the  intention  of  not  allowing  any  weakening  in 
their  defensive  capacity  so  long  as  the  wretched  war 
continues,  and  also  by  the  intention,  that  certain 
peoples  on  territory  adjacent  to  their  OAvn  shall 
finally  and  independently  be  placed  in  a  position  to 
decide  their  own  future  without  thereby  falling  into 
a  state  of  extreme  need,  misery  and  desperation.  An 
understanding  between  Russia  and  the  Central  Em- 
pires on  these  difficult  questions,  however,  is  only  pos- 
sible if  Russia  shows  an  earnest  desire  to  reach  an 
understanding,  and  if  she  will  endeavor,  instead  of 
attempting  to  advance  one-sided,  dictatorial  aims, 
to  see  the  question  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
opposite  side,  and  find  a  way  such  as  can  alone 
lead  to  a  peaceful  result.  Only  under  the  condition 
that  such  intentions  are  shown,  can  the  Delegations  of 
the  Allied  [Central]  Powers  still  hope  for  a  peaceful 
adjustment  of  the  conflict. 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  88 

Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  reading  of  this  reply,  Trotzky 
took  the  floor.  He  declared  that  the  reply  of  the  Central 
Powers  had  removed  the  doubts  which  had  arisen  in  the 
Russian  Delegation  by  reason  of  the  speech  made  by  Gen- 
eral Hoffmann  at  the  previous  sitting.  It  was  now  clear, 
from  what  Secretary  of  State  von  Kuehlmann  had  read, 
that  all  points  of  the  negotiations  rested  exclusively  on  the 
political  will  of  the  German  Government  alone. 

When  General  Hoffmann  pointed  out  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government  based  its  position  on  power,  and  that 
it  made  use  of  force  against  all  those  whose  opinions 
differed  from  its  own,  and  that  it  stigmatized  them  as 
counter-revolutionaries  and  bourgeois,  it  must  be  no- 
ticed that  the  Russian  Government  ivas  based  upon 
power.  Throughout  the  whole  of  history,  no  other 
kind  of  government  had  been  kno^vn.  So  long  as  soci- 
ety consisted  of  struggling  classes,  the  power  of  gov- 
ernment would  be  based  upon  strength,  and  these  gov- 
ernments would  maintain  their  dominion  by  force. 
He  must,  however,  protest  categorically  against  the 
assertion  that  his  own  Government  outlawed  everyone 
who  differed  from  it.  That  which  the  Governments  of 
other  countries  objected  to  in  the  doings  of  the  Russian 
Government,  was  the  way  in  which  it  made  use  of  its 
power  and  in  which  it  did  not  allow  itself  to  be  de- 
terred. 

When  the  Roumanian  Government  had  endeavored 
to  make  use  of  force  on  Russian  territory  against  rev- 
olutionary soldiers  and  workmen,  he  and  his  friends 
proposed  from  Brest-Litovsk  to  the  Petrograd  Gov- 
ernment that  the  Roumanian  Ambassador  and  all  his 
staff,  as  well  as  the  Roumanian  military  mission, 
should  be  arrested.  And  the  reply  was  received  that 
such  a  course  had  already  been  taken. 

As  regards  the  two  instances  which  General  Hoffmann 
has  adduced,  they  by  no  means  represent  our  policy  on 
national  questions.  We  have  had  sent  to  us  the  result 
of  investigations  regarding  the  White  Russian  Con- 
gress. This  Congress  was  composed  of  representatives 
of  White  Russian  agrarians,  and  it  had  made  an  at- 
tempt to  take  possession  of  all  those  points  of  support 
which  must  be  the  property  of  the  White  Russian  peo- 
ple, and  if  it  met  with  resistance,  such  resistance  orig- 


84  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

inated  with  the  soldiers,  amongst  whom  were  repre- 
sented Great  Russians,  Wliite  Russians  and  Little  Rus- 
sians. I  have  already  stated  in  my  formal  declaration 
that  those  conflicts  which  arose  between  ourselves  and 
the  Ukraine,  and  which,  to  my  regret,  are  not  yet  com- 
pletely overcome,  have  in  no  way  restricted  the  right 
of  the  Ukrainian  people  to  self-determination;  and 
they  have  not  prevented  us  from  recognizing  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Ukrainian  Republic. 

Trotzky  then  spoke  of  the  destiny  of  the  occupied  terri- 
tories, and  he  said  that  the  views  uttered  by  the  Ger- 
man Delegation  could  only  tend  to  strengthen  the  views  of 
the  Russian  Delegation  concerning  the  very  subordinate 
role  played  by  legal  philosophy  in  deciding  the  destiny  of 
peoples.  This  applies  equally  to  the  legal  philosophy  of 
the  American  Supreme  Court.  Anyone  who  has  carefully 
read  the  history  of  the  decisions  of  that  Court  knows  that 
it  has  frequently  modified  the  interpretation  of  its  legal 
philosophy  according  to  the  necessity,  or  otherwise,  for  the 
extension  of  United  States  territory.  After  declaring  that 
the  interest  of  the  Russian  Delegation  in  the  destiny  of  the 
occupied  territories  was  due  to  their  interest  in  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  right  of  self-determination  for  peoples,  Trotzky 
closed  with  the  observation  that  the  Russian  Delegation 
reserved  to  itself  the  right  to  make  a  more  precise  state- 
ment regarding  the  nature  of  the  declarations  which  had 
been  read  out  that  day. 

Von  Kuehlmann  then  spoke  as  follows : 

As  regards  the  speech  of  General  Hoffmann,  may  I, 
on  behalf  of  myself  and  of  General  Hoffmann,  reserve 
the  right  to  return  to  this  question?  The  political 
competence  of  the  German  Empire  has  been  correctly 
characterized  by  the  previous  speaker  with  the  precise 
knowledge  of  international  conditions  which  he  pos- 
sesses. The  Imperial  Chancellor,  the  sole  responsible 
Imperial  Minister,  has  imparted  instructions  with  re- 
gard to  the  whole  field  of  foreign  policy.  Moreover, 
it  goes  without  saying,  by  reason  of  the  close  relations 
in  which  I  am  bound  to  General  Hoffmann,  that  be- 
tween our  respective  conceptions  no  divergence  exists. 
The  fundamental  difference  between  our  conception 
and  that  of  the  Russian  Delegation  is,  that  contrary 
to  it  we  wish  to  see  arise  in  those  regions,  without 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  85 

break  or  violent  transition,  an  orderly  State,  and  that 
we  decline  to  act,  out  of  pure  excess  of  life,  on  the 
theory  of  creating  a  vacuum,  so  as  to  allow  of  the 
establishment  of  a  State  within  this  vacuum  in  no 
more  clearly  defined  manner  than  has  so  far  been  put 
forward. 

M.  Trotzky's  depreciatory  estimate  of  the  decision 
of  the  American  Supreme  Court  surprises  me.  To  me, 
the  history  of  the  founding  of  that  great  Republic  and 
a  decision  of  its  Supreme  Court  is,  however,  not  with- 
out importance  for  forming  an  opinion  in  the  contro- 
versies pending  between  us.  .  .  . 

I  now  propose  that  in  future  we  observe  the  method 
of  procedure  as  proposed  by  the  Russian  Delegation, 
so  that  we  may  really  enter  upon  a  detailed  discussion 
of  the  four  points  given  in  our  reply.  I  hope  that  in 
a  few  days  we  shall  have  progressed  so  far  and  with 
a  feeling  of  complete  responsibility,  as  to  be  able  to 
say  whether  the  difficulties  can  be  overcome,  or  whether 
the  attempt  made  here  must  be  abandoned. 

Trotzky  then  declared  that  in  his  opinion  they  could 
now  pass  on  to  the  discussion  of  the  two  documents  which 
had  been  put  forward.  He  must,  however,  once  more  em- 
phasize his  disagreement  with  the  view  of  von  Kuehlmann, 
that,  in  the  event  of  the  army  of  occupation  withdrawing, 
it  would  leave  a  vacuum.  The  peoples  who  inhabited  Po- 
land, Lithuania  and  Courland  would  by  no  means  find 
themselves  in  a  difficult  political  situation  if  the  army  of 
occupation  left  them  to  their  own  devices.  In  so  far  as 
technical  difficulties  were  concerned,  such  as  not  having 
their  own  railways,  posts,  etc.,  an  agreement  on  such  ques- 
tions could  always  be  arrived  at,  even  without  the  control  of 
an  army  of  occupation.  But  Secretary  of  State  von  Kuehl- 
mann had  pointed  out  that  besides  technical  grounds,  ques- 
tions of  security,  which  had  been  brought  forward,  played 
a  very  important  role  in  the  regions  referred  to. 

Von  Kuehlmann  then  moved  that  the  discussion  of  the 
four  points  proposed  by  the  Russian  Delegation  should 
now  commence  in  businesslike  manner,  and  that  these  points 
should  be  taken  in  the  order  suggested  by  the  Russian  Dele- 
gation, After  Trotzky  had  agreed  to  this  proposal,  the 
next  sitting  was  fixed  for  the  following  day. 


86  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

January  15.    The  fifth  sitting  of  the  Committee  on  Politi- 
cal and  Territorial  Relations  was  held  on  January  15. 

It  took  up  first  the  suggestions  in  the  German  document 
of  January  14  concerning  the  period  of  time  which  was  to 
elapse  between  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Russia  and  the 
final  organization  of  those  new  States  which  were  to  be 
created  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  self-determination 
by  the  peoples  of  occupied  territories.  Trotzky's  view  was 
that  there_werei  not  sufficient  reasons  for  binding  the  fate 
orjhe  "regions  in  ciuestion  with  th„e, .course  of  the  world  war. 
He  held  that  the  fate  of  the  occupied  regions  should  be 
dependent  upon  the  conclusion  of  peace  on  the  Eastern 
front  alone.  Von  Kuehlmann  replied  that  it  had  already 
been  a  conciliatory  act  on  the  part  of  the  Central  Powers 
to  propose  Article  I  of  the  Austro-German  draft  of  the 
peace  treaty.  In  this  Article  they  declared  themselves 
ready  "to  evacuate  their  present  positions  in  occupied 
Russian  territory  in  so  far  as  no  different  inferences  result 
from  Article  II"  as  soon  as  the  demobilization  of  the  Rus- 
sian armies  had  been  accomplished  and  without  regard  to 
the  continuance  of  the  world  war  on  other  fronts.  Further 
conciliation  on  this  last  point  was  not  impossible  should  an 
agreement  be  reached  on  other  points.  As,  however,  there 
was  a  considerably  greater  possibility,  or  probability,  of 
fighting  again  beginning  on  the  Eastern  front  in  the  event 
of  war  continuing  on  the  other  fronts  than  there  would  be 
after  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  he  must  say  that 
it  was  impossible  to  contemplate  evacuation  of  the  regions 
mentioned  in  Article  II  of  the  German  draft  (Poland, 
Lithuania,  Courland  and  portions  of  Esthonia  and  Livo- 
nia), except  in  relation  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace 
on  all  fronts.  So  long  as  the  war  in  general  lasted,  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  could  not  give  any  further  safeguard  than 
that  provided  in  Article  II  of  the  German  draft,  which 
provides  that  "a  special  commission  shall  discuss  and  fi:s 
the  time  and  other  details  in  conformity  and  accordance 
with  the  Russian  idea  of  the  necessary  ratification — by 
plebiscite  on  broad  lines  and  without  any  military  pressure 
whatever — of  the  already  existing  proclamations  of  separa- 
tion." 

To  this  statement,  Trotzky  replied: 

The  replies  to  our  questions  appear  to  be  essentially 
contradictory,  and  indicate  the  handing  over  to  the 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  87 

occupying  Power  of  the  full  and  unlimited  right,  based 
exclusively  on  physical  force,  to  decide  arbitrarily  the 
destiny  of  the  occupied  territories,  and  to  dispose  of 
such  and  such  bodies  without  taking  into  account  the 
moment  of  their  appearance,  their  social  basis  and  what 
their  real  political  weight  may  be. 

If,  however,  the  Governments  of  either  side  continue, 
at  least  in  the  peace  pourparlers,  to  characterize  thes& 
bodies  as  free  representatives  of  the  will  of  peoples 
which  have  already  freely  decided  their  own  des- 
tiny, we  consider  it  desirable  in  the  highest  degree  to 
invite  these  bodies  to  collaborate  with  us.  We  are 
ready  to  accept  the  proposal,  twice  defeated  by  the 
other  side,  to  invite  here  the  representatives  of  such 
bodies.  These  representatives  will  come  here  as  public 
criers  of  these  peoples.  "VVe  must  then  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding on  whether  these  peoples  are  firm  units 
or  whether  their  representatives  come  here  as  private 
individuals.  In  the  latter  case,  they  have  nothing  to 
do  at  the  pourparlers. 

If  these  preliminary  conditions  are  accepted  by  the 
President  of  the  German  Delegation,  then  I  consent 
immediately  to  begin  discussions  with  our  own  repre- 
sentatives on  the  question  as  to  whether  the  Russian 
Delegation  desires  to  admit  representatives  of  these 
countries,  and  if  so,  in  what  form.  We  cannot  decide 
or  regard  as  decided  a  question  which  is  for  the  mo- 
ment the  principal  subject  of  our  diversities  of  opinion. 
The  will  of  the  people  must  everywhere  be  expressed 
by  the  people,  and  not  by  economically  privileged 
groups.  It  would  be  a  complete  abrogation  of  the 
principles  which  are  the  essence  of  our  program  if, 
directly  or  indirectly,  we  should  seek  a  pretext  to  tell 
the  masses  in  Poland  and  Lithuania  and  the  Letts  that 
we  were  ready  to  admit  a  representation  of  the  upper 
and  privileged  classes  of  their  country  and  their  peo- 
ples. 

The  sitting  was  adjourned,  and  on  its  resumption  von 
Kuehlmann  said : 

This  morning  we  concluded  our  discussions  regard- 
ing the  period  of  time  to  elapse  between  the  Russian 
demobilization  and  the  final  organization  of  the  new 
States,  and  we  must  note  with  regret  that  despite  the 


88  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

entirely  convincing  reasons  brought  forward  by  us, 
there  has  been  no  inclination  on  the  other  side  to  ac- 
cept our  point  of  view  in  any  way.  I  should  like  to 
postpone  question  (1)  that  of  ''the  extent  of  territory 
over  which  any  population  will  be  called  upon  to  exer- 
cise the  right  of  self-determination."  I  think  the 
question  of  territories  will  be  the  least  disputed  of  all. 
Referring  to  question  (2)  the  "general  political  pre- 
requisites governing  the  solution  of  the  question  of  the 
political  destinies  of  the  territories  and  nations  con- 
cerned," in  the  nature  of  the  case,  this,  too,  in  great 
part,  is  a  military  question.  A  certain  number  of 
armed  and  disciplined  forces  is  necessary  to  maintain 
discipline  and  public  order.  Some  organized  military 
forces  are  required  to  keep  the  economic  machinery 
of  the  country  going.  We  will  give  a  binding  promise 
that  these  organized  forces  shall  indulge  in  no  political 
activity,  and  exercise  no  political  pressure.  We  there- 
fore maintain  that  the  presence  of  these  forces  is  in 
no  way  prejudicial  to  the  freedom  of  the  vote. 

Trotzky  reverted  to  the  question  of  the  evacuation  of 
the  occupied  regions,  and,  being  requested  by  von  Kuehl- 
mann  to  speak  to  the  point,  namely,  the  question  under 
what  conditions  the  vote  should  be  held,  declared  that  he 
must  have  complete  clearness  on  the  evacuation  question. 

Von  Kuehlmann  replied  that  he  could  give  no  guarantee 
that,  within  the  period  actually  in  question  for  the  voting, 
military  considerations  would  make  a  complete  evacuation 
of  the  region  possible.  It  was  clear  that  the  minimum  pro- 
gram of  the  Central  Powers  had  been  drawn  up  with  the 
most  careful  regard  to  military  necessities. 

Trotzky  declared  he  could  not  answer  these  questions  in 
this  form,  but  must  confine  himself  to  stating  that  the  pres- 
ence of  organized  troops  in  these  regions  would,  in  the  Eus- 
sian  view,  very  grievously  prejudice  the  significance  of  the 
vote.  The  return  of  fugitives  and  the  evacuated  popula- 
tion was  closely  connected  with  the  questions  just  discussed. 
In  his  view,  a  vote  could  be  taken  when  a  majority  of  these 
people  had  returned  home.  The  formula  used  in  the 
Austro-German  document  (of  January  14)  appeared  to  him 
too  restrictive. 

Von  Kuehlmann  admitted  in  principle  that  the  fugi- 
ctives  would  be  justified  in  returning  home,  but  it  was  the 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  89 

task  of  the  administrative  authorities  to  decide  whether, 
and  if  so,  what  exceptions  should  be  made  to  this  general 
rule.  In  order  to  facilitate  a  survey  of  the  subject,  he 
asked  Trotzky  to  let  them  have  the  material  in  the  Russian 
Government's  possession  bearing  on  it. 

Trotzky  expressed  his  readiness  to  do  this,  and  the  sitting 
thereupon  closed. 

'         The  British  Labor  Party  issued,  the  same  day,  an  address 
to  the  Peoples  of  Russia  and  of  Central  Europe : 

We  have  reached  a  crisis  in  the  war.  The  negotia- 
tions at  Brest-Litovsk  have  been  interrupted  because 
the  Germans  have  refused  to  admit  the  principle  of 
self-determination  of  peoples  and  the  doctrine  of  no 
annexations.  In  thus  acting,  the  Central  Powers  are 
speaking  clearly  in  the  name  of  a  militarist  State. 

In  this  crisis  the  British  people  must  speak,  because 
the  Russians  can  only  succeed  in  their  great  and  per- 
ilous task  if  supported  by  the  people  everywhere.  The 
British  people  must  proclaim  to  Russia  and  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  that  its  aim  is  identical  with  Russia's; 
that  we,  too,  see  no  solution  for  the  evils  of  militarism 
except  self-determination  and  no  indemnities. 

In  applying  this  Russian  principle  to  our  own  case, 
we  are  conscious  of  the  problems  raised,  but  we  do  not 
shrink  therefrom.  The  British  people  accepts  the  prin- 
ciple of  no  annexations  for  the  British  Empire.  This 
applies  in  our  case  to  the  Middle  East,  Africa  and 
India.  .  .  . 

We  adjure  the  peoples  of  Central  Europe  to  declare 
themselves  or  make  their  Governments  speak  for  them 
in  answer  to  Russia  and  ourselves.  We  call  on  them 
to  renounce  annexations  in  Europe  with  the  same  good 
faith  in  which  we  are  renouncing  them  in  Asia.  We 
call  on  them  to  give  the  same  self-determination  to  the 
French,  Alsatian,  Italian,  Polish  and  Danish  members 
of  their  States  as  Russia  has  given  to  Finland,  Cour- 
land,  Lithuania  and  Russian  Poland. 

The  family  interests  of  dynasties  or  the  desire  of  the 
German,  Austrian,  and  Magyar  governing  classes  to 
dominate  other  classes  and  nationalities  must  no  more 
be  suffered  to  prevent  self-determination  in  Central 


90  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Europe,  and  thereby  imperil  it  in  Europe  as  a  whole, 
than  the  interests  of  British  imperialism  or  British 
capitalism  must  be  suffered  to  do  so  elsewhere. 

Peoples  of  Central  Europe,  this  catastrophe  of  the 
human  race,  this  fatal  schism  in  the  civilized  world, 
can  only  be  ended  by  the  defeat  of  militarism  on  both 
sides,  and  by  the  victory  on  both  sides  of  moral  and 
intellectual  fair  dealing.  If  the  world  is  to  be  saved, 
it  must  be  saved  by  good  faith  and  reciprocity  on  the 
part  of  all.  Do  not  fail  us  now.  Do  not  let  your  Gov- 
ernments drive  the  British  people,  as  they  are  driving 
the  Eussian  people,  into  the  terrible  choice  between 
continuing  the  war  and  abandoning  the  only  princi- 
ples that  can  save  the  world. 

If  this  choice  is  forced  upon  us,  we  shall  choose  as 
Russia  chose.  We  shall  continue,  but  the  responsibil- 
ity will  be  yours. 

91  January  16.  The  following  morning  the  Delegations  of  the 
four  Allied  [Central]  Powers  assembled  for  private  dis- 
cussion. Von  Kuehlmann  reviewed  at  length  the  negotia- 
tions with  the  Russian  representatives  during  the  past  few 
days  for  the  adjustment  of  political  and  territorial  ques- 
tions. The  leaders  of  the  Allied  [Central]  Delegations  ex- 
pressed their  thanks  and  approval  to  von  Kuehlmann. 

92  In  the  afternoon,  at  the  residence  of  Count  Czernin,  a 
private  meeting  of  the  Central  Delegation  with  the  Ukrain- 
ian Delegation  took  place.  The  discussion,  lasting  an  hour 
and  a  half,  led  to  the  settlement  in  principle  of  questions 
concerning  the  future  political  relations  between  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  and  the  Ukraine.  The  resumption  of  these 
private  discussions  was  arranged  for  the  next  day,  Jan- 
uary 17,  when  economic  questions  were  to  be  considered. 
After  the  anticipated  early  conclusion  of  this  private  pre- 
paratory exchange  of  ideas,  discussions  of  greater  detail 
were  to  be  initiated. 

93  January  17.  The  confidential  discussions  between  the  Ger- 
man and  Austro-Hungarian  Delegations  and  the  Ukrainian 
Delegation  were  resumed. 

Czernin  called  special  attention  to  the  general  principle, 
valid  for  the  Brest  negotiations  and  recognized  by  the 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  91 

Ukrainian  Delegation,  that  the  intervention  of  one  party 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  other  party  was  quite  out  of 
the  question.  On  the  other  hand,  both  parties  agreed  that 
peace  was  to  be  assured  through  the  discussion  of  the  va- 
rious political  and  cultural  questions  interesting  both  par- 
ties. In  this  regard  Count  Czernin,  by  way  of  example, 
referred  to  the  necessity  of  assuring  the  destiny  of  that 
Polish  minority  which  may  belong  to  the  future  Ukrainian 
State.  His  statements  were  greeted  with  approval  by  the 
Ukrainian  Delegation,  which  was  prepared  to  enter  upon 
further  negotiations  upon  this  basis. 

During  the  subsequent  discussions  concerning  economic 
relations  it  appeared  that  no  differences  existed  in  the  fun- 
damental conceptions  of  both  parties  such  as  might  prevent 
an  agreement.  The  discussions  even  extended  to  concrete 
questions,  such  as  the  exchange  of  commodities.  Further 
discussion  on  these  questions  was  entrusted  to  a  special 
commission  which  was  to  complete  its  labors  with  the  great- 
est possible  speed. 

January  18.  The  sittings  of  the  Committee  on  Political 
and  Territorial  Relations  were  resumed. 

Von  Kuehlmann  referred  to  the  question  of  the  return 
of  fugitives  and  the  evacuated  population  of  the  occupied 
territories.  He  declared  that  the  Central  Powers  were 
agreed  in  principle,  and  that  the  practical  carrying  out 
of  this  repatriation  should  be  referred  to  that  commission 
which  was  considering  the  exchange  of  civilian  prisoners. 
Answering  the  question  if  it  would  be  possible  for  the  Rus- 
sian Government  to  give  such  emigrants  certificates  show- 
ing that  before  their  evacuation  they  had  lived  in  the  re- 
gions in  question,  Trotzky  declared  that  these  refugees 
had  been  grouped  in  Russia  in  accordance  with  their  for- 
mer places  of  residence,  and  that  it  would  doubtless  be 
possible  to  give  them  proper  certificates. 

The  Committee  then  took  up  question  (4),  that  of  the 
method  of  voting  on  the  future  State  organizations  in  the 
occupied  territories. 

The  German  Delegation  pointed  out  that  the  Russian 
proposal  for  a  referendum  was  not  justified  by  the  political 
development  of  the  population  of  these  regions,  and  that  it 
would  be  more  proper  to  enlarge  the  existing  representative 


92  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

bodies  through  elections  upon  a  broad  basis  in  order  that 
through  this  enlargement  they  might  actually  become  the 
representatives  of  the  entire  population. 

In  answer  to  this,  Trotzky  remarked  that  the  Russian 
Delegation  did  not  share  the  opinions  just  expressed  con- 
cerning the  intelligence  and  education  of  the  populations 
in  question,  and  that  they  persisted  in  their  proposal  that 
the  future  State  organization  of  these  territories  be  decided 
by  referendum. 

In  his  reply,  von  Kuehlmann  pointed  to  the  endeavor 
of  the  Central  Powers  to  accord  to  the  broad  masses  of  the 
population  of  these  regions  an  ever  increasing  political  in- 
fluence. What  must  under  all  circumstances  be  conceded 
was  the  maintenance  of  order  during  the  period  of  transi- 
tion. What  must  be  hindered  is  the  spread  of  the  revolu- 
tion to  these  regions,  which  were  already  sufficiently  dev- 
astated by  the  war. 

The  further  discussion  of  this  question  was  postponed. 

Point  No.  1  of  the  Russian  Document  of  January  12  con- 
cerning the  extent  of  territory  over  which  any  population 
will  be  called  upon  to  exercise  the  right  of  self-determina- 
tion was  then  taken  up  again.  Upon  the  invitation  of  the 
chairman,  General  Hoffmann  spread  out  a  map  and  drew 
with  his  finger  a  line  from  the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland 
east  of  Moon  Sound  and  then  on  to  Valk,  Dvinsk  and 
Brest-Litovsk,  When  the  Russians  referred  to  the  occu- 
pied territories  south  of  Brest-Litovsk,  General  Hoffmann 
replied,  "We  will  speak  about  them  to  the  Ukrainian 
Republic." 

Thereupon  Trotzky  replied  that,  "the  process  of  the 
self-determination  of  the  Ukraine  had  not  yet  progressed 
so  far  that  the  question  of  determining  the  boundaries 
between  us  and  the  new  Republic  can  be  regarded  as 
finally  settled.  I  remarked  at  the  time  that  this  need 
create  no  difficulties  in  the  discussions,  since,  according 
to  our  principles,  the  boundaries  are  to  be  determined  by 
the  will  of  the  masses  of  the  populations  interested,  and 
in  every  individual  instance  it  would  require  an  agreement 
between  us  and  the  Ukrainian  Delegation.  This  applies  in 
the  fullest  measure  also  to  those  occupied  territories  south 
of  Brest-Litovsk."  Answering  Czernin's  query  as  to 
whether  the   question   of   the   occupied   regions   south   of 


i 


SEPAEATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  93 

Brest-Litovsk  should  be  discussed  with  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment or,  as  the  Ukrainian  Delegation  wished,  only  with 
the  Ukraine,  Trotzky  replied  that  the  right  of  the  Ukrain- 
ian Delegation  to  consider  this  question  in  a  one-sided  and 
independent  manner  could  not  be  recognized.  Czernin  de- 
clared that  he  would  speak  on  the  question  further  after 
the  problem  of  competency  between  the  Russian  and  the 
Ukrainian  Delegations  had  been  clarified. 

Referring  further  to  questions  of  territory,  von  Kuehl- 
mann  asked  for  a  statement  regarding  the  relations  be- 
tween the  Caucasus  and  the  Petrograd  Government. 
Trotzky  made  the  following  statement:  "The  army  of 
the  Caucasus  is  completely  under  the  command  of  officers 
who  are  unqualifiedly  devoted  to  the  Soviet  of  People's 
Commissars.  That  was  confirmed  about  two  weeks  ago  at 
the  Congress  of  Delegates  at  the  Caucasian  front." 

Von  Kuehlmann  asked  further  if  the  affairs  of  the 
Aland  Islands  were  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment or  if  the  Republic  of  Finland  was  now  to  deal  with 
the  international  aspects  of  these  affairs.  Trotzky  made 
the  following  statement :  ' '  The  proclamation  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Finnish  State  has  thus  far  brought  about 
no  changes  in  the  question  of  the  Aland  Islands." 

Trotzky  reserved  any  expression  of  opinion  on  the  mer- 
its of  this  question  and,  addressing  the  meeting,  declared : 
t  The  position  of  the  Austro-Germans  is  now  abso- 

*  lutely  clear.  Germany  and  Austria  seek  to  cut  off 
more  than  150,000  square  versts  from  the  former  Po- 
lish Kingdom  of  Lithuania,  also  the  area  populated 
by  the  Ukrainians  and  White  Russians,  and,  further, 
they  want  to  cut  into  the  territory  of  the  Letts  and 
separate  the  islands  populated  by  the  Esthonians  from 
the  same  peoples  on  the  mainland.  Within  this  terri- 
tory Germany  and  Austria  wish  to  retain  their  reign 
of  military  occupation,  not  only  after  the  conclusion 
of  peace  with  Russia,  but  after  the  conclusion  of  a 
general  peace.  At  the  same  time  the  Central  Powers 
not  only  refuse  to  give  any  explanation  regarding  the 
terms  of  evacuation,  but  also  refuse  to  obligate  them- 
selves regarding  the  evacuation. 

The  internal  life  of  these  provinces  lies,  therefore, 
for  an  indefinite  period  in  the  hands  of  these  powers. 


94  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Under  such  conditions  any  indefinite  guarantees  re- 
garding an  expression  of  will  by  the  Poles,  Letts 
and  Lithuanians  are  only  of  an  illusory  character. 
Practically  it  means  that  the  Governments  of  Austria 
and  Germany  take  into  their  own  hands  the  destiny 
of  these  nations. 

Trotzky  declared  that  he  was  glad  now  that  the  Central 
Powers  were  speaking  frankly,  stating  that  General  Hoff- 
mann's conditions  proved  that  their  real  aims  were  built 
on  a  basis  quite  different  from  that  of  the  principles  recog- 
nized on  December  25,  and  that  real  or  lasting  peace  was 
only  possible  on  the  actual  application  of  self-determina- 
tion. 

"It  is  clear,"  Trotzky  declared,  "that  the  decision  could 
have  been  reached  long  ago  regarding  peace  aims  if  the 
Central  Powers  had  not  stated  their  aims  differently  from 
those  expressed  by  General  Hoffmann." 

Von  Kuehlmann  replied  to  Trotzky,  declaring  that  Gen- 
eral Hoffmann's  aims  were  in  principle  the  same  as  those 
advanced  at  Christmas.  Throughout  the  negotiations,  he 
said,  the  Germans  had  kept  in  view  the  ethnological  bound- 
aries, but  also  the  actual  boundaries  of  the  old  Russian 
Empire.  The  Central  Powers  intended  to  permit  free  self- 
determination,  and  he  scoffed  at  the  theory  that  the  pres- 
ence of  troops  would  prevent  this.  Regarding  evacuation, 
von  Kuehlmann  said  that  this  must  be  taken  up  with  the 
newly  born  self-determined  Governments. 

"If  General  Hoffmann  expresses  these  terms  more 
strongly,"  said  von  Kuehlmann,  "it  is  because  a  soldier 
always  uses  stronger  language  than  diplomats.  But  it 
must  not  be  deduced  from  this  that  there  is  any  dissention 
between  us  regarding  the  principles,  which  are  a  well 
thought-out  whole." 

At  the  close  of  the  sitting,  Trotzky  explained  that  be- 
cause of  inner  political  reasons  (the  Russian  Constituent 
Assembly  had  opened  at  Petrograd  on  that  very  day)  he 
would  be  compelled  to  return  to  Petrograd  for  about  a 
week.  Moreover,  the  sittings  of  the  Committee  had  led 
to  a  full  discussion  of  all  questions  in  detail.  He  therefore 
proposed  that  the  deliberations  of  the  Committee  be  ad- 
journed until  the  29th  of  January.  With  his  departure, 
the  leadership  of  the  Russian  Delegation  would  be  turned 


SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  95 

over  to  Joffe.  The  Delegations  of  the  Central  Powers  con- 
sented to  this  request,  declaring,  however,  that  it  would 
be  much  pleasanter  if  they  could  continue  the  negotiations 
without  interruption,  as  the  former  recess  had  brought 
about  many  misunderstandings;  and  they  expressed  the 
hope  that  after  Trotzky's  return  a  complete  agreement 
would  be  arrived  at. 

January  18-19.  The  Constituent  Assembly  which  had  been 
elected,  according  to  the  Soviet  Government,  "from  the 
old  election  lists"  and  which  was  "the  expression  of  the 
old  regime,  when  authority  belonged  to  the  bourgeoisie," 
attempted  to  meet  at  Petrograd.  The  Soviet  Government 
laid  before  the  Constituent  Assembly  a  draft  of  a  funda- 
mental law  whose  main  provision  was  that  "power  must 
lie  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  working  classes  and  their 
representatives,  the  Soviets."  The  Constituent  Assembly 
refused  to  adopt  this  document,  and,  as  a  consequence,  on 
January  19,  the  Soviet  Government  issued  a  decree  out- 
lining its  attitude  toward  the  Constituent  Assembly  and 
closing  with  the  words,  "The  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee therefore  orders  the  Constituent  Assembly  dissolved.' 


VIII.     THE  SECOND  INTERVAL 

96  January  19.  *' Peace  strikes"  began  to  spread  throughout 
Austria-Hungary,  particularly  in  Vienna  and  Budapest. 
Newspapers  stopped  appearing  and  industry  was  brought 
to  a  standstill  and  lighting  works  interfered  with.  Depu- 
tations of  workers  were  received  by  various  ministers.  It 
was  made  clear  in  every  instance  that  the  strikes  were  be- 
ing carried  on  in  order  to  secure  Governmental  declara- 
tions that  the  Brest  negotiations  would  not  be  permitted 
to  break  down  over  territorial  issues.  The  Austrian  Prime 
Minister,  von  Seydler,  informed  the  deputation  calling 
upon  him  that 

it  was  his  Majesty's  wish  to  end  the  war  at  the  ear- 
liest possible  moment  by  an  honorable  peace.  ...  If 
for  the  present,  however,  only  a  separate  peace  with 
Russia  is  practicable,  the  responsibility  rests  solely 
with  the  Entente  Powers,  which  have  rejected  repeat- 
edly our  peace  offers. 

Premier  Wekerle  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament  declared 
that  the  Government  adhered  to  the  principle  of  peace 
without  annexations  and  indemnities,  and  that  this  view 
was  shared  by  every  organ  of  the  monarchy,  above  all  by 
the  King. 

97  January  20-21.  The  first  official  sittings  of  the  Russo- 
German  Legal  Commission  were  held.  Articles  for  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  on  the  following  points  were  discussed 
and  formulated: 

1.  The  ending  of  belligerency. 

2.  The  renewal  of  diplomatic  and  consular  relations. 

3.  War  damages. 

4.  The  renewal  of  State  treaties. 

On  the  same  days  the  Russo-German  Economic  Commis- 
sion continued  its  discussions,  referring  to  sub-commissions 
preliminary  work  for  further  deliberations. 

98  January  21.  Trotzky  arrived  at  Petrograd,  He  said  that 
the  German  terms  preponderatingly  favored  annexations, 


SECOND  INTEEVAL  97 

their  object  being  to  strangle  Eussia  economically  and  po- 
litically. The  Austrian  Delegates  had  played  no  very  ac- 
tive role  in  the  negotiations,  merely  assenting  to  every 
German  proposal. 

Karaklian,  Secretary  of  the  Russian  Delegation  at 
Brest,  announced  that  the  Russian  Delegation  had  made 
an  official  protest  to  the  heads  of  the  German  and  Austrian 
Delegations  regarding  the  omission  from  the  official  Ger- 
man reports  of  the  declaration  of  Trotzky  at  the  last  sit- 
ting of  the  Brest  Conference,  that  after  a  fortnight's  nego- 
tiations Germany  and  Austria  were  insisting  upon  terms 
contrary  to  the  principles  acknowledged  on  December  25 
respecting  peace  without  annexations  and  indemnities. 

January  22.  The  Russian  Government  issued  two  wireless 
communications  "TO  ALL"  with  the  object  of  showing 
that  by  von  Kuehlmann's  declaration  that  the  Central 
Powers  cannot  remove  their  armies  from  the  occupied  re- 
gions until  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  the  peoples  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  being  deceived. 

One  communication  asserts  that  the  annexationists  have 
been  sufficiently  powerful  to  impose  their  will  upon  the 
evasive  diplomats  of  the  von  Hertling-von  Kuehlmann 
school,  but  that  the  Governments  of  the  Central  Powers 
did  not  dare  divulge  this  to  their  own  peoples.  It  con- 
tinues : 

This  object  is  monstrous,  the  annexation  of  Poland, 
Lithuania,   Courland,   Riga,  parts  of  Livonia,   Moon 
Sound  and  the  Islands,  with  the  purpose  of  the  com- 
plete  economic   and  political  subjugation  of  Russia, 
while  the  role  of  the  Austrian  representatives  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  has  been  limited  to  humble  approval.     Aus- 
trian statesmen  are  appeasing  their  restless  workmen 
by  affirming  that  the  Central  Powers  are  striving  for 
a  democratic  peace,  but  to  have  such  a  program  and 
to  talk  at  the  same  time  of  a  democratic  peace  sur- 
passes even  the  limits  permitted  to  diplomacy. 
The  second  wireless  "TO  ALL"  emphasizes  the  absolute 
refusal  to  give  any  sort  of  guarantee  for  the  evacuation  of 
occupied  territories. 

In  such  circumstances  the  words  self-determination 
sound  like  a  mockery  of  principles  and  of  the  peoples 


98  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

concerned.  .  .  .  The  revolution  cannot  live  in  an  at- 
mosphere of  deceit  and  falsehood.  The  revolution  may 
not  at  a  given  moment  be  in  a  position  to  repudiate  the 
annexationists,  but  it  will  never  humiliate  itself  so  as 
to  call  black  white  and  will  not  cover  up  brutal  annex- 
ationist pretensions  with  the  fig  leaf  of  democracy. 
The  significance  of  the  Brest-Litovsk  pourparlers  is 
that  they  have  stripped  from  German  imperialism  its 
false  cloak  temporarily  borrowed  from  the  democratic 
wardrobe,  and  exposed  the  cruel  reality  of  the  annex- 
ationism  of  owners  and  capitalists.  There  is  nothing 
more  to  be  demanded  from  the  pourparlers. 

101  January  24.  Two  addresses  were  delivered,  both  of  them 
dealing  Avith  the  Brest  negotiations  and  with  President 
Wilson's  fourteen  points.  The  one  was  delivered  by  the 
German  Chancellor,  von  Hertling,  before  the  Main  Com- 
mittee of  the  German  Reichstag  and  the  other  by  Count 
Czernin,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
before  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Austrian  Par- 
liamentary Delegation. 

Some  extracts  from  Hertling 's  address  referring  to  the 
Brest  negotiations  follow: 

The  negotiations  are  progressing  slowly.  They  are 
exceedingly  difficult.  .  .  .  Indeed  many  times  there 
were  reasons  to  doubt  whether  the  Russian  Delegation 
were  in  earnest  with  their  peace  negotiations,  and  all 
sorts  of  wireless  messages,  which  are  going  around  the 
world  with  remarkably  strange  contents,  tended  to 
strengthen  this  doubt.  Nevertheless,  I  hold  firmly  to 
the  hope  that  we  shall  come  to  a  favorable  conclusion 
in  the  near  future  with  the  Russian  Delegation  at 
Brest-Litovsk.     ' 

Our  negotiations  with  the  Ukrainian  representatives 
are  in  a  more  favorable  position.  Here  too  difficulties 
have  yet  to  be  overcome.  .  .  .  We  hope  shortly  to 
reach  conclusions  with  the  Ukraine  which  will  be  in 
the  interests  of  both  parties  and  will  be  economically 
advantageous. 

Referring  to  Points  I  and  VI  of  President  Wilson's 
Fourteen  Points,  Chancellor  Hertling  said: 

I.  The  negotiations  at  Brest-Litovsk  are  being  con- 
ducted with  full  publicity.     This  proves  that  we  are 


I 


SECOND  INTERVAL  99 

quite  ready  to  accept  this  proposal  and  declare  pub- 
licity of  negotiations  to  be  a  general  political  principle, 
VI.  Evacuation  of  Russian  territory.  Now  that 
the  Entente  has  refused  within  the  period  agreed  upon 
by  Russia  and  the  Quadruple  Alliance  to  join  in  the 
negotiations,  I  must  in  the  name  of  the  latter  decline 
to  allow  any  subsequent  interference.  We  are  dealing 
here  with  questions  which  concern  only  Russia  and  the 
four  Allied  [Central]  Powers.  I  adhere  to  the  hope 
that  with  recognition  of  self-determination  for  the 
peoples  on  the  western  frontier  of  the  former  Russian 
Empire,  good  relations  will  be  established  both  with 
these  peoples  and  with  the  rest  of  Russia,  for  whom 
we  wish  most  earnestly  a  return  of  order  and  peace 
and  of  conditions  guaranteeing  the  welfare  of  the 
country. 

Over  two-thirds  of  Foreign  Minister  Czernin's  lengthy 
speech  has  to  do  with  the  proceedings  at  Brest-Litovsk, 
He  describes  in  detail  the  difficulties  of  the  negotiations. 
They  are  due  in  the  first  instance  to  the  fact  that  the  nego- 
tiations 

have  taken  place   in  full  view.  .  .  .  Our  task   is  to 
build  a  new  world.  .  .  ,  Various  phases  of  all   past 
peace  negotiations  which  we  know  of  have  developed 
more  or  less  behind  closed  doors  and  their  results  were 
told  to  the  world  only  after  the  negotiations  had  been 
completed.  .  .  .  But  when  these  various   phases   and 
these  details  are  each  day  telegraphed  to  the  world,  it 
it  quite  easily  understood  that  they  .  .  .  excite  public 
opinion.     We  were  completely  aware  of  the  disadvan- 
tages of  this  procedure.     Still  we  immediately  gave 
way  to  the  desire  of  the  Russian  Government  for  pub- 
licity because  we  wished  to  show  ourselves  friendly 
and  because  we  have  nothing  to  hide.  .  .  .  But  the 
other  fact  consequent  upon  this  complete  publicity  of 
the  negotiations  is,  that  the  great  public,  the  country 
behind  the  front,  and,  above  all,  the  leaders,  must  keep 
their  nerves  steady. 
After  declaring  that  "the  basis  upon  which  Austria- 
Hungary  treats  ...  is  that  of  no  contributions  nor  annex- 
ations. ...  I   declare   once   more   that   I   demand   not    a 
square  meter  nor  a  penny  from  Russia,"  he  went  on  to 
describe 


100  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

the  two  greatest  difficulties  which  contain  reasons  why 
the  negotiations  are  not  progressing  as  rapidly  as  we 
all  should  like.         ^ 

The  first  difficulty  is  that  we  are  not  treating  with 
one  Russian  peace-maker,  but  with  various  newly- 
created  Russian  Governments  which  have  not  clearly 
defined  among  themselves  their  spheres  of  competency. 
.  .  .  first,  that  part  of  Russia  led  by  Petrograd,  second, 
our  own  new  neighboring  State,  great  Ukrainia,  third, 
Finland,  and  fourtH,  Caucasus.  ... 

What  interests  us  especially  and  chiefly  is  the  newly- 
created  great  State  which  will  be  our  neighbour  in 
the  future,  Ukrainia.  We  have  got  very  far  in  our 
negotiations  with  this  Delegation.  We  have  agreed 
on  the  above-mentioned  basis  of  no  annexations  or 
compensations  and  have  agreed  what  and  how  com- 
mercial relations  with  the  newly-created  Republic  are 
to  be  re-established.  But  ...  I  confess  I  do  not  know 
what  the  situation  is  to-day,  for  yesterday  my  rep- 
resentative at  Brest-Litovsk  received  two  telegrams 
to  the  effect  that  M.  Joffe,  the  President  of  the  Rus- 
sian Delegation  had  sent  to  the  Delegations  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  a  circular  Note  declaring  that  the 
Government  of  The  Republic  of  Workmen  and  Peas- 
ants of  the  Ukraine,  which  sits  at  Kharkov,  in  no  case 
recognizes  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Kiev  Rada 
as  representing  the  entire  Ukrainian  people,  because 
the  Central  Rada  represents  only  the  capitalist  classes 
and  cannot  consequently  speak  in  the  name  of  the 
Ukrainian  people.  The  Note  also  states  that  the 
Kharkov  Rada  does  not  recognize  any  agreements 
which  might  eventually  be  concluded  by  the  Central 
Rada  without  its  consent  and  announces  that  the  Khar- 
kov Rada  is  sending  two  Delegates  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  all  the  Soviets  of  Workmen,  Soldiers 
and  Peasants  in  the  Ukraine  .  .  .  (who)  recognize 
the  People's  Commissars  as  the  organ  of  all  the 
Soviets  of  Russia  and  as  having  the  right  to  speak 
in  the  name  of  the  entire  Russian  Federation.  .  .  . 
President  Joffe  adds  in  his  communication  that  his. 
Delegation  is  ready  to  co-operate  to  the  fullest  extent 
with  the  new  Ukrainian  Delegation.  .  .  . 

We  want  nothing  at  all  of  Poland.  .  .  .  Poland's 
people  shall  choose  their  own  destiny,  free  and  un- 


SECOND  INTEEVAL  iO'l 

influenced.  I  consider  the  form  of  the  popular  decision 
of  this  question  as  not  especially  important.  ...  I 
should  have  liked  to  see  the  Polish  Government  take 
part  in  the  negotiations,  for,  according  to  my  opinion, 
Poland  is  an  independent  State.  The  St.  Petersburg 
Government,  however,  thinks  that  the  present  Polish 
Government  is  not  entitled  to  speak  in  the  name  of  the 
country  and  it  has  failed  to  recognize  it  as  a  competent 

t  representative  of  the  country.  ... 

The  second  difficulty  ...  is  the  difference  of  opin- 
ion between  our  German  ally  and  the  St.  Petersburg 
Government  in  the  interpretation  of  the  right  of  the 
Russian  nations  to  determine  their  own  destinies,  that 
is,  in  those  territories  occupied  by  German  troops. 

Count  Czernin  then  explained  the  German  and  the  Rus- 
sian views  as  they  had  developed  during  the  discussions 
at  Brest,  first  as  to  the  representative  character  of  the 
existing  legislative  and  communal  bodies  in  the  occupied 
provinces,  and  second,  as  to  the  conditions  (with  or  with- 
out the  presence  of  German  troops)  under  which  a  plebi- 
scite should  take  place.  ''In  both  questions,"  he  declared, 
T     "we  must  find  a  compromise." 

P  After  discussing  President  Wilson 's  Fourteen  Points  and 
after  declaring,  "I  desire  peace  with  St.  Petersburg  also 
because  it  makes  general  peace  nearer,"  he  reverted  in  de- 
tail to  the  impending  peace  with  the  tFkraine — "the  wheat 
peace." 
^  The  question  is  not  one — I  repeat  it  the  tenth  time 

■  — of   imperialist   or    annexationist   plans    and    inten- 

B:  tions,   but  of  assuring  our  population  a  fijially  de- 

■:  served  reward  for  steadily  holding  out  and  giving  it 

M  those  foodstuffs  which  it  will  gladly  accept.  .  .  . 

If  you  want  to  spoil  peace  and  refuse  grain  ship- 
ments, then  it  is  logical  to  force  my  hand  by  speeches, 
resolutions,  strikes  and  demonstrations.  ...  If  behind 
the  front  you  arrange  strikes  .  .  .  5^ou  are  cutting 
your  own  flesh  and  all  those  who  think  that  such  means 
hasten  peace  are  in  awful  error.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  You  must  help  me  or  you  must  bring  about 
my  fall. 

'3     January  25.     Von  Kuehlmann  discussed  the  Brest-Litovsk 
negotiations  before  the  German  Reichstag.     He  defended 


;  lj3^\.:l   ;  .  r  NEGOTIAT^IOXS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

the  correctness  of  General  Hoffmann's  attitude.  He  was 
certain  that  friendly  relations  would  be  established  soon 
with  Finland  and  he  considered  an  early  conclusion  of 
peace  with  the  Ukraine  to  be  probable.  ' '  The  greatest  dif- 
ficulties are  in  coming  to  a  conclusion  with  the  Petrograd 
Bolsheviks  .  .  .  who  maintain  themselves  by  brutal  force 
and  whose  arguments  are  cannon  and  machine  guns.  The 
Bolsheviks  preach  beautifully,  but  they  practice  other- 
wise." Without  denying  the  Trotzkian  desire  for  peace, 
the  Minister  said  he  had  come  across  more  than  one  state- 
ment from  the  Maximalist  side  showing  that  "those  gen- 
tlemen are  indulging  in  another  policy  than  that  of  con- 
cluding an  open  and  honorable  peace  with  the  bourgeois 
Governments  of  the  Central  Powers  which  are  hated  like 
poison, ' ' 

104  January  25-27.  The  Third  All-Russian  Congress  of 
Soviets  met  at  Petrograd  to  hear  a  report  of  the  Brest 
negotiations  and  to  determine  upon  the  further  policy  of 
the  Russian  Delegation.  Members  of  the  Peasants '  Assem- 
bly were  also  given  seats. 

Kamenev  emphasized  the  new  grouping  in  the  world 
struggle  which  was  ceasing  to  be  a  struggle  of  one  im- 
perialistic group  against  another,  but  in  Europe,  at  any 
event,  was  a  struggle  of  the  general  proletariat  against  the 
bourgeoisie. 

We  welcome  the  rising  of  Austrian  workmen  and 
shall  welcome  their  emancipation  from  Austro-German 
imperialism  exactly  as  we  shall  w^elcome  the  escape 
of  the  Irish  people  from  the  imperialism  of  England. 

He  read  a  statement  from  Austrian  Socialists  who  had  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  supported  their  Government  and 
who  now  realized  that  the  Russians  and  Germans  could  not 
come  to  terms,  not  because  they  were  Russians  opposed 
to  Germans,  but  because  they  were  Social  Democrats  deal- 
ing with  landowners  and  bourgeois. 

Martov  and  other  opponents  of  the  Bolsheviki,  while 
criticising  details  in  the  management  of  the  negotiations, 
agreed  that  they  had  been  of  service  in  making  the  situation 
clear  to  democracy  throughout  the  world.  All  were  unani- 
mous in  refusing  to  accept  the  conditions  now  offered  by 
Germanv.     There  was  less  unanimity  on  what  was  to  be 


SECOND  INTEEVAL  103 

done,  some  delegates  insisting  upon  the  physical  impossi- 
bility of  fighting. 

An  exposition  of  the  history,  method,  aims  and  results  of 
the  peace  negotiations  was  given  by  Trotzky.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  Allies  had  now  had  two  and  a  half  months 
in  which  to  come  in  and  that  Kerensky's  repeated  efforts 
to  move  the  Allies  toward  peace  had  proved  fruitless.  The 
object  of  the  negotiations  was  to  make  the  actual  obstacles 
to  peace  clear.  He  touched  on  the  weak  point  on  the 
Russian  side — the  Delegation  from  the  Ukrainian  Rada. 
' '  We  asked  them  like  ourselves  to  hold  no  unpublished  con- 
versations Avith  the  enemy.  They  said  they  would  consult 
Kiev  before  answering.  That  answer  we  have  never  re- 
ceived in  spite  of  repeated  requests."  He  read  a  telegram 
showing  that  Albert  Thomas  even  to-day  believed  that  the 
patriotic  Rada  was  going  to  save  Russia  from  making  a 
separate  peace,  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Rada  was 
concluding  a  separate  peace  itself.  Then  after  mentioning 
three  distinct  tendencies  in  Germany  he  said  that  the  main 
point  on  which  the  discussions  hung  was  the  refusal  of 
Germany  to  name  a  date  for  the  removal  of  troops.  He 
sketched  the  line  which  the  Germans  intended  to  be  the 
new  frontiers  and  said  it  was  so  planned  as  to  make  fur- 
ther German  aggression  easy : 

The  whole  scheme  of  the  German  argument  was 
based  on  the  assumption  that  the  Russian  Government 
would  understand  but  remain  silent,  and  be  grateful  to 
the  Germans  for  saving  their  faces  by  giving  a  mock 
democratic  character  to  their  peace.  The  bourgeois 
Governments  can  sign  any  kind  of  peace.  The  Govern- 
ment of  the  Soviets  cannot.  .  .  .  Either  we  shall  be 
destroyed  or  the  power  of  the  bourgeoisie  throughout 
Europe  will  be  destroyed.  We  have  left  the  imperial- 
istic war  and  we  shall  never  return  to  it.  ...  I  can- 
not say  that  the  Russian  revolution  is  assured  of  vic- 
tory over  German  imperialism.  More  than  that,  I 
declare  that  anyone  who  says  that  the  Russian  revo- 
lution will  not  under  certain  conditions  be  obliged 
to  accept  an  unfortunate  but  not  disgraceful  peace  is 
a  demagogue  and  a  charlatan.  We  cannot  give  you 
a  pledge  that  we  will  not  conclude  separate  peace. 
If  we  gave  such  a  pledge  Ave  should  make  the  Russian 
army   dependent   upon   French   and   American   gold. 


104  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

We  are  strong  because  we  are  rousing  the  people's 
conscience  to  protest  in  all  countries.  The  conversa- 
tion between  the  Russian  revolution  and  German  im- 
perialism is  not  finished  yet.  We  shall  still  say  our 
say  there  and  we  will  not  bend  our  banners. 

With  regard  to  the  further  negotiations,  he  asked  to  be 
allowed  freedom  of  action.  In  any  case  he  would  not  sign 
a  non-democratic  peace. 

The  Congress  adopted  a  resolution  approving  the  policy 
of  the  Brest  Delegation,  declaring  against  the  German 
terms,  but  giving  the  Delegation  a  free  hand. 

i05  January  28.  "Peace,  Bread  and  Liberty"  strikes  began 
in  Berlin.  At  this  time  a  Soviet  was  formed  in  Berlin, 
to  which  members  of  even  the  Majority  Socialists  adhered 
before  the  whole  movement  was  suppressed  by  military 
force.  The  Berlin  workmen  formulated  the  following  con- 
ditions which  were  to  be  fulfilled  before  the  workers  were 
to  return  to  work: 

1.  Peace  without  annexations  or  indemnities,  based 
on  the  right  of  the  free  action  of  peoples,  as  soon  as 
possible. 

2.  Labour  representatives  from  all  countries  shall 
participate  in  the  peace  negotiations. 

3.  A  reorganisation  of  the  food  system  so  that  all 
classes  shall  get  the  same. 

4.  The  state  of  siege  shall  be  immediately  abolished, 
as  well  as  the  prohibition  against  meetings. 

5.  Newspapers  and  meetings  shall  be  permitted  free 
expression  of  opinion. 

6.  The  military  control  of  industry  shall  no  longer 
exist. 

7.  All  political  prisoners  shall  be  released. 

8.  The  whole  organisation  of  the  German  Empire 
shall  be  thoroughly  democratised. 

9.  General,  direct,  secret  suffrage  for  all  over  20 
years,  men  and  women,  shall  be  introduced  into 
Prussia. 


IX.     THE  SEPARATE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS— 
THE  UKRAINE 

January  30.  The  pourparlers  at  Brest-Litovsk  were  re- 
sumed under  the  presidency  of  the  Turkish  Grand  Vizier, 
Talaat  Pasha.     A  plenary  sitting  was  held. 

The  Russian  Delegation  consisted  of  the  following: 
Trotzky,  Joffe,  Bizenko  and  Karelin  as  representatives  of 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet  of  Work- 
men's, Soldiers'  and  Peasants'  delegates.  Two  members 
of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  had  been  added — 
Medvediev,  President  of  the  Executive  Committee  at  Khar- 
kov, and  General  Shachray,  Secretary  of  State  for  military 
affairs  of  the  Kharkov  Committee.  The  Russian  Dele- 
gation included  also  the  following  experts :  General 
Samoljo,  Captains  Lipski  and  Grinberget,  Admiral  Alt- 
vater,  representing  military  Councils ;  Radek,  expert  in  gen- 
eral and  Polish  affairs ;  Bobinski,  Polish  expert ;  Teriain, 
expert  for  Armenia ;  Stuczka  and  Mickiewicz,  experts  for 
Lettish  and  Lithuanian  affairs  respectively. 

The  Bavarian  Government,  by  virtue  of  its  treaty  rights 
and  after  agreement  with  the  German  Emperor  and  the 
Imperial  Chancellor,  had  appointed  Count  von  Podewils- 
Duernitz  as  its  representative  in  the  negotiations. 

The  question  of  the  competency  of  the  Delegations  from 
the  Ukraine  formed  the  subject  of  discussion  at  the  meeting. 

Trotzky  gave  the  information  that  the  Ukrainian  Soviets 
were  engaged  throughout  the  Ukraine  in  a  determined 
battle  against  the  Kiev  Rada.  The  Soviet  was  in  posses- 
sion of  the  whole  Donetz  coalfield,  the  entire  mining  region 
of  Ekaterineslav,  and  the  Governments  of  Kharkov  and 
Poltava.  The  power  of  the  Soviet  was  increasing  while 
that  of  the  Rada  was  declining.  It  was  reported  also  tliat 
the  Kiev  Secretariat  had  resigned.  What  influence  this 
would  have  upon  the  Delegation  of  ]\I.  Holubovich  was 
not  yet  known.  But  it  was  clear  that  a  peace  concluded 
with  the  Delegation  of  the  Kiev  Rada  could  not  be  regarded 
as  a  peace  concluded  with  the  Ukraine  Republic.  Dis- 
senting from  Kuelilmann's  representation  to  the  Reich- 
stag that  the  Russians  had  altered  their  view  regarding 


106  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

the  competency  of  the  Ukraine  Delegation  as  soon  as  the 
latter  would  not  play  the  role  of  auxiliary,  he  recalled  his 
declaration  at  the  first  sitting  that  the  process  of  developing 
the  self-determination  of  the  Ukraine  was  still  going  on. 
Now,  when  the  Ukrainian  Soviets  were  represented  at  the 
All-Russian  Congress  at  Petrograd,  which  had  established 
a  federative  basis  for  the  Russian  Republic,  the  inclusion  of 
representatives  of  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  in  the  Russian  Del- 
egation entirely  corresponded  to  conditions  obtaining  in  the 
Russian  Republic.  If  the  Delegation  of  M.  Holubovich 
had  as  before  the  mandate  of  the  Kiev  Secretariat,  no 
objection  was  raised  to  its  further  participation  in  the  peace 
negotiations.  In  any  case,  however,  only  such  an  agree- 
ment made  with  the  Ukraine  could  be  recognized  that  se- 
cured the  formal  endorsement  of  the  Government  of  the 
Federative  Republic  of  Russia. 

Levitsky  of  the  Kiev  Delegation  declared  that  it  had  been 
agreed  that  until  the  return  of  the  entire  Delegation  from 
Kiev  the  one  or  two  members  who  remained  behind  at 
Brest  would  not  act  on  political  questions.  The  attitude 
of  their  Delegation  was  therefore  reserved. 

Von  Kuehlmann,  while  undertaking  to  postpone  the  dis- 
cussion until  the  arrival  of  the  Kiev  Delegation,  complained 
of  the  absence  of  any  hint  that  besides  the  Delegation 
headed  by  Holubovich  other  bodies  existed,  claiming  to 
speak  on  behalf  of  the  Ukraine.  The  Central  Delegations 
would  thoroughly  examine  this  important  question. 

Trotzky  replied  that  the  question  would  be  decided  by 
the  result  of  the  struggle  between  the  two  organizations. 

Czernin  proposed,  and  Trotzky  assented,  that  to  avoid 
delay  the  Committee  on  Territorial  and  Political  Questions 
should  resume  its  work. 

The  plenary  sitting  was  then  closed  by  Talaat  Pasha. 

107  It  was  announced  in  Petrograd  that  Trotzky  had  ad- 
dressed a  letter  to  the  Persian  Minister  in  Petrograd  de- 
claring that  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  1907  was 
directed  against  the  liberty  and  independence  of  the  Per- 


THE  PART  OF  UKRAINE  107 

sian  people,  and  was  null  and  void  for  all  time.  The 
Russian  Government  denounce  all  agreements  preced- 
ing- or  following  the  said  agreement  which  in  any  way 
restrict  the  rights  of  the  Persian  people  to  free  and  inde- 
.pendent  existence.  The  Government  will  do  all  in  its  power 
in  the  domain  of  international  relations  to  bring  about  com- 
plete evacuation  of  Persia  by  Turkish  and  British  troops. 

A  meeting  was  held  of  the  Russo-Austro-Hungarian  Com- 
mittee on  Political  and  Territorial  Questions  under  the 
Chairmanship  of  Count  Czernin,  who  pointed  out  that  thus 
far  the  Committee  had  discussed  the  question  of  the  re- 
gions occupied  by  German  troops.  He  now  proposed  to 
attain  certainty  regarding  the  regions  occupied  by  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops.  Before  entering  upon  details  he  felt  it 
necessary  to  observe  that  the  Ukrainian  Delegation  held 
that  they  alone  and  independently  were  competent  to  dis- 
cuss and  decide  this  question. 

Replying,  Trotzky  emphatically  protested  against  the 
view  of  the  Kiev  Delegation  that  it  could  independently 
solve  territorial  questions.  He  pointed,  in  support  of  his 
view,  to  the  participation  as  members  of  the  Russian  Dele- 
gation of  representatives  of  the  Kharkov  Executive  Com- 
mittee. As  to  the  facts  themselves,  he  considered,  on  the 
strength  of  various  reports,  especially  a  telegram  just  re- 
ceived, that  the  participation  of  the  Delegation  of  the  Kiev 
Rada  was  more  a  question  of  the  past  than  of  the  future. 

Czernin  in  reply  proposed  that  a  plenary  sitting  be  held 
as  soon  as  possible  to  settle  definitely  the  controversy 
between  the  Kiev  and  Petrograd  Delegations.  From, 
his  impressions  at  the  first  sittings,  he  did  not  understand 
that  the  frontiers  of  the  Ukraine  with  respect  to  Poland, 
for  instance,  were  to  be  the  subject  of  special  discussion 
with  Petrograd.  He  asked  the  following  question,  "Does 
the  President  of  the  Russian  Delegation  intend  to  exclude 
the  idea  that  the  Ukraine  can  alone  decide  matters  concern- 
ing the  independent  Ukrainian  State,  particularly  with  re- 
spect to  its  frontiers'?" 

Trotzky  replied  that  the  Ukraine  was  part  of  the  Fed- 
erative Republic  of  Russia  and  that  therefore  everything 
would  have  to  be  decided  from  the  point  of  view  of  consti- 
tuting such  a  Republic. 


108  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

After  a  brief  passage  concerning  the  possibility  of  ad- 
mitting to  the  negotiations  the  President  of  the  existing 
Polish  Ministry,  M.  Kucharczevski,  the  meeting  was  ad- 
journed. 

109  February  1.  A  plenary  sitting  of  all  the  Delegations  took 
place.  The  Delegation  of  the  Kiev  Rada  was  present. 
The  Bulgarian  Premier,  Radoslavov,  sat  as  leader  of  the 
Bulgarian  Delegation. 

Severjuk,  who  announced  that  he  had  assumed  the  lead- 
ership of  the  Kiev  Delegation,  referred  to  the  Manifesto 
of  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada  on  November  20,  1917,  pro- 
claiming the  international  position  of  the  Ukrainian  Peo- 
ple's Republic,  which  at  that  time  was  recognized  by  the 
Council  of  People 's  Commissars  as  well  as  by  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  four  Allied  [Central]  Powers,  Furthermore, 
inasmuch  as  a  Federative  Government  of  all  Russian  Re- 
publics had  not  materialized  and  could  not  be  materialized, 
the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada  must  let  the  formation  of  a 
Federative  Government  drop.  In  order  to  avoid  fresh 
wrong  interpretations  from  any  side  whatever,  the  Ukrain- 
ian Delegation  proposed  the  formal  recognition  of  the 
Ukrainian  Republic  as  an  entirely  independent  State. 

Thereupon,  at  Trotzky's  request,  Medvediev,  represent- 
ing the  Kharkov  Ukrainian  Executive  Committee,  said  that 
the  Kiev  Rada  had  only  spoken  at  Brest-Litovsk  in  the 
name  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic.  The  Ukrainian 
Soviets  had  not  been  represented.  As  regards  occupied  ter- 
ritories, the  Ukrainian  Executive  Committee  fully  shared 
the  Russian  Delegation's  standpoint,  and  declared  that  the 
Ukrainian  people  refused  to  recognize  any  agreements  or 
treaties  with  the  Kiev  Rada. 

Trotzky  then  stated  that  they  had  that  day  heard  from 
the  head  of  the  Kiev  Delegation  an  extraordinarily  impor- 
tant change  in  the  conception  and  principles  of  the  Kiev 
Rada  regarding  the  international  legal  position  of  the 
Ukraine.  The  Kiev  Rada  declined  to  join  the  Federative 
Russian  Republic,  and  that  very  afternoon  the  Russian 
State  had  been  recognized  as  a  Federative  Republic  at  the 


THE  PAET  OF  UKEAINE  109 

Third  Soviet  Congress  at  Petrograd  at  which  the  Ukrainian 
people  had  been  represented.     Continuing,  Trotzky  said : 

Many  quarters  have  overvalued  the  tendencies  striv- 
ing for  secession  in  to-day's  revolutionary  Russia.  In 
the  border  regions  of  the  former  Russian  Empire  the 
separatist  idea  is  advocated  by  those  very  groups  and 
classes  which,  under  the  old  regime,  were  obstinate 
supporters  of  centralization.  In  this  separatism  no 
continuous  historical  tendency  is  perceptible.  It 
foi-ms  merely  a  transient  weapon  of  defense  in  the 
hands  of  those  groups  who  feared  the  results  for  them- 
selves of  revolutionary  power  in  Russia.  The  firmer 
the  power  of  the  Soviets  is  established  throughout 
the  country,  the  more  did  the  propertied  classes  trans- 
fer their  separatist  tendencies  to  the  border  regions. 
If  these  classes  were  to  get  the  upper  hand  in  the  pres- 
ent Russia  they  would  again  become  the  advocates  of 
centralization.  Representatives  of  the  Central  Powers 
could  not  here  assume  the  role  of  arbiters  in  regard 
to  the  present  situation  in  Russia  and  the  Ukraine.  .  .  . 
So  long  as  the  Delegation  of  the  Kiev  Rada  retained 
its  plenipotentiary  powers,  he  did  not  protest  against 
its  independent  participation  in  the  negotiations.  But 
now  that  the  representatives  of  the  Ukrainian  Execu- 
tive Committee  had  joined  the  Russian  Delegation,  he 
must  repeat  with  redoubled  emphasis  that  no  agree- 
ments with  the  Kiev  Rada  could  be  recognized  unless 
they  were  also  recognized  by  the  Russian  Delegation. 

Hereupon  a  member  of  the  Kiev  delegation,  Lubynsky, 
entered  upon  a  detailed  defense  of  the  Kiev  Rada  and  a 
severe  attack  upon  the  Bolshevik  Government.  He  laid 
down  the  principle  that 

internal  conflicts  within  the  States  are  in  no  wise ''to  be 
brought  to  the  cognizance  of  opposing  parties  during 
official  negotiations.  But  since  the  Ukrainian  Rada 
has  proclaimed  the  independence  of  the  Ukrainian 
Republic,  and  since  that  Republic  has  also  been  rec- 
ognized by  friendly  and  other  powers,  these  questions 
have  ceased  to  be  internal  questions  for  them,  and  their 


110  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

mission  now  obliges  them  resolutely  to  protest  against 
false  assertions  made  by  M.  Trotzky  during  their 
absence. 

The  Bolsheviks '  loud  declarations  about  the  complete 
liberty  of  the  peoples  of  Russia  are  only  coarse  dema- 
gogic expedients.  The  Bolsheviks'  Government, 
which  broke  up  the  Constituent  Assembly  and  which 
is  supported  on  the  bayonets  of  the  mercenaries  of  the 
Red  Guard,  will  never  resolve  to  apply  in  Russia  itself 
the  just  principles  of  the  right  of  self-determination. 
The  Bolshevik  Government  only  proclaimed  the  prin- 
ciple of  self-determination  in  order  to  combat  the  prin- 
ciple in  its  practical  application.  .  .  , 

The  struggle  of  the  Petrograd  Government  against 
the  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  and  its 
manifest  insincerity  on  the  occasion  of  the  recognition 
of  our  Delegation  evoked  suspicion  on  our  part.  .  ,  . 
On  the  day  we  left  for  Kiev  to  get  our  final  instruc- 
tions a  fresh  Delegation  arrived  here  via  Petrograd 
and  Dvinsk  at  the  incitement  and  with  the  benevolent 
co-operation  of  the  Bolsheviks,  its  object  being  to  un- 
dermine our  authority  in  the  eyes  of  the  laboring 
masses  of  Europe. 

In  order  to  establish  the  rights  of  this  Delegation, 
we  must  go  more  closely  into  detail.  The  Ukrainian 
people,  united  by  common  ideals  and  aspirations,  which 
incline  to  quiet  and  orderly  forms  of  State  life,  zeal- 
ously devoted  itself  from  the  first  to  the  long  expected 
possibility  of  State  construction.  As  a  result  of  this 
labor,  which  had  been  prepared  for  through  long  years 
of  endeavor  by  Ukrainian  politicians,  and  as  the  prod- 
uct of  Ukrainian  revolutionary  creative  power,  the 
Ukrainian  Rada  came  into  being,  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives of  Ukrainian  soldiers,  peasants  and  work- 
men. The  Ukrainian  Rada,  which  chose  as  its  first 
Government  the  General  Secretariat  last  June,  thereby 
formed  the  first  Government  in  Russia  which  was  solely 
composed  of  Socialists.  The  Ukrainian  people  thus 
created  its  own  State,  and  the  Petrograd  Government 
has  no  cause  for  interference  in  its  internal  affairs. 

Already  under  the  Czar's  regime  soldiers  of  non- 
Ukrainian    origin    were    sent    by    preference    to    the 


THE  PART  OF  UKRAINE  111 

Ukraine  and  adjoining:  fronts,  and  it  has  not  been  pos- 
sible during  the  Revolution  to  free  the  Ukraine  from 
these  foreign  elements.  In  some  towns  of  the  Ukraine 
these  troops  established  their  soldiers'  Soviets  which 
have  no  influence  on  the  life  of  the  surrounding  dis- 
tricts, although  frequently  representatives  of  the  local 
workers  participate  in  these  Soviets.  Desiring  to  in- 
terfere in  the  internal  life  of  the  Ukrainians,  the  Pet- 
rograd  Bolsheviks  began  to  demand  that  the  entire 
authority  of  government  in  the  Ukraine  should  be 
transferred  to  these  soldiers'  Soviets  without  any  re- 
gard to  the  demands  of  the  Bolsheviks  at  the  Peace 
Conference  that  foreign  troops  be  removed  from  occu- 
pied regions.  The  Ukrainian  Government  could  not 
comply  with  this  demand. 

A  second  ground  for  interference  with  the  internal 
life  of  the  Republic  was  furnished  by  the  demand  of 
the  Petrograd  Bolsheviks,  that  a  new  election  of  the 
Central  Rada  should  be  held.  Apart  from  the  fact 
that  such  a  demand  constitutes  an  open  violation  of 
the  right  of  self-determination,  it  is  also  impracticable 
because  the  electors  have  the  right  to  recall  their  rep- 
resentatives in  the  Rada  and  replace  them.  The  elec- 
tions for  the  Constituent  Assembly  for  All  Russia  at 
the  end  of  November  led  all  over  the  Ukraine  to  the 
brilliant  victory  of  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada.  Over 
75  per  cent  of  the  Ukrainian  candidates  were  elected, 
and  of  the  Bolsheviks  less  than  10  per  cent.  In  the 
government  of  Kiev  20  of  our  22  candidates  were 
elected,  in  Podolia  18  out  of  19,  in  VolhjTiia  9  out  of 
10,  in  Poltava  14  out  of  17,  etc.  These  are  the  masses 
on  which  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada  rests  and  in 
whose  name  we  come  here  to  speak. 

Finally  the  Petrograd  Government,  with  the  tacit 
consent  of  the  Central  Rada,  convoked  a  Ukrainian 
Congress  of  peasants  and  soldiers  for  December  3  in 
Kiev.  Over  2,000  delegates  attended  and,  against  the 
hopes  of  the  conveners,  began  with  a  great  ovation  for 
the  Kiev  Central  Rada  and  its  President,  Professor 
Gruzevski,  and  by  an  overwhelming  majority  expressed 
full  confidence  in  the  Central  Rada.  After  this  a 
small  group  of  Bolsheviks  about  80  strong  fled  to  Khar- 
kov  and   declared   itself   a   new   Government   of   the 


112  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic.  The  Peoples'  Commis- 
sars sent  thither  unorganized  bands  of  Eed  Guards 
to  plunder  the  population  of  Kharkov  and  to  protect 
the  Kharkov  Government  from  the  inhabitants.  This 
Government  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  representing 
even  the  town  of  Kharkov. 

Our  future,  our  history,  our  descendants,  and  broad 
masses  of  working  people  on  both  sides  of  the  front 
will  decide  which  of  us  is  Socialist  and  which  counter- 
revolutionary, which  creates  and  which  destroys  that 
which  has  been  created. 

Czernin  then  made  the  following  statement : 

In  view  of  the  altered  attitude  of  the  President  of 
the  Eussian  Delegation  at  the  plenary  sitting  of 
January  30,  according  to  which  only  such  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Ukraine  could  be  recognized  and  put 
into  force  as  was  formally  endorsed  by  the  Government 
of  a  Federative  Republic  of  Russia,  the  Delegations  of 
the  four  Allied  [Central]  Powers  make  the  following 
declaration  respecting  the  standpoint  of  the  Kiev  Peo- 
ples' Ministerial  Council  just  set  forth: 

"We  have  no  reason  to  withdraw  or  restrict  the  rec- 
ognition of  the  Ukrainian  Delegation  as  an  independ- 
ent Delegation  and  as  a  plenipotentiary  representative 
of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic,  which  was  ac- 
corded at  the  plenary  sitting  of  January  12.  On  the 
contrary,  we  find  ourselves  disposed  to  recognize 
the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic  as  an  independ- 
ent, free  and  sovereign  State  which  is  in  a  position  to 
make  independent  international  agreements." 

Trotzky  briefly  remarked  that  he  had  not  altered  the  con- 
ception of  the  character  of  the  Ukrainian  State  which  he 
had  hitherto  held.  He  must  point  out  that  it  would  be  dif- 
ficult for  the  Central  Powers  to  state  the  geographical  fron- 
tiers of  the  Republic  just  recognized  by  them.  At  peace 
negotiations,  however,  the  frontiers  of  a  State  were  not  a 
matter  of  no  moment. 

The  sitting  then  closed. 

In  a  Petrograd  account  of  the  sitting  of  February  1,  Sev- 

erjuk,  leader  of  the  Kiev  Delegation,  is  quoted  as  follows : 

By  this  act  the  Ukrainian  international  position  is 

recognized  by  the  Council  of  "Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 


THE  PART  OF  UKRAINE  113 

Delegates  as  well  as  by  the  representatives  of  the  four 
Allied  [Central]  States,  and  also  by  the  French  Re- 
public and  the  British  Government,  which  have  ap- 
pointed and  sent  diplomatic  representatives  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic. 

A  Finnish  Deputation,  issued  on  February  1  at  Brest- 
Litovsk,  a  declaration  denying  that  the  Finnish  Govern- 
ment had  been  overthrown  and  insisting  that  the  revolu- 
tionaries had  succeeded  merely  in  assuming  power  tempo- 
rarily, by  forcible  means,  in  a  small  section  of  Southern 
Finland.  The  Delegates  contended  that  they  represented 
the  rightful  Finnish  Government  and  possessed  authority 
to  represent  the  country  in  the  negotiations. 

February  3.    A  meeting  of  the  Committee  on  Political  and 
Territorial  Questions  was  held. 

Yon  Kuehlmann  opened  the  discussion  by  declaring  that 
the  standpoint  of  the  Central  Powers  remained  quite  un- 
changed regarding  the  invitation  or  admission  of  the  West- 
ern Border  States  to  the  negotiations. 

Trotzky  replied : 

We  for  our  part  recognize  the  independence  of  the 
Polish  State  to  its  full  extent.  Bnt  we  cannot  close 
our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  its  independence  is  only  make- 
believe  so  long  as  Poland  is  under  the  regime  of  occu- 
pation. 

Just  because  we  recognize  the  absolute  independence 
and  autonomy  of  the  Polish  people  and  State,  we  can- 
not, without  impugning  the  independence  of  the  Polish 
State,  regard  as  representatives  of  the  Polish  people 
those  representatives  who  have  been  appointed  by  the 
will  of  the  occupying  authorities. 

He  added  that  he  could  only  recognize  a  Deputation  of 
a  Polish  State  based  on  the  broad  masses.  In  not  recog- 
nizing LI.  Kucharczevski  's  Government  as  a  plenipotentiary 
Government  of  the  Polish  people,  the  Russian  Delegation 
by  no  means  meant  that  it  did  not  recognize  the  independ- 
ence of  the  State  or  of  the  people. 

Von  Kuehlmann  said  he  did  not  know  why  the  Chairman 
of  the  Russian  Delegation  to-day  made  an  exception  of 
Poland,  inasmuch  as  the  affairs  of  Poland,  Lithuania  and 


114  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Courland  had  hitherto  been  discussed  together.  He  be- 
lieved, however,  that  he  could  perceive  a  certain  advance  in 
the  fact  that  Trotzky  recognized  the  independence  of  the 
Polish  State  to  its  full  extent.  If  the  Chairman  of  the 
Kussian  Delegation  would  also  recognize  the  independence 
of  the  other  Western  Border  peoples  of  Russia,  the  negotia- 
tions would  thereby  make  a  considerable  step  forward. 

Trotzky:     ''Has  Germany  recognized  Finland?" 

Von  Kuehlmann:  "Conditions  there  are  still  uncer- 
tain." 

Trotzky  continued: 

As  to  Finland,  Russia  will  not  interfere  in  the  Fin- 
nish revolution.  As  to  Poland,  Russia  recognizes  the 
complete  right  of  the  Polish  people  to  be  free  and  inde- 
pendent. But  the  present  State  is  occupied  by  foreign 
troops  and  the  present  Government  can  move  only 
within  given  limits.  Either  the  Polish  State  is  a  State : 
then  it  must  have  geographic  boundaries.  If  it  is  a 
Kingdom,  then  it  must  have  a  King.  But  without 
either  it  is  neither  a  State  nor  a  Kingdom. 

Czernin  remarked: 

The  Polish  State  is  still  developing.  The  Russian 
Republic  is  also  without  boundaries.  The  willingness 
of  the  Central  Powers  to  deal  mth  radical  States  is 
proved  by  the  present  negotiations.  ...  I  cannot  ad- 
mit that  the  question,  whether  the  present  Polish  Gov- 
ernment is  entitled  to  represent  the  Polish  State, 
should  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration  of  a  third  Gov- 
ernment. 

Both  Czernin  and  von  Kuehlmann  protested  that  they 
had  not  come  to  engage  in  an  intellectual  wrestling  match. 
At  the  close  the  German  Secretary  of  State  explained  that 
he  was  obliged  by  unavoidable  duties  to  depart  for  a  short 
time,  but  said  that  during  his  absence  the  Political  and  the 
Economic  Committees  could  continue  their  negotiations. 

112  The  Supreme  War  Council  of  the  Allies  issued  a  state- 
ment at  Versailles  from  which  the  following  excerpts  are 
taken : 

The  Supreme  War  Council  gave  the  most  careful 
consideration  to  the  recent  utterances  of  the  German 


THE  PAET  OF  UKRAINE  115 

Chancellor  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  but  was  unable  to  find  in  them  any 
approximation  to  the  moderate  conditions  laid  down 
by  the  Allied  Governments.  This  conviction  was  only 
deepened  by  the  impression  made  by  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  professed  idealistic  aims  with  which  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  entered  upon  the  present  negotiations  at 
Brest-Litovsk  and  their  now  openly  disclosed  plans  of 
conquest  and  spoliation. 

In  the  circumstances  the  Supreme  War  Council  de- 
cided that  the  only  immediate  task  before  them  lay  in 
the  prosecution,  with  the  utmost  vigor  and  in  the 
closest  and  most  effective  co-operation  of  the  mili- 
tary effort  of  the  Allies  until  such  time  as  the  pressure 
of  that  effort  shall  have  brought  about  in  the  enemy 
governments  and  peoples  a  change  of  temper  which 
would  justify  the  hope  of  the  conclusion  of  peace  on 
terms  which  would  not  involve  the  abandonment,  in 
face  of  an  aggressive  and  unrepentant  militarism,  of 
all  the  principles  of  freedom,  justice  and  the  respect 
for  the  law  of  nations  which  the  Allies  are  resolved  to 
vindicate.  .  .  . 

February  4.  Von  Kuehlmann  and  Czernin  with  their  suite 
left  for  "^Berlin  where  they  arrived  on  February  4.  On 
that  day  Hindenburg,  Ludendorff  and  Count  von  Wedel, 
German  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  also  arrived  in  Berlin. 
The  Bulgarian  Premier  Radoslavov  and  the  Turkish  Grand 
Vizier  Talaat  Pasha  arrived  in  Berlin  on  February  5.  All 
participated  in  important  conferences  with  the  German 
Emperor  on  the  Russian  and  Ukrainian  peace  situation. 

The  leading  article  in  the  semi-official  North  German 
Gazette  for  February  4  contained  the  following  statements : 
We  have  seen  how  the  Maximalists,  by  long  speeches 
about  the  right  of  self-determination,  have  tried  to 
cause  obstruction  at  Brest-Litovsk.  The  German  peo- 
ple must  reckon  with  the  possibility  that  these  tactics 
may  be  continued,  and  it  will  have  to  ask  itself  what 
value,  if  any,  Germany  should  attach  to  the  conclusion 
of  peace  with  Northern  Russia.  .  .  .  The  Ukraine  has 
not  been  internally  deranged  by  social  revolutions  to 
the   same   extent   as   Northern   Russia.     The    Central 


116  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Powers  have  it  in  their  power  either  to  satisfy  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  the  territorial  aspirations  of  the  Ukraine 
in  regard  to  which  they  have  already  shown  their  sym- 
pathy, or  to  place  obstacles  in  their  way. 

115  The  German  "peace,  bread  and  liberty"  strikes  were 
finally  suppressed — but  not  before  a  manifesto  had  been 
addressed  to  the  ''Soviets"  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  by  the 
Soviet  of  Petrograd  through  Zinoviev,  its  President. 

Brothers :  Across  the  barbed  wire  barriers  of  the 
trenches,  through  the  triple  barrier  of  the  military  cen- 
sorship, the  news  has  filtered  through  to  us  of  your 
glorious  fight  against  German  and  universal  Imperial- 
ism. The  workers  and  soldiers  of  Petrograd  have  wel- 
comed the  news  with  transports  of  indescribable  enthu- 
siasm. At  the  very  time  when  the  Austro-German 
landowners  and  bankers  were  making  ready  to  strangle 
unhappy,  martyred  Poland,  and  the  Hoffmanns,  Kuehl- 
manns,  and  Hindenburgs  were  threatening  the  liberty 
and  independence  of  Courland  and  Lithuania,  you 
raised  your  voices  in  Vienna,  Berlin,  Hamburg,  Kiel, 
Niiremburg,  Leipzig,  and  many  other  cities. 

Brothers  and  companions  in  arms,  by  your  strikes 
and  demonstrations  and  the  creation  of  your  Soviet  of 
"Workers'  and  Soldiers'  Delegates,  you  have  shown  that 
the  Austro-German  working  class  will  not  allow  the 
hangmen  and  spoilers  to  impose  a  peace  of  violation 
and  annexations  on  the  Socialist  Republic  of  the 
Soviets.  "We  have  never  had  a  moment  of  greater  joy 
at  the  Soviet  than  to-day,  when  Comrades  Liebknecht 
and  Adler  were  unanimously  elected  as  Honorary 
Presidents  of  the  Soviet. 

Brothers,  throwing  a  retrospective  glance  back  on 
the  road  which  has  been  traversed,  we  say  this  to  you : 
During  the  first  months  our  Soviets  floundered  in  a 
"social-patriotic"  network,  and  it  was  only  through 
the  bitter  and  too  costly  experience  of  our  "patriots" 
that  the  Soviets  have  freed  themselves  from  a  series  of 
errors.  Comrades,  do  not  repeat  this  bitter  experience. 
At  the  present  moment,  too  serious  and  too  great  a 
responsibility  rests  upon  the  German  workers'  move- 
ment. The  bankruptcy  of  a  system  of  society  based 
on  a  demoralized  patriotism  which  has  been  renounced 


THE  PAET  OF  UKRAINE  117 

by  the  better  portions  of  the  proletariat  of  the  world 
presents  to  your  eyes  an  object-lesson  of  what  the  work- 
ing class  should  avoid.  Civil  war  in  Russia  is  nearing 
its  end  in  the  complete  victory  of  the  social  revolution. 

In  Finland,  that  revolution  is  making  way  towards  a 
glorious  end.  The  Soviets  of  Workers'  Delegates  have 
been  born  in  Austria  and  Germany.  The  red  spectre 
of  communism  is  invading  the  whole  of  Europe,  and 
the  universal  social  revolution  is  here.  Midnight  has 
struck.  We  must  sacrifice  all  for  the  victory  of  So- 
cialism. Our  Socialist  generation  has  been  allotted 
the  great  happiness  of  taking  part  in  this  decisive 
struggle. 

The  destined  outcome  of  the  peace  pourparlers  is 
being  decided  not  at  Brest-Litovsk  but  in  the  streets  of 
Berlin  and  Vienna  and  other  German  and  Austrian 
cities.  It  is  being  decided  within  the  walls  of  the 
Council  Chambers  of  the  Soviets  of  Workers '  Delegates 
in  Berlin  and  Vienna.  Brothers,  we  cordially  believe 
that  you  will  do  all  that  is  possible  to  insure  that  the 
peace  pourparlers  begun  by  the  Russian  Workmen's 
and  Peasants'  Government  with  the  Government  of 
Kuehlmann  shall  end  in  pourparlers  between  the  Rus- 
sian Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government  with  the 
German  Government  of  Liebknecht.  All  that  is  best 
and  heroic  in  the  proletariat  of  the  world  is  watch- 
ing you. 

Comrades,  members  of  the  Soviets  of  Workers'  Dele- 
gates of  Berlin  and  Vienna,  your  victory  will  signify 
the  full  and  indisputable  victory  of  Socialism,  for  two 
victorious  revolutions  in  Russia  and  in  Germany  will 
be  invincible.  Long  live  the  Soviets  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Delegates  of  Berlin  and  Vienna!  Long 
live  Communism ! 

By  order  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Soviet  of 
Petrograd. 

(Signed)  Zinoviev,  President. 

February  6.    Germany  sent   an   ultimatum   to   Roumania 
demanding  peace  within  four  days. 

February  7.   Von   Kuehlmann   and   Czernin  returned  to 
Brest-Litovsk  and   another  sitting  of  the   Committee   on 


118  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

Political  and  Territorial  Questions  was  held  the  following 
day. 

Bodinski,  the  Russian  Delegation's  expert  for  Polish  af- 
fairs, read  a  statement  in  Russian  which  his  colleague 
Radek  repeated  in  German.  Both  Delegates,  who  described 
themselves  as  the  sole  appointed  representatives  of  the  Po- 
lish people,  demanded  the  immediate  removal  of  the  present 
Government  organs  in  Poland,  and  criticized  the  independ- 
ence of  Poland  as  hitherto  developed.  They  further  de- 
clared that  up  to  now  revolutionary  Russia  alone  had  de- 
fended the  true  interests  of  Poland's  freedom,  and  both 
appealed  to  the  Poles  fighting  in  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies. 

Von  Kuehlmann  asked  Trotzky  whether  this  statement 
was  to  be  regarded  as  an  official  communication  by  the  Rus- 
sian Delegation. 

Trotzky  replied  that  within  the  limits  which  the  Russian 
Delegation  had  fixed  at  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations, 
these  views  were  to  be  regarded  as  an  official  declaration, 
and  that  in  so  far  as  they  exceeded  those  limits  they  were 
only  to  be  considered  as  information. 

Von  Kuehlmann  said  that  the  statement  appeared  to  be 
wholly  addressed  to  the  gallery,  and  that  it  was  quite  in- 
comprehensible to  him  how  Trotzky  could  have  imagined 
that  the  negotiations  could  have  been  served  by  such  pro- 
vocative speeches.  He  emphatically  refused  to  receive  any 
declarations  from  the  Russian  Delegation  which  did  not 
from  the  outset  represent  the  official  declarations  of  the 
entire  Delegation.  He  feared  the  patience  of  the  Allied 
[Central]  Delegations  would  be  put  to  a  very  hard  test  by 
occurrences  such  as  the  speeches  just  listened  to,  and  a 
doubt  must  now  arise,  not  on  the  part  of  the  German  press 
alone,  whether  the  Russian  Delegation  really  intended  to 
bring  the  negotiations  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

February  8.  The  decree  abolishing  the  Russian  National 
Debt  was  published.  Inasmuch  as  part  of  its  purpose  was 
said  to  have  been  the  exertion  of  additional  pressure  upon 
the  Allies  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Soviet  Republic  at 
Brest-Litovsk,  a  reproduction  of  the  decree  will  not  be  out 
of  place  here : 

1.     All  State  loans  concluded  by  the  Governments  of 
the  Russian  landlords  and  Russian  bourgeoisie,  enu- 


THE  PART  OF  UKRAINE  119 

merated  in  a  special  list,  are  hereby  repudiated  as  from 
December  14,  1917.  The  December  coupons  of  these 
loans  are  not  paid. 

2.  In  the  same  way  are  all  the  guarantees  repudi- 
ated which  the  said  Governments  gave  to  loans  of  va- 
rious concerns  and  bodies. 

3.  All  foreign  loans,  without  exception,  are  abso- 
lutely repudiated. 

4.  Short-term  liabilities  and  Treasury  bonds  remain 
in  force.  Interest  on  them  is  not  paid,  but  the  bonds 
themselves  have  a  currency  along  with  credit  notes. 

5.  Poorer  citizens  who  hold  State  bonds  of  internal 
loans  to  an  amount  of  not  more  than  10,000  roubles 
nominal  receive  in  exchange  certificates,  made  out  in 
their  names,  of  a  new  loan  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federative  Soviet  Republic  to  an  amount  not  exceeding 
10,000  roubles.  The  terms  of  the  loan  will  be  fixed 
later  on. 

6.  Deposits  at  the  State  savings  banks  and  interest 
on  them  remain  intact.  All  debentures  of  the  an- 
nulled loans  which  belong  to  the  savings  banks  are 
replaced  by  a  book  debt  on  the  part  of  the  Russian 
Socialist  Federative  Soviet  Republic. 

7.  Co-operative  organizations,  local  government 
bodies,  and  other  democratic  bodies  or  institutions  of 
common  utility  holding  debentures  of  the  repudiated 
loans  are  to  be  given  certificates  in  accordance  with 
rules  to  be  drawn  up  by  the  Supreme  Economic  Coun- 
cil in  conjunction  with  representatives  of  these  bodies, 
which  must  prove  that  the  debentures  were  acquired 
by  them  previous  to  the  publication  of  the  present  de- 
cree. (Note. — The  local  organs  of  the  Supreme  Eco- 
nomic Council  have  to  determine  which  of  the  local 
bodies  can  be  regarded  as  democratic  or  of  common 
utility. ) 

8.  The  general  direction  of  the  liquidation  of  the 
State  loans  is  entrusted  to  the  Supreme  Economic 
Council. 

9.  The  work  in  connection  with  the  liquidation  of 
the  loans  is  entrusted  to  the  State  Bank,  which  shall 
immediately  begin  the  registration  of  all  the  deben- 
tures of  State  loans  and  other  interest-bearing  papers 


120  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

in  the  hands  of  various  holders,  which  may  or  may  not 
be  subject  to  invalidation, 

10.  The  Soviets,  in  agreement  with  the  local  eco- 
nomic councils,  appoint  committees  to  determine  what 
citizens  are  to  be  regarded  as  poor.  These  commit- 
tees have  the  right  to  annul  all  savings  not  acquired 
by  personal  labor,  even  if  they  do  not  exceed  tlie  sum 
of  5,000  roubles. 

119  February  8-9.  After  the  return  of  the  Delegations  of  the 
Central  Powers  to  Brest-Litovsk  on  February  6,  the  sep- 
arate negotiations  for  a  peace  with  the  Ukraine  were  con- 
tinued. An  agreement  on  all  points  was  established  on 
February  8.  Owing  to  technical  difficulties  connected  with 
the  framing  of  five  treaty  texts,  it  was  not  possible  to  hold 
the  formal  final  sitting  of  the  Central  Delegations  and  the 
Ukrainian  Delegation  and  affix  signatures  until  the  early- 
morning  hours  of  February  9.  Von  Kuehlmann,  as  Presi- 
dent, opened  the  sitting  shortly  before  two  in  the  morning. 
He  said: 

Gentlemen:  None  of  you  will  be  able  to  close  his 
eyes  to  the  historical  significance  of  this  hour  at  which 
representatives  of  the  four  Allied  [Central]  Powers 
are  met  in  this  hall  with  representatives  of  the  Ukrain- 
ian Peoples'  Republic  to  sign  the  first  peace  to  be  at- 
tained in  this  world  war.  That  this  peace  is  signed 
with  a  young  State  which  has  emerged  from  the 
storms  of  the  great  war  gives  special  satisfaction  to 
the  representatives  of  the  Allied  [Central]  Delega- 
tions. May  this  peace  be  the  first  of  a  series  of  blessed 
conclusions  of  peace,  blessed  both  for  the  Allied  [Cen- 
tral] Powers  and  for  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic, 
for  the  future  of  which  we  all  cherish  the  best  wishes. 

The  President  of  the  Ukrainian  Delegation  replied: 

We  state  with  joy  that  from  this  day  peace  begins 
between  the  Quadruple  Alliance  and  the  Ukraine.  It 
is  true  that  we  came  here  in  the  hope  that  we  should  be 
able  to  achieve  a  general  peace  and  make  an  end  of  the 
fratricidal  war.  The  political  position,  however,  is 
such  that  not  all  the  powers  are  met  together  here  to 
sign  a  general  peace  treaty.  Inspired  with  the  most 
ardent  love  of  our  people  and  recognizing  that  this 
long  war  has  exhausted  the  cultural  and  national  pow- 


r 


THE  PART  OF  UKRAINE  121 

ers  of  our  people,  we  must  now  direct  all  our  strength 
to  do  our  part  to  bring  about  a  new  era  and  a  new 
birth.  We  are  firmly  persuaded  that  we  conclude  this 
peace  in  the  interest  of  our  great  democratic  masses, 
and  that  this  peace  will  contribute  to  a  general  ter- 
mination of  the  great  war.  We  gladly  state  here  that 
the  long  and  hard  labor  performed  at  Brest-Litovsk 
has  been  crowned  with  success  and  that  we  have  at- 
tained a  democratic  peace  that  is  honorable  for  both 
parties. 

From  to-day  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic  is  born 
to  a  new  life.  It  enters  as  an  independent  State  into 
the  circle  of  nations  and  ends  the  war  on  its  front. 
It  will  see  to  it  that  all  the  powers  that  in  it  lie  will 
rise  to  new  life  and  flourish. 

At  one  minute  before  two  von  Kuehlmann  as  the  first 
signatory  signed  the  copy  of  the  peace  treaty  prepared  for 
Germany  and  by  2 :20  a.  m.  all  the  signatures  were  ap- 
pended. 

The  full  text  of  the  treaty  with  the  Ukraine,  in  German 
and  with  an  English  translation,  has  been  published  by  the 
British  Government.  An  official  summary  of  its  terms  was 
issued  by  Germany  immediately  upon  its  conclusion.  The 
following  extracts  from  the  official  summary  are  given : 

Article  I. — The  contracting  parties  **  declare  that  the 
state  of  war  between  them  is  at  an  end.  .  .  .  They  are  re- 
solved henceforth  to  live  in  peace  and  friendship  with  one 
another. ' ' 

Article  II. — The  borders  between  Austria-Hungarj^  and 
the  Ukraine  are  to  be  ''those  frontiers  which  existed  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war."  Tentative  frontiers  are 
fixed  for  "further  north,"  which  are  to  be  determined  "in 
detail  by  a  mixed  commission,  according  to  ethnographical 
conditions  and  with  a  regard  to  the  desires  of  the  popu- 
lation. ' ' 

Article  III. — "The  evacuation  of  occupied  territories 
will  begin  immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  present 
treaty.  The  manner  of  carrying  out  the  evacuation  and 
transfer  of  the  territories  will  be  determined  by  the  pleni- 
potentiaries of  the  interested  parties." 


122  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Article  IV. — Concerning  the  resumption  of  diplomatic 
and  consular  relations. 

Article  V. — The  contracting  parties  renounce  reimburse- 
ment of  their  war  costs — that  is  to  say,  the  state  expendi- 
ture for  carrying  on  the  war  as  well  as  indemnification  of 
damages — that  is  to  say,  those  damages  suffered  by  them 
and  their  subjects  in  the  war  as  through  military  measures^ 
including  all  requisitions  made  in  the  enemy's  countries. 

Article  VI. — Concerning  the  exchange  of  prisoners  of 
war. 

Article  VII. — "The  contracting  parties  undertake  mu- 
tually and  without  delay  to  enter  into  economic  relations 
and  organize  an  exchange  for  goods  on  the  basis  of  the  fol- 
lowing prescriptions : ' ' 

(Then  follow  five  lengthy  sections  outlining  the  manner 
in  which  commodities  are  to  be  exchanged  between  the 
Ukraine  and  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany.) 

Article  VIII. — Concerning  the  "restoration  of  public 
and  private  legal  relations,"  interned  civilians,  amnesty, 
merchantmen  in  enemy  hands — all  of  these  subjects  to  be- 
regulated  in  separate  treaties. 

Article  IX. — "The  agreements  made  in  this  peace  treaty 
form  an  indivisible  whole." 

Article  X. — The  concluding  pafrt  of  the  treaty  provides: 
**The  present  peace  treaty  will  be  ratified.  Ratified  docu- 
mients  shall  be  exchanged  as  soon  as  possible.  So  far  as 
there  are  no  provisions  to  the  contrary,  the  peace  treaty 
shall  come  into  force  on  ratification. ' ' 

A  letter  purporting  to  have  been  written  about  this  time 
from  Brest-Litovsk  by  Trotzky  to  Lenin  has  had  consider- 
able currency,  and,  as  far  as  knowTi,  its  authenticity  has 
not  been  disputed.  From  the  developments  at  the  final 
session  on  February  10  it  would  seem  to  give  a  true  picture 
of  Trotzky 's  attitude. 

Dear  Vladimir  Ilyitch : 

It  is  impossible  to  sign  their  peace.  They  already 
have  agreed  with  fictitious  Governments  of  Poland, 
Lithuania,  Courland  and  others  concerning  territorial 


THE  PAET  OF  UKRAINE  125 

concessions  and  military  and  customs  treaties.  In 
view  of  "self-determination,"  these  provinces,  accord- 
ing to  German  interpretation,  are  already  independent 
States,  and  as  independent  States  they  already  have 
concluded  territorial  and  other  agreements  with  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary. 

To-day  I  put  these  questions  squarely  and  received  a 
reply  leaving  no  room  for  misunderstandings.  Every- 
thing is  stenographed.  To-morrow  we  shall  present 
the  same  questions  in  writing.  We  cannot  sign  their 
peace.     My  plan  is  this : 

We  announce  the  termination  of  the  war  and  demo- 
bilization without  signing  any  peace.  We  declare  we 
cannot  participate  in  the  looting  war  of  the  Allies  nor 
can  we  sign  a  looting  peace.  Poland's,  Lithuania's 
and  Courland's  fate  we  place  upon  the  responsibility 
of  the  German  working  people. 

The  Germans  will  be  unable  to  attack  us  after  we 
declare  the  war  ended.  At  any  rate,  it  would  be  very 
difficult  for  Germany  to  attack  us,  because  of  her  in- 
ternal condition.  The  Scheidemannites  adopted  a  for- 
mal resolution  to  break  with  the  Government  if  it 
makes  annexationist  demands  of  the  Russian  revolu- 
tion. 

The  Berliner  Tageblatt  and  the  Vossische  Zeitung 
demand  an  understanding  with  Russia  by  all  means. 
The  Centrists  favor  an  agreement.  The  internal  strife 
is  demoralizing  the  government.  Bitter  controversy  is 
raging  in  the  press  over  the  struggle  on  the  western 
front. 

We  declare  we  end  the  war  but  do  not  sign  a  peace. 
They  will  be  imable  to  make  an  offensive  against  us. 
If  they  attack  us,  our  position  will  be  no  worse  than 
now,  when  they  have  the  opportunity  to  proclaim  and 
declare  us  agents  of  England  and  Wilson  after  his 
speech  and  to  commence  an  attack. 

We  must  have  your  decision.     We  can  still  drag  on 
negotiations  for  one  or  two  or  three  or  four  days. 
Afterward  they  must  be  broken  off.     I  see  no  other 
solution  than  that  proposed.     I  clasp  your  hand. 
Yours, 

TROTZKY. 

Answer  by  direct  wire:  "I  agree  to  your  plan"  or 
"I  don't  agree." 


124  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BKEST-LITOVSK 

121  February  9.  The  final  session  of  the  Committee  on  Polit- 
ical and  Territorial  Questions  was  held  under  the  chair- 
manship of  von  Kuelilmann. 

Von  Kuehlmann: 

.  .  .  We  have  reached  the  point  where  it  is  neces- 
sary to  give  an  account  of  the  negotiations.  As  we 
all  know,  these  negotiations  have  been  of  a  political 
character.  ...  I  regret  to  say  that  up  to  the  present 
we  have  not  succeeded  in  bringing  together  to  any 
great  extent  the  two  points  of  view  in  spite  of  the  de- 
bates. .  .  .  Faithful  to  my  principles  during  all  the 
negotiations,  I  still  hope  that  a  free  discussion  of  prin- 
ciples may  bring  us  nearer  to  our  goal.  But  I  shall 
dispel  all  doubts,  and  I  say  that  the  circumstances  at 
the  moment  are  of  such  a  character  that  we  must  reach 
a  decision  promptly.  ...  In  putting  these  questions 
again  before  you,  I  only  wish  to  tell  you  that  I  desire 
to  see  them  all  connected  up,  the  one  with  the  other. 
The  commissions  have  already  discussed  all  the  details. 
...  So  far  as  the  economic  questions  are  concerned, 
the  preparatory  work  of  the  commissions  has  not  at 
present  sufficiently  progressed;  nevertheless  I  hope 
that  in  regard  to  these  questions,  during  the  short  time 
which  remains  at  our  disposal,  we  shall  reach  some  sat- 
isfactory agreement — satisfactory  to  both  sides. 

Czernin : 

...  I  think  that  the  past  discussions  have  shown  the 
different  points  of  view  qualifying  the  territorial 
changes  which  must  take  place.  But  they  have  not 
indicated  that  an  agreement  in  these  matters  is  impos- 
sible. Secretary  of  State  von  Kuehlmann  on  Decem- 
ber 28  clearly  stated  what  changes  must  take  place. 
They  concern  Courland  and  Lithuania,  parts  of  Livo- 
nia and  Esthonia,  and  also  Poland.  Let  us  put  aside 
the  question  as  to  how  these  proposed  changes  are  to 
be  characterized.  Let  us  try  and  clear  up  the  point  as 
to  whether  these  disputed  questions  would  form  an 
obstacle  to  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

Trotzky : 

.  .  .  The  peace  negotiations  began  with  our  deelafa- 
tion  of  December  22  and  the  reply  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance    through    its    declaration    of    December    25. 


THE  PART  OF  UKRAINE  125 

These  two  statements  formulated  the  object  of  the  ne- 
gotiations as  being  based  on  the  principle  of  the  self- 
determination  of  peoples.  During  a  short  interval — 
which  could  be  measured  by  hours — it  appeared  that 
this  principle,  accepted  by  both  sides,  would  serve  as  a 
means  for  the  solution  of  the  national  and  territo- 
rial questions  arising  out  of  the  war.  But  after  an 
exchange  of  views  on  December  27  it  became  clear 
that  the  appeal  to  this  principle  was  of  a  character 
calculated  only  to  complicate  all  other  questions.  The 
point  of  view  of  our  side,  as  applied  by  the  other  side, 
was  a  direct  negation  of  the  very  principle  itself. 
Afterward,  the  discussions  took  on  an  entirely  aca- 
demic character,  without  any  prospect  of  a  practical 
settlement,  because  the  opposite  side  was  striving,  with 
the  aid  of  complicated  logical  manoeuvres,  to  draw  from 
the  principle  of  self-determination  what,  in  their  opin- 
ion, was  in  accordance  with  the  actual  situation  as  dis- 
closed by  the  military  maps. 

The  question  of  the  occupied  territories,  which  was 
the  principal  theme  of  all  the  discussions,  was  reduced 
after  a  number  of  sessions  to  the  question  of  the  evac- 
uation of  the  occupying  troops.  .  .  .  The  first  formula 
of  the  other  side,  so  far  as  we  understood  it — and  we 
honestly  tried  to  understand  it — was  as  follows :  Un- 
til the  end  of  the  war,  so  far  as  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  were  concerned,  there  could  be  no  question 
of  the  evacuation  of  occupied  territory  on  any  front, 
owing  to  military  considerations.  Our  Delegation 
later  understood  that  the  opposite  side  had  now  the 
intention  of  evacuating  these  occupied  regions  on  the 
conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  when  the  above  men- 
tioned strategical  considerations  would  have  been  put 
aside.  This  conclusion  of  ours,  however,  also  ap- 
peared to  be  wrong.  The  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  Delegations  have  refused  categorically  to 
make  a  declaration  which  would  bind  them  to  with- 
draw their  troops  from  the  occupied  regions,  with  the 
exception  of  the  small  belt  of  territory  which  they  pro- 
posed to  return  to  Kassia.  The  situation  only  then 
became  clear.  This  clarity  became,  if  possible, 
greater  when  General  Hoffmann  in  the  name  of  both 
Delegations  proposed  to  us  the  frontier  line  which 
would   in  future   separate   Russia   from   its  western 


126  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

neighbors.  These  neighbors  were  actually  to  be  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary,  inasmuch  as  the  separated 
regions  were  to  be  occupied  by  their  troops  for  an  in- 
definite period  unrestricted  by  any  treaty.  .  .  . 

The  new  frontier  proposed  by  the  other  side  is  dic- 
tated by  military  and  strategic  considerations,  and 
from  this  point  of  view  must  be  judged  not  only  the 
separation  from  Russia  of  Poland  and  Lithuania,  but 
even  the  separation  of  the  Lettish  countries.  If  such 
had  been  the  desire  of  the  peoples  of  these  regions, 
then  no  danger  would  arise  for  the  safety  of  the  Rus- 
sian Republic.  Friendly  relations  with  these  States, 
which  had  freely  formed  for  themselves  an  independ- 
ent existence,  would  follow  as  a  natural  consequence 
of  their  origin  and  their  conditions.  ,  .  ,  But  these 
new  frontiers  which  the  opposite  side  proposes  appear 
to  us  in  a  very  different  light.  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  while  maintaining  their  troops  in  the  occu- 
pied regions  are  linking  these  regions  to  their  States 
T3y  railways  and  by  other  means,  and  for  us  the  new 
frontier  must  thus  be  considered  not  as  a  frontier  with 
Poland,  Lithuania  and  Courland  and  so  on,  but  as  a 
frontier  with  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Both 
these  are  seeking  military  expansion,  as  is  clearly 
shown  by  their  attitude  toward  the  occupied  regions. 
.  .  .  What  are  really  the  military  conceptions  of  the 
other  side  when  they  ask  for  such  a  frontier  ?  For  the 
purpose  of  examining  this  new  question  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  leading  military  institutions  of  the  Re- 
public, I  shall  ask  for  the  views  of  our  military  ad- 
visers. 

"We  have  here  to  meet  a  new  difficulty.  We  have 
heard  nothing  of  that  part  of  the  new  frontier  which 
is  to  run  to  the  south  from  Brest-Litovsk.  The  oppo- 
site side  was  of  the  opinion  that  this  part  of  the  fron- 
tier had  to  be  established  in  discussion  with  the  Dele- 
gation of  the  Kiev  Rada.  .  .  .  We  officially  informed 
the  other  side  that  the  Ukrainian  Rada  was  deposed. 
Nevertheless  the  negotiations  with  a  non-existent  Gov- 
ernment have  been  continued.  We  proposed  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Delegation,  in  a  private  conversa- 
tion, it  is  true,  but  formally  nevertheless,  that  they 
should  send  their  representatives  to  Ukrainia  with  the 


THE  PAET  OP  UKRAINE  127 

object  of  seeing  for  themselves  that  the  Ukrainian  Rada 
no  longer  existed  and  that  the  negotiations  with  its 
Delegation  could  not  have  any  practical  value.  We 
understood  that  so  far  as  the  Delegations  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  needed  confirmation  of  facts  they  would 
postpone  the  signature  of  the  Peace  Treaty  until  the 
return  of  their  representative  from  Ukrainia.  We 
have  been  informed  that  the  signature  of  the  peace 
treaty  could  not  be  postponed  any  longer.  While  nego- 
tiating with  the  Government  of  the  Federative  Russian 
Republic,  the  Governments  of  the  Central  Empires,  in 
spite  of  their  former  declaration,  not  only  hurried  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic 
on  February  1,  at  the  very  moment  when  it  declared 
itself  to  be  a  part  of  the  Russian  Federation,  but  are 
signing  a  treaty  with  a  Government  which,  as  we  have 
categorically  declared  to  the  other  side,  does  not  exist 
any  longer.  Such  conduct  is  creating  doubts  as  to 
whether  there  is  any  sincerity  of  purpose  on  the  side 
of  the  Central  Powers  for  the  establishment  of  peace- 
ful relations  with  the  Russian  Federation.  We  are 
striving  for  peace  now  as  in  the  beginning  of  the  nego- 
tiations. .  .  .  Only  such  a  peace  treaty  will  be  binding 
for  the  Russian  Federative  Republic  and  its  countries 
as  will  be  signed  by  our  Delegation.  .  .  .  We  ask  the 
opposite  side  to  complete  on  our  map  the  frontier  line 
which  was  submitted  to  us  by  General  Hoffmann. 

Von  Kuelilmann : 

If  I  am  not  replying  to  the  detailed  explanation  of 
the  preceding  speaker,  it  is  as  I  have  already  stated 
to-day  with  the  purpose  of  avoiding  every  controversy. 
Accordingly,  I  shall  not  reply  to  the  historical  review 
of  our  negotiations.  They  have  become  public;  they 
can  be  studied  and  compared.  .  .  . 

I  shall  propose  that  the  question  of  frontiers  be  first 
submitted  to  a  military  sub-commission.  .  .  .  This 
sub-commission  could  be  formed  at  the  present  session 
and  must  prepare  for  our  next  session,  to-morrow,  a 
report  concerning  the  results  of  its  discussions.  .  .  . 

Our  policy  as  regards  the  newlj''  created  States  will 
always  be  directed  toward  the  maintenance  of  friendly 
relations  and  non-intervention  in  their  internal  life,  as 
soon  as  this  war  is  satisfactorily  ended. 


128  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

That  is  all  I  have  to  say  concerning  the  fron- 
tiers. .  .  . 

Concerning  the  .  .  .  Ukraine,  the  point  of  view  of 
the  Central  Powers  has  been  repeatedly  stated  here, 
and  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  all  further  explanation 
is  unnecessary.  The  Central  Powers  have  concluded 
to-day  a  peace  with  the  representatives  of  the  Central 
Eada  which  they  have  recognized.  The  consequences 
for  the  Central  Powers  are  obvious.  .  .  .  This  is  no 
hostile  act  against  Russia,  We  have  concluded  with 
the  Ukraine  no  Alliance,  but  only  a  Peace  Treaty. 
Ukrainia  has  not  become  our  Ally,  but  only  a  neutral 
State.  If  we  could  arrive  at  a  peace  with  Russia, 
Russia  would  also  become  a  neutral  State.  In  such 
case  our  relations  to  Russia  would  be  the  same  as  they 
are  now  to  the  Ukraine.  There  will  be  a  difference  if 
we  are  unable  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Peoples'  Commissaries,  because  then 
.  .  .  those  regions,  which  submit  themselves  to  the 
authority  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars,  we 
shall  have  to  consider  as  regions  against  which  we  are 
in  a  state  of  war.  We  are  willing  to  avoid  that  by  a 
conclusion  of  peace  with  Russia.  If  we  had  ignored 
the  Rada,  as  M.  Trotzky  wished,  that  would  have 
meant  that  we  should  have  to  intervene  in  the  internal 
life  of  Russia.  And  we  will  not  do  it.  .  .  .  We  are 
not  arbiters  in  questions  which  concern  only  Russia 
herself.  .  .  .  We  do  not  demand  that  the  President  of 
the  Russian  Delegation  shall  renounce  his  claim  for  the 
authority  of  the  Soviet  for  the  whole  of  former  Rus- 
sia. We  shall  avoid  difficulties  if  we  sign  an  event- 
ual treaty  concerning  these  regions  which  are  under 
the  authority  of  the  Council  of  the  Peoples'  Commis- 
sars. How  many  regions  such  a  treaty  would  concern 
we  cannot  tell  at  present.  We  realize  that  such  a 
treaty  would  be  concluded  without  knowing  for  which 
regions  exactly  it  would  be  valid;  but  the  situation 
which  would  be  created  would  be  more  disagreeable 
for  us  than  for  the  Government  of  the  Russian  Repub- 
lic. Nevertheless  we  agreed  to  do  it  for  the  sake  of 
peace. 

Concerning  the  .  .  .  fate  of  the  occupied  regions 
...  I  cannot  give  the  categorical  reply  asked  for  by 


THE  PAET  OF  UKEAINE  129> 

the  President  of  the  Russian  Delegation,  but  I  gladly 
agree  that  a  communication  on  this  subject  should  be 
made  to  the  sub-commission. 

Czernin : 

I  agree  completely  with  the  preceding  speaker  ,  .  . 
and  I  do  not  see  any  reasonable  objection  why  a  reply 
could  not  be  given  to  this  question  afterward. 

Trotzky : 

...  It  seems  to  me  that  there  can  be  no  objection  to< 
the  creation  of  a  military  technical  sub-commission 
which  will  have  to  examine  the  question  of  fron- 
tiers. .  .  . 

Von  Kuehlmann : 

.  .  .  Our  proposal  has  been  known  a  long  time.  All 
the  questions  concerned  have  been  discussed  in  detail, 
and  I  firmly  believe  that  all  arguments  have  already 
been  used  and  that  now  we  must  bring  them  to  a  con- 
clusion with  a  view  to  making  a  decision  concerning 
our  peace  negotiations.  I  have,  already  stated  our  pro- 
posal, which,  in  a  certain  degree,  replaces  Article  II 
of  the  projected  peace  treaty.  This  formula  is  as  fol- 
lows : 

Russia  must  agree  to  the  following  territorial 
changes  which  will  enter  into  force  after  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  peace  treaty :  The  regions  between  the 
frontiers  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  and  the 
indicated  line  will  not  be  in  the  future  a  dependency 
of  Russia.  As  a  result  of  their  former  adhesion  to  the 
Russian  Empire  no  obligation  will  bind  them  to  Rus- 
sia. The  further  destiny  of  these  regions  will  be  set- 
tled in  agreement  with  the  peoples  concerned,  namely, 
on  the  basis  of  those  agreements  which  have  been  con- 
cluded between  them  and  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary. 

In  handing  over  this  formula  to  the  President  of 
the  Russian  Delegation,  I  state  that  an  essential  part 
of  our  proposal  is  included  in  Article  I  [of  the  draft 
of  the  projected  treaty]  which  we  have  already  suf- 
ficiently discussed.  .  .  . 

I  will  give  my  point  of  view  in  a  few  words.  It  is 
as  follows :     The  evacuation  of  certain  territories  was 


130  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

promised  by  us  under  the  condition  that  at  the  same 
time  the  evacuation  of  regions  taken  from  our  Allies 
should  be  carried  out.  At  that  time  we  considered,  as 
the  nearest  date  when  the  evacuation  was  to  begin,  the 
date  of  the  complete  demobilization  of  the  Russian 
army.  I  state  that  concerning  this  date  we  are  ready 
to  compromise  and  I  must  repeat  what  I  have  already 
stated.  I  declare  that  we  cannot  accept  a  peace  treaty 
in  which  it  is  not  diplomatically  promised  to  evacuate 
the  provinces  taken  from  our  Allies.  In  accordance 
with  the  explanation  given  by  the  People's  Commis- 
sar for  Foreign  Affairs,  I  think  there  is  no  ground 
for  doubt  that  the  troops  which  are  in  occupation  of 
Turkish  provinces  are  under  the  authority  of  the  Pet- 
rograd  Government.  I  shall  touch  here  also  the  sec- 
ond clause,  which  has  been  discussed  by  us  many  times, 
namely,  the  question  of  the  Aland  Islands.  I  must 
point  out  that  the  peace  treaty  must  give  us  at  least 
the  same  rights  as  we  had  before  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  I  shall  also  recall  to  you  the  most  passionate 
wish  of  the  Swedish  people  to  reunite  with  these  islands 
where  they  have,  aside  from  geographical  and  eth- 
nographical considerations,  the  most  vital  interests, 

Trotzky : 

Concerning  the  evacuation  of  the  Turkish  provinces, 
we  find  in  our  principles  sufficiently  weighty  consid- 
erations for  our  declarations,  that  the  evacuation  of 
the  Armenian  territories  could  not  be  considered  sim- 
ply as  exchange  for  the  evacuation  of  the  one  or  the 
other  portions  of  the  occupied  Russian  territories.  As 
we  are  withdrawing  our  troops  from  Persia,  we  shall 
also  withdraw  them — we  have  already  begun  it— from 
Armenia.  It  is  beyond  doubt  that  we  shall  establish 
that  clearly  in  our  peace  treaty  with  Turkey,  if  our 
negotiations  should  advance  so  far.  Concerning  the 
Aland  Islands,  I  must  saj^  that  I  did  not  understand 
of  what  minimum  of  rights  the  Secretary  of  State  was 
speaking.  If  he  had  in  view  the  obligation  of  Russia 
not  to  fortify  these  islands,  ...  we  have,  as  is  known, 
in  our  possession  documents  which  prove  that  in  1907 
von  Schoen  for  Germany  and  Gubastov  for  Czarist 
Russia  signed  a  treaty,  which  cannot  be  published,  in 
which  von  Schoen  declared  that  Germany  would  not 


THE  PAET  OF  UKEAINE  131 

consider  it  a  breach  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  if  Russia 
fortified  the  Aland  Islands.  Before  the  question  can 
be  discussed,  my  opinion  is  that  it  should  be  prepared 
from  a  technical  point  of  view  by  the  military  com- 
mission. 

Von  Kuehlmann: 

In  remaining  faithful  to  my  statement  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  session,  I  will  not  discuss  the  importance 
of  the  document  which  the  preceding  speaker  refers 
to.  I  shall  once  again  express  my  opinion  in  a  few 
words,  that  the  Peace  Treaty  must  return  us  all  the 
rights  which  we  possessed  before  the  war.  As  far  as 
these  Islands  are  concerned,  it  is  a  demand  of  prin- 
ciple. If  in  the  opinion  of  the  President  of  the  com- 
mission we  did  not  possess  any  rights  before  the  war 
then  such  a  demand  must  appear  to  him  as  one  which 
can  be  easily  agreed  upon.  I  used  the  word  minimum 
with  the  object  of  expressing  exactly  that  our  demand 
is  for  us  a  demand  of  principle.  If  some  one  asked 
me  of  what  I  was  thinking  in  using  the  word  maxi- 
mum, then  I  should  reply,  as  I  have  suggested  several 
times  previously,  that  it  means  the  neutralization  of 
these  Islands  by  the  consent  of  the  peoples  on  the 
borders  of  the  Baltic  Sea. 

For  the  further  discussion  we  need  some  prepara- 
tory work  by  the  sub-commission.  ...  In  any  case  I 
propose  to  have  our  next  session  at  six  o'clock  p.  m. 
We  shall  discuss  the  report  of  the  sub-commission.  .  .  . 

After   remarks   concerning   the   personnel   of   the   sub- 
commission,  von  Kuehlmann  declared  the  session  closed. 

February  10.  Before  the  final  plenary  session  took  place 
the  military  sub-commission  held  two  sittings,  under  the 
chairmanship  of  Dr.  Gratz.  The  Russian  militaiy  ex- 
perts attempted  to  demonstrate  the  strategical  disadvan- 
tages to  which  Russia  would  be  exposed  by  the  new  fron- 
tier line,  while  the  Germans  denied  this  contention,  adding 
that  it  was  not  a  matter  of  the  Russo-German  frontier,  but 
of  the  frontier  between  Russia  and  the  new  border  States. 
The  sub-commission  could  not  reach  an  agreement. 

The  final  plenary  sitting  of  all  the  Delegations  was  held 
on  the  same  day. 


132  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

Dr.  Gratz  having  reported  that  no  agreement  could  be 
reached  in  the  military  sub-commission  as  to  frontiers,  von 
Kuehlmann  asked  Trotzky  whether  he  had  any  communica- 
tion to  make  which  might  contribute  to  a  satisfactory  solu- 
tion.    This  question  led  to  the  final  rupture. 

Trotzky,  replying,  said  his  Delegation  considered  that 
the  decisive  hour  had  arrived.  After  an  attack  on  im- 
perialism, he  declared  that, 

while  Russia  was  desisting  from  signing  a  formal  Peace 
Treaty,  it  declared  the  state  of  war  to  be  ended  with 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria, 
simultaneously  giving  orders  for  the  complete  demo- 
bilization of  Russian  forces  on  all  fronts. 

This  announcement,  he  said,  had  been  made  by  wireless 
to  all  peoples  and  their  Governments. 

To  this  statement  von  Kuehlmann  rejoined  that,  if  he 
analyzed  the  present  situation  correctly,  the  Quadruple 
[Central]  Alliance  was  still  at  war  with  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment. Acts  of  war  had  been  ended  when  Russia  and 
the  Allies  had  signed  the  armistice,  but  on  the  lapse  of 
the  armistice  warfare  would  automatically  revive.  The  fact 
that  one  of  the  two  contracting  parties  had  demobolized 
its  armies  would  in  no  wise  alter  this  situation.  The  ex- 
istence of  the  customary  international  relations  between 
States  was  the  mark  of  a  state  of  peace.  He  therefore  re- 
quested Trotzky  to  say  where  the  frontiers  of  Russia  ran 
and  whether  Russia  was  willing  to  resume  diplomatic,  legal 
and  commercial  relations  with  the  Central  Powers.  It  was 
essential  to  determine  these  questions  in  order  to  judge 
whether  or  not  the -Quadruple  [Central]  Alliance  was  still 
at  war.  Von  Kuehlmann  tlien  proposed  a  sitting  for  the 
next  day,  at  which  the  attitude  of  the  Central  Powers  to 
the  latest  statement  of  the  Russian  Delegation  might  be 
made  known. 

Trotzky  replied  that  his  Delegation  had  now  exhausted 
its  powers  and  considered  it  necessary  to  return  to  Petro- 
grad.  The  Central  Powers  might  communicate  with 
Petrograd  by  wireless  or  through  the  Commissions  of  the 
Central  Powers  then  in  Petrograd. 

The  sitting  then  closed. 


X.     NO  WAR  AND  NO  PEACE      ■ 

A  wireless  addressed  ''To  All  Whom  It  May  Concern," 
dated  at  Brest-Litovsk,  Feb.  10,  1918,  and  signed  by  the 
entire  Russian  Delegation,  reads: 

The  peace  negotiations  are  at  an  end.  German 
capitalists,  bankers  and  landlords,  supported  by  the 
silent  cooperation  of  the  English  and  French  bour- 
geoisie, submitted  to  our  comrades,  the  members  of 
the  Peace  Delegation  at  Brest-Litovsk,  conditions  such 
as  could  not  be  subscribed  to  by  the  Russian  Revo- 
lution. 

The  Governments  of  Germany  and  Austria  desire 
to  possess  countries  and  peoples  vanquished  by  force 
of  arms.  .  .  .  We  could  not  sign  a  peace  which  would 
bring  with  it  sadness,  oppression  and  suffering  to  mil- 
lions of  workmen  and  peasants.  But  we  also  cannot, 
will  not,  and  must  not  continue  a  war  which  was  be- 
gun by  Tsars  and  capitalists.  We  will  not  and  we 
must  not  continue  to  be  at  war  with  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians — workmen  and  peasants  like  ourselves.  .  .  . 

Our  Delegation,  fully  conscious  of  its  responsibility 
before  the  Russian  people  and  the  oppressed  workers 
and  peasants  of  other  peoples  declared  on  February 
10  .  .  .  that  it  refuses  to  sign  an  annexationist  treaty. 

Russia  for  her  part  declares  the  present  war  with 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  at 
an  end.  .  .  . 

February  11.  President  Wilson,  in  replying  to  the  ad- 
dresses of  January  24  of  the  German  Chancellor  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  made  one 
direct  reference  to  the  Brest  negotiations :  * '  Count  Hert- 
ling's  reply  .  .  .  confirms  I  am  sorry  to  say  rather  than 
removes  the  unfortunate  impression  made  by  what  we  had 
learned  of  the  conferences  at  Brest-Litovsk." 


134  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

February  12.  An  official  announcement  was  made  in  Lon- 
don that  "the  British  do  not  consider  themselves  bound 
to  recognize  the  peace  concluded  between  the  Austro-Ger- 
mans  and  those  who  have  signed  it  on  behalf  of  the 
Ukraine. ' ' 

Lloyd  George  in  the  House  of  Commons  said: 

The  action  of  Germany  in  reference  to  Russia  proves 
that  all  her  declarations  about  no  annexations  and  no 
indemnities  have  no  real  meaning.  ...  In  spite  of 
the  undertaking  given  by  the  Germans  to  the  Rus- 
sians that  during  the  period  of  the  armistice  no  troops 
would  be  moved  from  the  East  to  the  West,  they  are 
moving  them  as  speedily  as  railway  and  transport  ar- 
rangements will  allow.  That  has  to  be  kept  in  mind 
when  we  discuss  terms  of  peace,  because  it  has  a  real 
bearing  upon  guarantees. 

February  14.  Trotzky  reported  on  the  course  and  results 
of  the  Brest-Litovsk  negotiations  before  the  Central  Exec- 
utive Committee  of  the  Soviets.  An  official  statement  is- 
sued at  the  close  of  the  session  declares  that  "a  resolution 
was  passed  which  approves  the  whole  of  the  policy  of  the 
Brest-Litovsk  Delegation  of  the  Council  of  the  People's 
Commissaries. ' ' 

Trotzky  reviewed  the  history  of  the  peace  negotiations 
as  follows: 

' '  When  history  put  before  the  Russian  Revolution  the 
question  of  the  peace  negotiations,  we  had  no  doubt 
that  in  these  negotiations,  and  so  long  as  the  decisive 
power  of  the  revolutionary  proletariat  of  the  world 
had  not  interfered,  we  should  be  compelled  to  stand 
the  bill  of  three  and  a  half  years  of  war.  There  was 
no  doubt  in  our  minds  that  in  the  person  of  Ger- 
man imperialism  we  were  dealing  with  an  opponent 
who  was  saturated  with  the  consciousness  of  his  im- 
mense power,  which  was  strikingly  revealed  during  the 
present  war. 


NO  WAR  AND  NO  PEACE  135 

All  the  argiunents  made  by  bourgeois  cliques  that 
we  might  have  been  incomparably  stronger  if  we  had 
conducted  these  negotiations  together  with  our  Allies 
are  absolutely  without  foundation.  In  order  that  we 
might  at  an  indefinite  future  date  conduct  negotiations 
together  with  our  Allies,  we  should  first  of  all  have 
had  to  continue  the  war  together  with  them.  And  if 
our  country  was  weakened  and  exhausted,  the  contin- 
uation of  the  war,  a  failure  to  bring  it  to  a  conclusion, 
would  have  still  further  weakened  and  exliausted  it. 
We  should  have  had  to  settle  the  war  under  conditions 
still  more  unfavorable  to  us.  In  the  case  even  that  the 
combination  of  which  Eussia,  owing  to  international 
intrigues  of  Czarism  and  the  bourgeoisie,  had  become 
a  part — the  combination  headed  by  Great  Britain — 
in  the  case  even  that  this  combination  had  come  out  of 
the  war  completely  victorious — let  us  for  a  moment 
admit  the  possibility  of  such  a  not  very  probable  issue 
— even  in  that  case,  comrades,  it  does  not  mean  that 
our  country  would  also  have  come  out  victorious.  For 
during  further  continuation  of  this  protracted  war, 
Russia  would  have  become  even  more  exhausted  and 
plundered  than  now.  The  masters  of  that  combina- 
tion, who  w^ould  concentrate  in  their  hands  the  fruits 
of  the  victory,  that  is,  Great  Britain  and  America, 
would  have  displayed  toward  our  country  the  same 
methods  which  were  displayed  by  Germany  during  the 
peace  negotiations.  It  would  be  absurd  and  childish 
to  appraise  the  politics  of  the  imperialistic  countries 
from  the  point  of  view  of  any  considerations  other 
than  those  considerations  of  naked  interests  and  mate- 
rial power.  Consequently,  if  we,  as  a  nation,  are  at 
present  weakened  before  the  imperialism  of  the  world, 
we  are  weakened,  not  because  of  extricating  ourselves 
from  the  fiery  ring  of  the  war,  having  already  pre- 
viously extricated  ourselves  from  the  shackles  of  inter- 
national military  obligations :  no !  we  are  weakened  by 
that  very  policy  of  the  Czarists  and  the  bourgeois 
classes,  which  we,  as  a  revolutionary  party,  have  al- 
ways fought  against  before  this  war  and  during  this 
war. 


136  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

You  remember,  comrades,  under  what  conditions  our 
delegation  went  to  Brest-Litovsk  last  time,  right  after 
one  of  the  sessions  of  the  Third  All-Russian  Congress 
of  the  Soviets.  At  that  session,  we  reported  on  the 
state  of  the  negotiations,  and  the  demands  of  our  oppo- 
nents. These  demands,  as  you  remember,  were  really 
no  more  than  masked,  or,  rather,  half-masked  annexa- 
tionist aspirations  at  the  expense  of  Lithuania,  Cour- 
land,  a  part  of  Livonia,  the  Isles  of  Moon  Sound,  as 
well  as  a  half-masked  demand  for  a  punitive  war  in- 
demnity which  we  then  estimated  would  amount  to  six, 
eight  or  even  ten  milliards  of  rubles.  During  the  in- 
terruption of  the  sessions,  which  continued  for  about 
ten  days,  a  considerable  disturbance  took  place  in 
Austria-Hungary ;  strikes  of  masses  of  workers  broke 
•out,  and  these  strikes  were  the  first  recognition  of  our 
methods  of  conducting  peace  negotiations  that  we  met 
with  from  the  proletariat  of  the  Central  Empires,  a^ 
against  the  annexationist  demands  of  German  mili- 
tarism. We  promised  here  no  miracles,  but  we  did  say 
that  the  road  we  were  pursuing  was  the  only  road  re- 
maining to  the  revolutionary  democracy  for  securing 
the  possibility  of  its  further  development. 

There  is  room  for  complaint  that  the  proletariat  of 
the  other  countries,  and  particularly  of  the  Central 
Empires,  is  too  slow  to  enter  the  road  of  open  revolu- 
tionary struggle,  yes,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
pace  of  its  development  is  all  to#  slow — neverthe- 
less, there  could  be  observed  a  movement  in  Austria- 
Hungary  which  swept  the  entire  country  and  which 
was  a  direct  echo  of  the  Brest-Litovsk  negotiations. 

Leaving  for  Brest-Litovsk,  it  was  our  common  opin- 
ion that  there  was  no  ground  to  believe  that  just  this 
wave  would  sweep  away  Austro-German  militarism. 
If  we  had  been  convinced  that  this  could  be  ex- 
pected, we  would  gladly  have  given  the  promise  that 
several  persons  demanded  from  us,  namely,  that  under 
no  circumstances  would  we  sign  a  separate  peace  with 
Germany.  I  said  at  that  very  time,  that  we  could  not 
make  such  a  promise,  for  it  would  amount  to  taking 


NO  WAR  AND  NO  PEACE  137 

upon  ourselves  the  obligation  of  vanquishing  German 
militarism.  The  secret  of  attaining  such  a  victory  was 
not  in  our  possession.  And  inasmuch  as  we  would  not 
undertake  the  obligation  to  change  the  .balance  of  the 
world  powers  at  a  moment's  notice,  we  frankly  and 
openly  declared  that  revolutionary  power  may  under 
certain  conditions  be  compelled  to  agree  to  an  annexa- 
tionist peace.  A  revolutionary  power  would  fall  short 
of  its  high  principles  only  in  the  event  that  it  should 
attempt  to  conceal  from  its  own  people  the  predatory 
character  of  the  peace,  but  by  no  means,  however,  in 
the  event  that  the  course  of  the  struggle  should  com- 
pel it  to  adopt  such  a  peace. 

At  the  same  time,  we  indicated  that  we  were  leav- 
ing to  continue  negotiations  under  conditions  which 
were  seemingly  improving  for  us  and  becoming  worse 
for  our  enemies.  We  observed  the  movement  in  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and  there  were  signs  indicating  (this 
was  made  the  basis  for  statements  by  representatives 
of  the  German  Social  Democracy  in  the  Reichstag) 
that  Germany  was  on  the  eve  of  similar  events.  We 
went  with  this  hope.  During  the  first  days  of  this  visit 
to  Brest-Litovsk  the  wireless  brought  us  from  Vilna 
the  first  news  that  in  Berlin  an  enormous  strike  move- 
ment was  developing;  this  movement  as  well  as  that  of 
Austria-Hungary  was  directly  connected  with  the 
course  of  negotiations  in  Brest.  However,  as  is  often 
the  case,  by  reason  of  the  dialectic  of  the  class  struggle, 
just  this  conspicuous  beginning  of  the  proletarian  ris- 
ing, which  surpassed  anything  Germany  had  ever  seen, 
was  bound  to  push  the  property  classes  to  a  closer  con- 
solidation and  to  greater  hostility  against  the  proleta- 
riat. The  German  dominating  classes  are  saturated 
with  a  sufficiently  strong  instinct  of  self-preservation 
to  understand  that  concessions  in  such  an  exigency  as 
they  were  in,  under  the  pressure  of  the  masses  of  their 
OAvn  people — concessions  however  small — would  amount 
to  capitulation  before  the  idea  of  the  revolution.  That 
is  why,  after  the  first  moment  of  perplexity  and  panic, 
the  time  when  Kuehlmann  deliberately  dragged  out 
the  negotiations  by  minor  and  formal  questions,  had 
passed — as  soon  as  the  strikes  were  disposed  of,  as  soon 
as  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  for  the  time  being 


138  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

no  imminent  danger  threatened  his  masters,  he  again 
changed  front  and  adopted  a  tone  of  unlimited  self- 
confidence  and  aggression. 

Our  negotiations  were  complicated  by  the  participa- 
tion of  the  Kiev  Rada.  "We  called  attention  to  this  last 
time,  too.  The  delegation  from  the  Kiev  Rada  ap- 
peared at  a  time  when  the  Rada  represented  a  fairly 
strong  organization  in  the  Ukraine  and  when  the  way 
out  of  the  war  had  not  yet  been  predetermined.  Just 
at  that  time,  we  made  the  Rada  an  official  offer  to  con- 
clude a  definite  treaty  with  us,  making  as  one  of  the 
conditions  of  such  a  treaty  the  following  demand: 
that  the  Rada  declare  Kaledin  and  Kornilov  to  be 
counter-revolutionists  and  put  no  hindrance  in  the  way 
of  our  waging  war  on  these  two  leaders.  The  dele- 
gation from  the  Kiev  Rada  arrived,  just  when  we 
hoped  to  reach  an  understanding  with  it  on  these  mat- 
ters. We  declared  that  as  long  as  the  people  of  the 
Ukraine  recognized  the  Rada,  we  considered  its  in- 
dependent participation  in  these  negotiations  permis- 
sible. But  with  the  further  development  of  events  in 
Russian  territory  and  in  the  Ukraine,  and  the  more 
the  antagonism  between  the  Ukrainian  masses  and  the 
Rada  increased,  the  greater  became  the  Rada's  readi- 
ness to  conclude  any  kind  of  treaty  with  the  govern- 
ments of  the  Central  Empires,  and,  if  need  be,  to  drag 
German  imperialism  into  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Russian  Republic,  in  order  to  support  the  Rada  against 
the  Russian  revolution. 

On  the  9th  day  of  February  we  learned  that  the 
peace  negotiations  carried  on  behind  our  backs  between 
the  Rada  and  the  Central  Powers,  had  been  signed. 
The  9th  of  February  happened  to  be  the  birthday  of 
Leopold  of  Bavaria,  and,  as  is  the  custom  in  monarchi- 
cal countries,  the  triumphant  historical  act  was  timed — 
with  or  without  the  consent  of  the  Kiev  Rada  for  this 
festive  day.  General  Hoffmann  had  a  salute  fired  in 
honor  of  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  having  previously  asked 
permission  to  do  so  of  the  Kiev  Delegation,  since  by 
the  treaty  of  peace  Brest-Litovsk  had  been  ceded  to 
the  Ukraine. 

Events  had  taken  such  a  turn,  however,  that  at  the 
time  General  Hoffmann  was  asking  permission  for  a 


NO  WAE  AND  NO  PEACE  139 

military  salute,  the  Kiev  Rada  had  but  very  little  ter- 
ritory left  outside  of  Brest-Litovsk.  On  the  strength 
of  the  telegrams  we  had  received  from  Petrograd,  we 
officially  made  it  known  to  the  Central  Powers'  Delega- 
tion that  the  Kiev  Rada  no  longer  existed,  a  circum- 
stance which  certainly  had  some  bearing  on  the  course 
of  the  peace  negotiations.  We  suggested  to  Count 
Czernin  that  his  representatives  accompany  our  officers 
into  Ukrainian  territory  to  ascertain  whether  the  Kiev 
Rada  existed  or  not.  Czernin  seemed  to  welcome  this 
suggestion,  but  when  we  asked  him  if  this  meant  that 
the  treaty  made  with  the  Kiev  Delegation  would  not 
be  signed  before  the  return  of  his  own  mission,  he  hesi- 
tated and  promised  to  ask  Kuehlmann  about  it.  Hav- 
ing inquired,  he  sent  us  an  answer  in  the  negative. 

This  was  on  February  8th.  By  the  9th,  they  had  to 
sign  the  treaty.  This  could  not  be  delayed,  not  only 
on  account  of  Leopold's  birthday,  but  for  a  more  im- 
portant reason,  which  Kuehlmann  undoubtedly  ex- 
plained to  Czernin :  "If  we  should  send  our  represent- 
atives into  the  Ukraine  just  now,  they  might  really 
convince  themselves  that  the  Rada  does  not  exist;  and 
then  we  shall  have  to  face  a  single  All-Russian  delega- 
tion which  would  spoil  our  prospects  in  the  negotia- 
tions." ...  By  the  Austro-Hungarian  Delegation  we 
were  advised  to  put  principle  aside  and  to  place  the 
question  on  a  more  practical  plane.  Then  the  German 
Delegation  would  be  disposed  to  concessions.  ...  It 
was  unthinkable  that  the  Germans  should  decide  to 
continue  the  war  over,  say,  the  Moon  Islands,  if  you 
put  this  demand  in  concrete  form. 

We  replied  that  we  were  ready  to  look  into  such 
concessions  as  their  German  colleagues  were  prepared 
to  make.  *'So  far  we  have  been  contending  for  the 
self-determination  of  the  Lithuanians,  Poles,  Livonians, 
Letts,  Esthonians,  and  other  peoples ;  and  on  all  these 
issues  you  have  told  us  that  such  self-determination 
is  out  of  the  question.  Now  let  us  see  what  your  plans 
are  in  regard  to  the  self-determination  of  another  peo- 
ple— the  Russians ;  what  designs  and  plans  of  a 
military  strategic  nature  are  behind  your  seizure  of  the 
Moon  Islands.  For  these  islands,  as  an  integral  part  of 
an  independent  Esthonian  Republic,  or  as  a  possession 
of  the  Federative  Russian  Republic  would  have  only  a 


140  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

defensive  military  importance,  while  in  the  hands  of 
Germany  they  would  assume  offensive  significance, 
menacing  the  most  vital  centers  of  our  country,  and 

^especially  Petrograd. ' ' 

But,  of  course,  Hoffmann  would  make  no  concessions 
whatsoever.  Then  the  hour  for  reaching  a  decision 
had  come.  We  could  not  declare  war,  for  we  were  too 
weak.  The  army  had  lost  all  of  its  internal  ties.  In 
order  to  save  our  country,  to  overcome  this  disorgan- 
ization, it  was  imperative  to  establish  the  internal 
coherence  of  the  toilers.  This  psychological  tie  can 
only  be  created  by  constructive  work  in  factory,  field 
and  workshop.  We  had  to  return  the  masses  of  labor- 
ers, who  had  been  subjected  to  great  and  intense  suf- 
fering— who  had  experienced  catastrophes  in  the  war 
— to  the  fields  and  factories,  where  they  must  find 
themselves  again  and  get  a  footing  in  the  labor  world, 
and  rebuild  internal  discipline.  This  was  the  only 
way  to  save  the  country,  which  was  now  atoning  for 
the  sins  of  Czarism  and  the  bourgeoisie.  We  had  to 
get  out  of  the  war  and  withdraw  the  army  from  the 
slaughter  house.  Nevertheless,  we  threw  this  in  the 
face  of  the  German  militarism:  The  peace  you  are 
forcing  down  our  throats  is  a  peace  of  aggression  and 
robbery.  We  cannot  permit  you,  Messrs.  Diplomats, 
to  say  to  the  German  workingmen:  "You  have  char- 
acterized our  demands  as  avaricious,  as  annexationist. 
But  look,  under  these  very  demands  we  have  brought 
you  the  signature  of  the  Russian  revolution."  Yes, 
we  are  weak,  we  cannot  fight  at  present.  But  we  have 
sufficient  revolutionary  courage  to  say  that  we  shall  not 
willingly  affix  our  signature  to  the  treaty  which  you 
are  writing  with  the  sword  on  the  body  of  living  peo- 
ples. We  refused  to  affix  our  signature.  I  believe 
we  acted  properly,  comrades. 

I  do  not  mean  to  say,  friends,  that  a  German  advance 
upon  Russia  is  out  of  the  question.  It  were  too  rash 
to  make  such  an  assertion  in  view  of  the  great  strength 
of  the  German  imperialistic  party.  But  I  do  believe 
that  the  stand  we  have  taken  in  the  matter  has  ren- 
dered it  far  more  difficult  for  German  militarism  to 
advance  upon  us.  What  would  happen  if  it  should 
advance?  To  this  there  is  but  one  thing  to  say:  If 
it  is  possible  in  our  country,  a  country  completely  ex- 


NO  WAR  AND  NO  PEACE  141 

hausted  and  in  a  state  of  desperation,  to  raise  the 
spirits  of  the  more  revolutionary  energetic  elements; 
if  a  struggle  in  defence  of  our  Revolution  and  the 
territory  comprised  within  it  is  still  possible,  then  this 
is  the  case  only  as  a  result  of  our  abandoning  the  war 
and  refusing  to  sign  the  peace  treaty." 

*  During  the  first  few  days  following  the  breaking 
off  of  negotiations  the  German  Government  hesitated, 
not  knowing  what  course  to  pursue.  The  politicians  and 
diplomats  evidently  thought  that  the  principal  objects 
had  been  accomplished  and  that  there  was  no  reason 
for  coveting  our  signatures.  The  military  men  were 
ready,  in  any  event,  to  break  through  the  lines  drawn 
by  the  German  Government  at  Brest-Litovsk.  Pro- 
fessor Krigge,  the  advisor  of  the  German  Delegation, 
told  a  member  of  our  Delegation  that  a  German  inva- 
sion of  Russia  under  the  existing  conditions  was  out 
of  the  question.  Count  Mirbach,  then  at  the  head  of 
the  German  missions  at  Petrograd,  went  to  Berlin  with 
the  assurance  that  an  agreement  concerning  the  ex- 
change of  prisoners  of  war  had  been  satisfactorily 
reached.  But  all  this  did  not  in  the  least  prevent  Gen- 
eral Hoffmann  from  declaring  on  the  fifth  day  after 
the  Brest-Litovsk  negotiations  had  been  broken  off — 
that  the  armistice  was  over,  antedating  the  seven-day 
period  from  the  time  of  the  last  Brest-Litovsk  session. 
It  were  really  out  of  place  to  dilate  here  on  the  moral 
indignation  caused  by  this  piece  of  dishonesty.  It  fits 
in  perfectly  with  the  general  state  of  diplomatic  and 
military  morality  of  the  ruling  classes. 

The  new  German  invasion  developed  under  circum- 
stances most  fatal  for  Russia.  Instead  of  the  week's 
notice  agreed  upon,  we  received  notice  only  two  days 
in  advance.  This  circumstance  intensified  the  panic 
in  the  army  which  was  already  in  a  state  of  chronic  dis- 
solution. Resistance  was  almost  unthinkable.  The  sol- 
diers could  not  believe  that  the  Germans  would  advance 
after  we  had  declared  the  state  of  war  at  an  end.  The 
panicky  retreat  paralyzed  the  will  even  of  such  indi- 
vidual detachments  as  were  ready  to  make  a  stand. 
In  the  workingmen's  quarters  of  Petrograd  and  Mos- 

*The  remainder  of  this  item  is  not  a  part  of  Trotzky's  speech, 
but  is  a  further  extract  from  his  book  "From  October  to  Brest- 
Litovsk." 


142  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

COW,  the  indignation  against  the  treacherous  and  truly 
murderous  German  invasion  reached  a  pitch  of  great- 
est intensity.  In  these  ahirming  days  and  nights,  the 
workers  were  ready  to  enlist  in  the  army  by  the  ten 
thousand.  But  the  matter  of  organizing  lagged  far 
behind.  Isolated  tenacious  detachments  full  of  enthu- 
siasm became  convinced  themselves  of  their  instability 
in  their  first  serious  clashes  with  German  regulars. 
This  still  further  lowered  the  country's  spirits.  The 
old  army  had  long  ago  been  hopelessly  defeated  and 
was  going  to  pieces,  blocking  all  the  roads  and  byways. 
The  new  army,  owing  to  the  country's  general  exhaus- 
tion, the  fearful  disorganization  of  industries  and  the 
means  of  transportation,  was  being  got  together  too 
slowly.  Distance  was  the  only  serious  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  the  German  invasion. 

The  chief  attention  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  govern- 
ment was  centered  on  the  Ukraine.  The  Rada,  through 
its  Delegation,  had  appealed  to  the  Governments  of  the 
Central  Empires  for  direct  military  aid  against  the 
Soviets,  which  had  by  that  time  completely  defeated 
the  Ukrainians.  Thus  did  the  petty-bourgeois  democ- 
racy of  the  Ukraine,  in  its  struggle  against  the  work- 
ing class  and  the  destitute  peasants,  voluntarily  open 
the  gates  to  foreign  invasion. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Svinhufvud  government  wast 
seeking  the  aid  of  German  bayonets  against  the  Fin- 
nish proletariat.     German  militarism,  openly  and  be-/ 
fore  the  whole  world,  assumed  the  role  of  executioner^ 
of  the  peasant  and  proletarian  revolution  in  Eussia. 

In  the  ranks  of  our  party  hot  debates  were  being 
carried  on  as  to  whether  or  not  we  should,  under  these 
circumstances,  yield  to  the  German  ultimatum  and  sign 
a  new  treaty,  which — and  this  no  one  doubted — would 
include   conditions   incomparably  more   onerous  than 
those  announced  at  Brest-Litovsk.    The  representatives 
of  the  one  view  held  that  just  now,  with  the  German 
intervention  in  the  internal  war  of  the  Russian  Re- 
public, it  was  impossible  to  establish  peace  for  one  part 
of  Russia  and  remain  passive,  while  in  the  South  and 
in  the  North,  German  forces  would  be  establishing  a 
^regime  of  bourgeois  dictatorship.  Another  view,  cham-  \^ 
j '  pioned  chiefly  by  Lenin,  was  that  every  delay,  even  I  I 
I  the  briefest  breathing  spell,  would  greatly  help  the  { J 


NO  WAR  AND  NO  PEACE  143 

internal  stabilization  and  increase  the  Russian  powers 
of  resistance.  After  the  whole  country  and  the  whole 
world  had  come  to  know  of  our  absolute  helplessness 
against  foreign  invasion  at  this  time,  the  conclusion  of 
peace  would  everj-w^here  be  understood  as  an  act  forced 
upon  us  b}^  the  cruel  law  of  disproportionate  forces. 
It  would  be  childish  to  argue  from  the  standpoint  of 
abstract  revolutionary  ethics.  The  point  is  not  to  die 
with  honor  but  to  achieve  ultimate  victory.  The  Rus- 
sian Revolution  wants  to  survive,  must  survive,  and 
must  by  every  means  at  its  disposal  avoid  fighting 
an  uneven  battle  and  gain  time,  in  the  hope  that  the 
"Western  revolutionary  movement  wdll  come  to  its  aid. 

German  imperialism  is  still  engaged  in  a  fierce  an- 
nexationist struggle  with  English  and  American  mili- 
tarism. Only  because  of  this  is  the  conclusion  of  peace 
between  Russia  and  Germany  at  all  possible.  We  must 
fully  avail  ourselves  of  this  situation.  The  welfare 
of  the  Revolution  is  the  highest  law.  "We  should  ac- 
cept the  peace  which  we  are  unable  to  reject;  we  must 
secure  a  breathing  spell  to  be  utilized  for  intensive 
work  within  the  country  and,  especially,  for  the  crea- 
tion of  an  army. 

At  the  conference  of  the  Communist  party  as  well  as 
at  the  Fourth  Conference  of  the  Soviet,  the  peace  par- 
tisans triumphed.  They  were  joined  by  many  of  those 
who  in  January  considered  it  impossible  to  sign  the 
Brest-Litovsk  treaty.  "Then,"  said  they,  "our  signa- 
ture would  have  been  looked  upon  by  the  English  and 
French  workingmen  as  a  shameful  capitulation,  with- 
out an  attempt  to  fight.  Even  the  base  insinuations 
of  the  Anglo-French  chauvinists  as  to  a  secret  compact 
between  the  Soviet  Government  and  the  Germans, 
might  in  case  that  treaty  had  been  signed  find  cre- 
dence in  certain  circles  of  European  laborers.  But 
after  we  had  refused  to  sign  the  treaty,  after  a  new 
German  invasion,  after  our  attempt  to  resist  it,  and 
after  our  military  weakness  had  become  painfully  obvi- 
ous to  the  whole  world,  after  all  this,  no  one  dare  to 
reproach  us  for  surrendering  without  a  fight. 

The  Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  in  its  second  enlarged  edi- 
tion, was  signed  and  ratified. 

In  the  meantime,  the  executioners  were  doing  their 
work  in  Finland  and  the  Ukraine,  menacing  more  and 


144  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

more  the  most  vital  centers  of  Great  Russia.  Thus 
the  question  of  Russia's  very  existence  as  an  independ- 
ent country  is  henceforth  inseparably  connected  with 
the  question  of  the  European  revolution. 

When  our  party  took  over  the  government,  Ave  knew 
in  advance  what  difficulties  we  had  to  contend  with. 
Economically  the  country  had  been  exhausted  by  the 
war  to  the  very  utmost.  The  revolution  had  destroyed 
the  old  administrative  machinery  and  could  not  yet 
create  anytliing  to  take  its  place.  Millions  of  workers 
had  been  wrested  from  their  normal  nooks  in  the  na- 
tional economy  of  things,  declassified,  and  physically 
shattered  by  the  three  years'  war.  The  colossal  war 
industries,  carried  on  on  an  inadequately  prepared  na- 
tional foundation,  had  drained  all  the  lifeblood  of  the 
people;  and  their  demobilization  was  attended  with 
extreme  difficulties.  The  phenomena  of  economic  and 
political  anarchy  spread  throughout  the  country.  The 
Russian  peasantry  had  for  centuries  been  held  together 
by  barbarian  national  discipline  from  below  and  iron- 
Czarist  rule  from  above.  Economic  development  had 
undermined  the  former,  the  revolution  destroyed  the 
latter.  Psychologically,  the  revolution  meant  the  awak- 
ening of  a  sense  of  human  personality  among  the  peas- 
antry. The  anarchic  manifestations  of  this  awakening 
are  but  the  inevitable  results  of  the  preceding  oppres- 
sion, A  new  order  of  things,  an  order  based  on  the 
workers'  own  control  of  industry,  can  come  only 
through  gradual  and  internal  elimination  of  the  an- 
archic manifestations  of  the  revolution. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  propertied  classes,  even 
though  deprived  of  political  power,  will  not  relinquish 
their  advantages  without  a  fight.  The  Revolution  has 
brought  to  a  head  the  question  of  private  property  in 
land  and  the  tools  of  production — that  is,  the  question 
of  vital  significance  to  the  exploiting  classes.  Politi- 
cally this  means  ceaseless,  secret  or  open  civil  war.  In 
its  turn,  civil  war  inevitably  nourishes  anarchical  ten- 
dencies within  the  workingmen's  movement.  With  the 
disorganization  of  industries,  of  national  finances,  of 
the  transportation  and  provisioning  systems,  prolonged 
civil  strife  thus  sets  up  tremendous  difficulties  in  the| 
way  of  constructive  organizing  work.  Nevertheless, 
the  Soviet  Government  can  look  the  future  in  the  face 


NO  WAR  AND  NO  PEACE  145- 

with  perfect  confidence.  Only  a  careful  inventory  of 
all  the  country 's  resources ;  only  a  rational  organization 
of  industries — an  organization  born  of  one  general 
plan ;  only  wise  and  careful  distribution  of  all  the 
products,  can  save  the  country.  And  this  is  Social- 
ism. Either  a  complete  descent  to  colonial  status  or  a 
Socialist  resurrection — these  are  the  alternatives  be- 
fore which  our  country  finds  itself. 

The  war  has  undermined  the  soil  of  the  entire  cajH 
italistic  world.  Herein  lies  our  unconquerable 
strength.  The  imperialistic  ring  that  is  pressing 
around  us  will  be  burst  asunder  by  the  proletarian 
revolution.  We  do  not  doubt  this  for  a  minute,  any 
more  than  we  doubted  during  our  decades  of  under- 
ground struggle  the  inevitableness  of  the  downfall  of 
Czarism. 

To  struggle,  to  unite  our  forces,  to  establish  indus- 
trial discipline  and  a  Socialist  regime,  to  increase  the 
productivity  of  labor,  and  to  press  on  in  the  face  of  all 
obstacles — this  is  our  mission.  History  is  working  in 
our  favor.  The  proletarian  revolution  will  flare  up, 
sooner  or  later,  both  in  Europe  and  America,  and  will 
bring  emancipation  not  only  to  the  Ukraine,  Poland, 
Lithuania,  Courland,  and  Finland,  but  also  to  all  suf- 
fering humanity. 

Kaiser  Karl  of  Austria-Hungary  issued  a  manifesto  **To' 
My  Peoples,"  regarding  the  peace  with  the  Ukraine: 

Thanks  to  God's  gracious  aid  we  have  concluded 
peace  with  Ukrainia.  Our  victorious  arms  and  the 
sincere  peace  policy  which  we  have  pursued  with  in- 
defatigable perseverance  have  shown  the  first  fruits  of 
a  defensive  war  waged  for  our  preservation.  .  .  . 

Under  the  impression  of  this  peace  with  Ukrainia, 
our  glance  turns  with  full  sympathy  to  that  aspiring 
young  people  in  whose  heart  first  among  our  oppo- 
nents the  feeling  of  neighborly  love  has  become  opera- 
tive. ...  It  thus  has  been  the  first  to  leave  the  camp 
of  our  enemies,  in  order,  in  the  interest  of  the  speediest 
possible  attainment  of  a  new  and  great  common  aim^ 
to  unite  its  efforts  with  our  strength.  .  .  . 

May  the  Almighty  bless  us  further  with  strength 
and  endurance  that  not  only  for  ourselves  and  our- 


146  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BKEST-LITOVSK 

faithful   allies,   but   also    for   all   humanity   we   may- 
attain  a  fijial  peace. 

130  When  the  terms  of  the  Brest  Treaty  with  the  Ukraine 
were  made  public,  there  was  great  excitement  throughout 
Poland  because  the  Province  of  Kholm  had  been  ceded 
to  the  Ukrainian  People's  Kepublic. 

A  manifesto  was  issued  by  the  Polish  Regency  Council, 
which  had  been  set  up  in  accordance  with  the  independ- 
ence granted  Poland  by  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
Governments  in  November,  1916,  and  which  consisted  of 
Archbishop  Kakovski,  Count  Ostrovski,  and  Prince  Lu- 
bomirski. 

.  ,  .  But  when  the  Czar's  reign  in  Russia  came  to 
an  end,  and  Russia's  new  rulers  began  peace  negotia- 
tions with  the  Central  Powers,  Poland  was  not  ad- 
mitted to  these  negotiations.  We  demanded  our  par- 
ticipation in  these  negotiations  earnestly  and  inces- 
santly. We  were  promised  this  participation.  Then 
the  answer  was  delayed,  and  we  were  deluded  until 
the  plenipotentiaries  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary decided  alone  about  our  frontiers,  contrary  to 
our  rights.  We  were  not  admitted  in  order  that  peace 
might  be  made  at  our  cost,  and  in  order  that  the  de- 
sired security  in  the  East  might  be  obtained.  At  the 
price  of  our  nation's  living  body,  a  piece  of  Polish 
land  was  carved  out  and  given  to  the  Ukrain- 
ians. .  .  . 

The  Polish  Club  also  issued  a  manifesto  signed  by  six 
Polish  political  parties: 

The  reports  of  the  peace  negotiations  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  published  in  the  press  show  that  the  German 
Delegates  have  formed  ideas  in  regard  to  the  terri- 
tories occupied  by  them,  that  is  to  say,  in  regard  to 
the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  Vv'hieh  Polish  public  opinion 
cannot  accept.  The  German  Delegates  hold  among 
other  things  the  theory  that  "the  various  political 
bodies  authorized  to  represent  the  various  nationali- 
ties in  the  occupied  territories  can  express  the  will  of 
the  nation,"  and  that  for  this  reason  they  are  "from 
henceforth  competent  to  conclude  conventions."  This 
theory  proceeds  evidently  from  a  serious  and  danger- 
ous misunderstanding,  .  .  .  Any  engagement  made  in 


NO  WAE  AND  NO  PEACE  147 

the  name  of  the  nation,  any  conclusion  of  facts  of 
any  kind  by  provisional  bodies,  would  certainly  call 
forth  throughout  Poland  a  unanimous  protest.  .  .  . 


XI.     THE  NEW  GERMAN  WAR 

131  February  15.  It  was  announced  that  Germany  had  re- 
solved to  resume  military  operations  against  Russia.  The 
decision  had  been  reached  at  a  conference  of  German  mili- 
tary and  political  leaders,  including  the  Kaiser.  Russia's 
action  of  February  10,  in  refusing  to  sign  a  Treaty  of 
Peace,  was  declared  to  be  equivalent  to  a  denunciation 
of  the  armistice  signed  on  December  15.  Accordingly, 
German  Army  Headquarters  announced  that  the  armistice 
on  the  Russian  front  would  expire  at  noon  on  Monday, 
February  18. 

132  February  17.  The  Ukrainian  Government  addressed  a 
declaration  ' '  To  the  German  People ' ' : 

On  February  9  we  signed,  in  the  deep  and  ardent 
desire  to  live  in  peace  and  friendship  with  our  neigh- 
bors, a  peace  treaty  with  the  States  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance.  .  .  .  The  joyful  news  of  February  9,  how- 
ever, for  which  the  working  masses  of  our  people  so 
greatly  longed,  has  brought  us  no  peace  in  our  land. 
.  .  .  The  Russian  Maximalists  who  a  month  ago  dis- 
persed the  All-Russian  Constituent  Assembly  in  Petro- 
grad,  consisting  almost  solely  of  Socialists,  have  now 
undertaken,  as  they  call  it,  a  holy  war  against  the 
Socialists  of  the  Ukraine.  .  .  .  Before  the  whole  world 
we  declare  that  the  Petrograd  Commissars  of  the 
People  lie  when  they  talk  about  a  rising  of  the  people 
in  the  Ukraine.  .  .  .  The  Petrograd  Commissars 
who,  with  words  only,  have  stubbornly  defended  the 
weal  of  the  Ukraine,  Poland,  Courland  and  other  peo- 
ples, have  made  use  of  a  fine  pose  at  Brest-Litovsk 
to  recall  from  the  front  the  remnants  of  the  Russian 
army  for  the  purpose  of  secretly  throwing  them  against 
the  Ukraine  to  rob  us,  to  send  our  stocks  of  corn  to 
the  north  and  to  subjugate  the  country.  .  .  . 

In  this  hard  struggle  for  our  existence,  we  look 
around  for  help.  We  are  firmly  convinced  that  the 
peaceful  and  order-loving  German  people  will  not  re- 
main indifferent  when  it  learns  of  our  distress.  The 
German  army  that  stands  on  the  flank  of  our  northern 
enemy  possesses  the  power  to  help  us,  and  by  its  in- 


NEW  GERMAN  WAS  149 

tervention  to  protect  the  northern  frontiers  against 
further  invasion  by  the  enemy, 

February  18.  Two  hours  after  the  armistice  came  to  an 
end,  the  German  army  crossed  the  Dvina  and  entered 
Dviusk  in  the  north  with  the  immediate  objective  of  seiz- 
ing Livonia  and  Esthonia.  The  Germans  declared  that  it 
was  their  aim  to  rescue  the  population  of  these  provinces 
from  the  Bolshevist  rule  of  murder  and  looting.  Simul- 
taneously, the  town  of  Lutsk  in  Volhynia  was  occupied 
without  fighting,  in  response,  according  to  the  official  Ger- 
man statement,  to  an  appeal  of  the  Ukrainians.  In  an 
army  order,  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  Commander-in- 
Chief  on  the  Russian  front,  declared  that  the  aim  of  the 
advance  was  not  annexation,  but  restoration  of  order  and 
suppression  of  the  anarchy  threatening  to  infect  Europe. 
"Russia  is  sick  and  is  trying  to  contaminate  all  the  coun- 
tries of  the  world  with  a  moral  infection.  We  must  fight 
against  the  disorder  inoculated  by  Trotzky,  and  defend 
outraged  liberty.  Germany  is  fortunate  in  being  the  in- 
carnation of  the  sentiments  of  other  order-loving  peoples." 

On  the  same  day  it  was  announced  in  Vienna  that  "an 
agreement  had  been  reached  between  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary whereby  in  the  event  of  military  action  being 
necessary,  the  German  troops  would  be  confined  to  the 
frontier  of  Great  Russia  and  the  Austrians  to  the  Ukraine 
only. ' ' 

February  19.  Von  Seydler,  the  Austrian  Premier,  an- 
nounced in  the  Reichsrat  the  signing  of  a  supplementary 
treaty  by  representatives  of  the  Ukrainian  Rada  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  concerning  the  Province 
of  Kholm.  The  Polish,  Czech,  Slav  and  Socialist  Deputies 
had  threatened  to  unite  in  voting  against  any  further 
credits  unless  the  Brest  treaty  was  changed  on  that  point. 
The  passage  in  the  supplementary  treaty  reads: 

For  the  purpose  of  avoiding  all  misunderstandings 
in  the  interpretation  of  Clause  2,  Article  II,  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  concluded  at  Brest-Litovsk  on  February 
9,  1918,  ...  it  is  hereby  declared  that  the  mixed  com- 
mission  provided  for  in  Paragraph  2  of  this  Article 
of  the  Treaty  shall,  in  fixing  the  frontier,  not 
be  bound  to  draw  the  frontier  line  through  the  places 
of  Bielgorag  .  .  .  Sarnaki,  but  shall  have  the  right  on 


150  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

the  ground  of  Article  II,  Clause  2,  of  this  Peace  Treaty, 
to  draw  the  frontier  which  may  result  from  ethno- 
graphical conditions  and  from  the  desires  of  the  local 
populations  east  of  the  line  named. 

136  ^"^on  Seydler  stated  that  the  mixed  commission  to  deter- 
mine the  new  boundarj^  would  be  composed  of  representa- 
tives of  the  contracting  parties  and  representatives  of  Po- 
land, each  sending  an  equal  number  of  delegates  to  the 
commission. 

At  5 :30  in  the  morning,  after  an  all-night  meeting  of 
the  Council  of  People's  Commissars,  a  proclamation  of  pro- 
test was  addressed  by  wireless  to  the  Berlin  Government : 

The  Council  of  People 's  Commissars  protests  against 
the  fact  that  the  German  Government  has  directed  its 
troops  against  the  Russian  Soviet  Republic,  which  has 
declared  the  war  as  at  an  end  and  which  is  demobiliz- 
ing its  army  on  all  fronts. 

The  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government  of  Rus- 
sia could  not  anticipate  such  a  step  because  neither 
directly  nor  indirectly  has  any  one  of  the  parties  which 
concluded  the  armistice  given  the  seven  days'  notice 
required  in  accordance  with  the  treaty  of  December 
15  for  terminating  it. 

The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  in  the  present 
circumstances  regards  itself  as  forced  formally  to  de- 
clare its  willingness  to  sign  a  peace  upon  the  condi- 
tions which  had  been  dictated  by  the  Delegations  of 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  at  Brest-Litovsk. 

The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  further  de- 
clares that  a  detailed  reply  v/ill  be  given  without  de- 
lay to  the  conditions  of  peace  as  proposed  by  the 
German  Government. 

(Signed)     For  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars, 

LENIN, 
TROTZKY. 

137  On  the  same  day,  the  People's  Commissar  of  War,  Kry- 
lenko,  addressed  the  following  message  to  headquarters 
on  all  fronts : 

The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  has  offered  to 
the  Germans  to  sign  peace  immediately.  I  order  that, 
in  all  cases  where  Germans  are  encountered,  massed 
pourparlers  with  the  German  soldiers  should  be  or- 
ganized and  the  proposal  to  refrain  from  fighting  made 


NEW  GEEMAN  WAR  151 

to  them.     If  Germans  refuse,  then  you  must  offer  to 
them  every  possible  resistance. 

On  the  same  day  Trotzky  forwarded  a  wireless  message 
to  Czernin,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister : 

The  German  Government  having  re-established  a 
state  of  war  with  Russia  without  even  giving  the  seven 
days'  previous  notice,  I  have  the  honor  to  ask  you  to 
inform  me  whether  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
also  considers  itself  in  a  state  of  war  with  Russia,  and 
if  not,  wliether  it  believes  it  possible  to  reach  a  prac- 
tical realization  of  the  agreements  worked  out  at  Pet- 
rograd. 

The   German  reply  came  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
same  day.     It  was  signed  by  General  Hoffmann: 
To  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars: 

A  wireless  message  signed  by  Nicolai  Lenin  and  L. 
Trotzky  from  Tsarskoe-Selo  was  today  received  at 
Konig  Wusterhausen  at  9  :12  a.  m.  It  has  been  handed 
over  to  the  Royal  Government,  although  a  wireless 
message  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  official  document 
because  the  original  signatures  are  absent.  I  am  au- 
thorized to  request  from  the  People's  Commissars  au- 
thentication in  writing  of  the  wireless  message  which 
must  be  sent  to  the  German  Command  at  Dvinsk. 
To  this  message,  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commis- 
sars made  the  following  reply: 

We  are  sending  today  from  Petrograd  a  messenger 
to  Dvinsk  with  the  wireless  message  containing  the 
original  signatures  of  Lenin  and  Trotzky.  "We  beg 
you  to  give  us  an  acknowledgment  of  this  message 
and  inform  us  if  it  has  been  received  promptly.  We 
also  beg  you  to  reply  in  writing. 

Speaking  on  the  same  day  before  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Soviets,  Lenin  defended  the  Council 
of  Commissars  by  pointing  out  that  the  country  was  com- 
pletely unable  to  oft'er  resistance,  and  that  peace  was  in- 
dispensable for  the  completion  of  the  social  revolution  in 
Russia.  He  also  argued  that  the  imperialist  governments 
then  at  war  would  sooner  or  later  unite  for  the  purpose  of 
crushing  the  Socialist  commonwealth  of  Russia,  and  that 
it  was  therefore  imperative  to  make  peace  while  Russia's 
enemies  were  divided. 


152  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

141  February  20.  Yon  Kuehlmann,  at  the  opening  session  of 
the  Reichstag,  delivered  an  address  dealing  at  length  with 
the  peace  treaty  signed  by  the  Central  Powers  with  the 
"Ukraine  and  the  collapse  of  the  peace  negotiations  with 
Russia.  He  asserted  that  the  pacific  intentions  of  Russia 
could  no  longer  be  credited,  but  that  even  today  Germany 
was  prepared  to  conclude  a  peace  "which  corresponds  to 
our  interests."  He  instanced  the  peace  agreement  with 
the  Ukraine  as  an  indication  of  the  readiness  of  the  Central 
Powers  for  peace.  "Ukraine  is  a  rich  country,  and  the 
decisive  factor  for  the  conclusion  of  peace  was  economic." 
"When  it  came  to  the  fixing  of  the  frontiers,  Ukraine 
claimed  Kholm.  There  was  danger  that  negotiations  might 
be  wrecked  if  this  demand  were  not  taken  into  account. 
The  frontiers  of  Kholm  have  not  yet  been  fixed  definitely. 
They  will  be  established  by  a  commission,  including  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Ukraine  and  Poland. 

He  then  read  a  wireless  despatch  from  Lenin  and  Trotzky 
announcing  that  they  found  it  necessary  to  sign  a  peace 
agreement  on  the  terms  dictated  by  the  Central  Powers. 
He  warned  the  members  of  the  Reichstag  that  peace  with 
Russia  will  have  been  arrived  at  only  when  the  signatures 
on  the  treaty  are  dry.  He  said  that  the  conduct  of  the 
Russian  Delegates  at  Brest-Litovsk  and  in  particular  that 
of  Leon  Trotzky  was  without  precedent  in  history.  With 
his  final  declaration  Trotzky  had  attempted  to  extricate 
himself  from  a  position  that  had  become  untenable,  and  he 
was  not  really  desirous  of  concluding  peace.  Von  Kuehl- 
mann expressed  the  conviction  that  if  anything  could  in- 
duce Trotzky  to  sign  a  satisfactory  peace,  it  would  be  the 
Ukrainian  Treaty  which  he  considered  an  important  means 
for  arriving  at  a  settlement  tolerable  for  both  Germany 
and  Russia.  He  defended  the  "new  war"  against  Russia 
as  necessary  to  enforce  peace. 

142  Meanwhile,  the  German  and  Austrian  advance  continued 
almost  unopposed.  On  February  21,  German  detachments 
were  70  miles  northeast  of  Riga,  and  their  cavalry  was 
pushing  toward  Mohilev,  the  former  Russian  General  Head- 
quai'ters.  On  February  23,  the  Turkish  army  began  an 
■offensive  in  the  Caucasus. 

143  February  21.  Two  proclamations  were  issued  by  the  Peo- 
ple's Commissars  calling  the  Russian  soldiers,  workmen 
and  peasants  to  arms  "for  the  defense  of  the  Republic 


I 


NEW  GERMAN  WAR  153 

against  the  masses  of  bourgeoisie  and  imperialists  of  Ger- 
many."  They  declared  that  "the  German  Generals  desire 
to  establish  their  own  order  in  Petrograd  and  Kiev.  .  .  . 
German  militarism  wishes  to  smother  the  working  classes 
and  the  Ukrainian  masses,  to  give  back  the  land  to  the  land 
owners,  factories  and  workshops  to  the  bankers,  and  power 
to  a  monarchy."  The  proclamation  then  enumerates  eight 
paragraphs  containing  instructions  to  "all  the  forces  in 
the  country  in  their  entirety, "  as  to  how  they  are  to  ' '  place 
themselves  at  the  service  of  the  defense  of  the  revolution." 
Each  position  must  be  defended  to  the  last  drop  of  blood. 
Railways,  rolling  stock,  corn  and  provisions  in  general  are 
if  necessary  to  be  destroyed.  Petrograd  and  Kiev  and  all 
towns  and  villages  on  the  line  of  the  new  front  must  be 
defended  by  battalions  "under  the  direction  of  the  mili- 
tary Socialists,"  and  members  of  the  bourgeois  class, 
women  as  well  as  men,  must  enter  these  battalions  under 
the  surveillance  of  Red  Guards.  All  institutions  resisting 
the  defense  of  the  revolution  or  profiting  "by  the  invasion 
of  the  imperialistic  masses  in  order  to  overthrow  the  au- 
thority of  the  Soviets  must  be  closed.  Directors  of  and 
collaborators  with  these  institutions  who  are  capable  of 
work  must  mobilize  themselves  to  dig  trenches  and  engage 
in  other  defensive  works.  Foreign  agents  and  speculators 
are  regarded  as  counter-revolutionary  agitators,  and  Ger- 
man spies  must  be  shot  on  sight.  The  Socialist  Fatherland 
is  in  danger !  Long  live  the  People 's  Social  Revolution  ! ' ' 
In  the  appeal  to  the  workmen  and  peasants  the  People's 
Commissars  say: 

We  agreed  to  sign  peace  terms  at  the  cost  of  enor- 
mous concessions  in  order  to  save  the  country  from 
final  exhaustion  and  the  ruin  of  the  revolution.  Once 
more  the  German  working  class,  in  this  threatening 
hour,  has  shown  itself  insufficiently  determined  to  stay 
the  strong  criminal  hand  of  its  own  militarism.  We 
had  no  other  choice  but  to  accept  the  conditions  of 
German  militarism  until  a  revolution  changes  or  can- 
cels them. 

The  German  Government  is  not  hastening  to  reply 
to  us,  evidently  aiming  to  seize  as  many  important 
positions  in  our  territory  as  possible.  .  .  .  We  even 
now  are  convinced  that  the  German  working  classes 
w^ill  rise  against  the  attempts  of  the  ruling  classes  to 
stifle  the  revolution.     But  we  cannot  predict  with  cer- 


154  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

tainty  v/hen  this  will  occur.  .  .  .  The  Commissar* 
call  upon  all  loj^al  Soviets  and  army  organizations  to 
use  all  efforts  to  recreate  the  army.  Perverted  ele- 
ments of  hooligans,  marauders,  and  cowards  should 
be  expelled  from  the  ranks,  and  in  the  event  of  re- 
_^_^_  sistance,  wiped  off  the  face  of  the  earth.  ,  .  . 

144  "February  23.  The  Russian  Government  received  by- 
courier  from  Dvinsk  a  new  offer  of  peace  from  Germany, 
signed  by  von  Kuehlmann  and  the  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Army.     The  document  reads : 

Germany  will  renew  the  peace  negotiations  and  will 
conclude  peace  on  the  following  conditions : 

Both  to  declare  the  war  ended. 

All  regions  west  of  the  line  indicated  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  to  the  Russian  Delegation,  which  formerly  be- 
longed to  Russia,  to  be  no  longer  under  the  territorial 
protection  of  Russia.  In  the  region  of  Dvinsk  this 
line  must  be  advanced  to  the  eastern  frontier  of  Cour- 
land. 

The  former  attachment  of  these  regions  to  the  Rus- 
sian State  must  in  no  ease  involve  for  them  obliga- 
tions toward  Russia.  Russia  renounces  every  claim 
to  intervene  in  the  internal  affairs  of  those  regions. 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  have  the  intention  to 
define  further  the  fate  of  these  regions,  in  agreement 
with  their  population. 

Germany  is  ready,  after  the  completion  of  Russian 
demobilization,  to  evacuate  the  regions  which  are  east 
of  the  above  line.  So  far  as  it  is  not  stated  otherwise, 
Livonia  and  Estlionia  must  immediately  be  cleared  of 
Russian  troops  and  Red  Guards. 

Livonia  and  Esthonia  will  be  occupied  by  German 
police  until  the  date  when  the  constitution  of  the 
respective  countries  shall  guarantee  their  social  se- 
curity and  political  order.  All  inhabitants  who  were 
arrested  for  political  reasons  must  be  released  imme- 
diately. 

Russia  will  conclude  peace  with  the  Ukrainian  Peo- 
ple's Republic.  Ukraine  and  Finland  will  be  imme- 
diately evacuated  by  Russian  troops  and  Red  Guards. 

Russia  will  do  all  in  its  power  to  secure  for  Tnrkey 
the  orderly  return  of  its  Anatolian  frontiers.     Russia 


NEW  GERMAN  WAR  155 

recognizes  the  annulment  of  the  Turkish  Capitula- 
tions. 

The  complete  demobilization  of  the  Russian  Army^ 
inclusive  of  the  detachments  newly  formed  by  the  pres- 
ent Government,  must  be  carried  out  immediately, 

Russian  warships  in  the  Black  Sea,  the  Baltic  Sea, 
and  the  Arctic  Ocean  must  immediately  either  be  sent 
to  Russian  harbors  and  kept  there  until  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace  or  be  disarmed.  Warships  of  the  En- 
tente which  are  in  the  sphere  of  Russian  authority- 
must  be  regarded  as  Russian  ships. 

Merchant  navigation  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic 
Sea  must  be  renewed,  as  stated  in  the  armistice  treaty. 
The  clearing  away  of  mines  is  to  begin  immediately. 
The  blockade  of  the  Arctic  Ocean  is  to  remain  in  force 
until  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace. 

The  Russo-German  commercial  treaty  of  1914  must 
be  put  into  force  again.  In  addition,  there  must  be  a 
guarantee  for  the  free  export,  ^^dthout  tariff,  of  ores, 
and  the  immediate  commencement  of  negotiations  for 
the  conclusion  of  a  new  commercial  treaty,  with  a  guar- 
antee of  the  most  favored  nation  treatment,  at  least 
until  1925,  even  in  the  case  of  the  termination  of  the 
provisorium,  and,  finally,  the  sanctioning  of  all  clauses 
corresponding  to  paragraph  11,  of  classes  3,  4,  and  15 
of  the  Ukrainian  peace  treaty. 

Legal  and  political  relations  are  to  be  regulated  in 
accordance  with  the  decision  of  the  first  version  of 
the  Germano-Russian  convention.  So  far  as  action 
on  that  decision  has  not  yet  been  taken,  especially 
with  respect  to  indemnities  for  civilian  damages,  this 
must  be  in  accordance  with  the  German  proposal.  And 
there  must  be  indemnification  with  expenses  for  war 
prisoners,  in  accordance  with  the  Russian  proposal. 

Russia  will  permit  ?nd  support,  so  far  as  she  can, 
German  commissions  for  war  prisoners  and  war  ref- 
ugees. 

Russia  promises  to  put  an  end  to  every  propaganda 
and  agitation,  either  on  the  part  of  the  Government 
or  on  the  part  of  persons  supported  by  the  Govern- 
ment, against  members  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  and 
their  political  and  military  institutions,  even  in  locali- 
ties occupied  by  the  Central  Powers. 


156  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

The  above  conditions  must  be  accepted  within  forty- 
eight  hours.  The  Russian  plenipotentiaries  must  start 
immediately  for  Brest-Litovsk  and  sign  at  that  place 
within  three  days  a  peace  treaty  which  must  be  rati- 
fied within  two  weeks. 

145  February  24.  The  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Soviets  met  all  night  to  consider  the  German  offer  with 
the  result  that  a  message  was  sent  to  the  Berlin  Govern- 
ment, announcing  that  a  representative  had  left  Petrograd 
at  noon  for  Dvinsk  for  the  purpose  of  transmitting  to  the 
German  High  Command  at  Dvinsk  Russia's  official  reply 
to  German}^ 's  peace  conditions.  Another  wireless  ad- 
dressed "TO  ALL"  announced  that  the  following  mes- 
sage had  been  sent  to  the  German  Government : 

According  to  the  decision  of  the  Central  Executive 
of  the  Soviets  taken  at  4:30  Sunday  morning,  the 
Soviets  and  People's  Commissars  have  decided  to  ac- 
cept Germany's  peace  conditions,  and  will  send  a  Dele- 
gation to  Brest-Litovsk. 

This  decision  was  taken  at  the  meeting  by  a  vote  of  126 
to  85,  twenty-six  members  not  being  present,  among  them 
Trotzky.  It  was  decided  that  an  entirely  new  Delega- 
tion, with  the  exception  of  Secretary  Karakhan,  should  go 
to  Brest,  and  the  following  were  chosen :  Zinoviev,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Petrograd  Soviet ;  Alexiev,  Acting  Commissary 
for  Agriculture,  and  Sokolkokov.  These  were  to  be  accom- 
panied by  naval  and  military  representatives  and  were  to 
leave  for  Brest  that  evening. 

The  Bolshevik  majority  at  the  meeting  were  convinced 
by  Lenin  of  the  correctness  of  his  own  policy  as  against 
that  of  Trotzky.  He  differed  from  Trotzky  on  two  points: 
First,  he  was  sure  no  effective  resistance  could  be  offered 
to  the  Germans,  and  second,  he  did  not  believe  in  the  im- 
manence of  the  proletarian  revolt  in  Germany  and  Austria. 
At  the  Bolshevik  party  caucus  Radek,  Volodarsky  and 
Bronsky  were  the  advocates  of  resistance  to  the  bitter  end 
and  of  a  refusal  to  sign  the  peace  treaty.  Martov  Avas  the 
spokesman  of  the  Mensheviks  at  the  general  meeting.  They 
were  in  favor  of  resistance.  Lenin's  attitude  was  outlined 
by  him  in  two  articles  in  the  Pravda  which  appeared  be- 
fore the  meeting  of  the  Central  Executive  took  place.  He 
writes : 


NEW  GERMAN  WAB  157 

I  am  absolutely  convinced  that  to  refuse  to  sign 
these  terms  is  only  possible  to  those  who  are  intoxi- 
cated by  revolutionary  phrases.  Up  till  now  I  have 
tried  to  impress  upon  the  members  of  the  party  the 
necessity  of  clearing  their  minds  of  revolutionary  cant. 
Now  I  must  do  this  openly,  for  unfortunately  my 
worst  forebodings  have  been  justified. 

Party  workers  in  January  declared  war  on  revolu- 
tionary phrases  and  said  that  a  policy  of  refusal  to 
sign  a  peace  would  perhaps  satisfy  the  craving  for 
effectiveness — and  brilliance — but  would  leave  out  of 
account  the  objective  correlation  of  class  forces  and 
material  factors  in  the  present  initial  moment  of  the 
Socialist  revolution.  They  further  said  that  if  we 
refused  to  sign  the  peace  then  proposed,  more  crush- 
ing defeats  would  compel  Russia  to  conclude  a  still 
more  disadvantageous  separate  peace. 

The  event  proved  even  worse  than  I  anticipated, 
for  our  retreating  army  seems  demoralized  and  ab- 
solutely refuses  to  fight.  Only  unrestrained  phrase- 
making  can  impel  Russia  at  this  moment  and  in  these 
conditions  to  continue  the  war,  and  of  course  I  per- 
sonally should  not  remain  one  second  either  in  the 
Government  or  in  the  Central  Committee  of  our  party 
if  the  policy  of  phrase-making  were  to  prevail. 

This  bitter  new  truth  has  revealed  itself  with  such 
terrible  distinctness  that  it  is  impossible  not  to  see  it. 
All  the  bourgeoisie  in  Russia  is  jubilant  at  the  ap- 
proach of  the  Germans.  Only  a  blind  man  or  a  man 
infatuated  with  phrases  can  fail  to  see  that  the  policy 
of  a  revolutionary  war  without  an  army  is  water  on 
the  bourgeois  mill.  In  the  bourgeois  papers  there  is 
already  exulting  in  view  of  the  impending  overthrow 
of  the  Soviet  Government  by  the  Germans. 

We  are  compelled  to  submit  to  a  distressing  peace. 
It  will  not  stop  revolution  in  Germany  and  Europe. 
We  shall  now  begin  to  prepare  a  revolutionary  army, 
not  by  phrases  and  exclamations,  as  did  those  who 
after  February  10  did  nothing  even  to  attempt  to 
stop  our  fleeing  troops,  but  by  organized  work,  by 
the  mighty  creation  of  a  serious,  national,  mighty 
army. 


158  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

In  his  address  before  the  meeting  Lenin  added : 

Their  knees  are  upon  our  chest  and  our  position 
is  hopeless.  This  peace  must  be  accepted  as  a  respite, 
enabling  us  to  prepare  a  decisive  resistance  to  the 
bourgeois  and  imperialism.  The  proletariat  of  the 
whole  world  will  come  to  our  aid.  Then  we  shall  re- 
new the  fight. 

146  On  the  same  day  the  Petrograd  Soviet  passed  a  resolu- 
tion approving  the  action  of  the  Government  and  at  the 
same  time,  faced  with  the  plain  intention  of  German  im- 
perialism to  refuse  peace  on  any  conditions,  summoning 
the  working  class  and  garrison  of  Petrograd  to  the  defense 
of  Socialist  Russia  and  the  revolutionary  eapitol. 

147  February  25.  Chancellor  Hertling  addressed  the  German 
Reichstag,  taking  up  in  detail  the  four  principles  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  address  of  February  11.  As  to  Russia  and 
the  prospects  of  peace  at  Brest-Litovsk,  he  said: 

Our  war  aims  from  the  beginning  were  the  defense 
of  the  Fatherland,  the  maintenance  of  our  territ(*ial 
integrity,  and  the  freedom  of  our  economic  develop- 
ment. Our  warfare,  even  where  it  must  be  aggressive 
in  action,  is  defensive  in  aim.  I  lay  especial  stress 
upon  that  just  now  in  order  that  no  misunderstand- 
ings shall  arise  about  our  operations  in  the  east. 

After  the  breaking  off  of  peace  negotiations  by  the 
Russian  Delegation  on  February  10  we  had  a  free  hand 
as  against  Russia.  The  sole  aim  of  the  advance  of 
our  troops,  v/hich  was  be^iS  seven  days  afier  the  rup- 
turer^M~To~saI'eguard_^j^fr^  with 

the""TTErain_e.  Anas  oFconquest  were  in  no  way  a  deter- 
m!ming  factor.  We  were  strengthened  in  this  by  the 
Ukrainians'  appeal  for  support  in  bringing  about  or- 
der in  their  young  State  against  the  disturbances  car- 
ried on  by  the  Bolslieviki. 

If  further  military  operations  in  other  regions  have 
taken  place,  the  same  applies  to  them.  They  in  no 
way  aim  at  conquest.  They  are  taking  place  solely 
upon  the  urgent  appeals  and  representations  of  the 
populations  for  protection  against  atrocities  and  dev- 
astation by  Red  Guards  and  other  bands.  They  have 
therefore,  been  undertaken  in  the  name  of  humanity. 


NEW  GERMAN  WAR  159 

They  are  measures  of  assistance,  and  have  no  other 
character.  It  is  a  question  of  creating  peace  and  order 
in  the  interest  of  peaceable  populations. 

We  do  not  intend  to  establish  ourselves,  for  example, 
in  Esthonia  or  Livonia,  In  Courland  and  Lithuania 
■our  chief  object  is  to  create  organs  of  self-determina- 
tion and  self-administration.  Our  military  action, 
however,  has  produced  a  success  far  exceeding  the  orig- 
inal aim. 

You  already  know  from  the  announcement  made  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  M. 
Trotzky  had  by  a  wireless  message,  which  was  speedily 
followed  by  a  written  confirmation,  declared  his  readi- 
ness to  resume  the  peace  negotiations  which  had  been 
broken  off.     W^j^ifj^j^rl  imm'^^T^^'^iy  ^^y  <^v^TigTYiUfinnr_ 

our    peace    C0n5itir>r|s    ir\    t,hp    fnrTYi    nf    an    nItimat.nTn. 

YesterdayizT-and  this  is  a  very  grj^ifying  communica^ 
tion  wliicli  I  have  to  make  to  you — news_  arrived  thaJL. 
the  Petro.Ljrad   Governniont  accepted  our  peace  condi- 

tio~hs   and   had   sent   rei)resentatives_  to  _Brest-Litovsk 

for  further  negotiations. 

It  is  possible  that  there  will  still  be  dispute  about 
the  details,  but  the  main  thing  has  been  achieved. 
The  will  to  peace  has  been  expressly  announced  from 
the  Russian  side,  while  the  conditions  have  been  ac- 
cepted, and  the  conclusion  of  peace  must  ensue  within 
a.  very  short  time. 

To  safeguard  the  fruits  of  our  peace  with  the 
Ukraine,  our  army  command  drew  the  sword.  Peace 
with  Russia  will  l3e  the  happy  result. 

Peace  negotiations  with  Rumania  began  at  Bucharest 
yesterday.  It  appeared  necessary  that  Secretary  von 
Kuehlmann  should  be  present  there  during  the  first 
days  when  the  foundations  were  laid.  Now,  however, 
he  will  presumably  soon  go  to  Brest-Litovsk.  It  is 
to  be  remembered  regarding  negotiations  with  Ru- 
mania that  we  are  not  taking  part  in  them  alone,  and 
are  under  obligations  to  champion  the  interests  of  our 
allies,  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  and 
to  see  to  it  that  a  compromise  is  arranged  there  re- 
garding any  divergent  desires  that  will  possibly  give 
rise  to  difficulties.  But  these  difficulties  will  be  over- 
come. 


160  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

"With  regard  to  Rumania,  too,  the  guiding  principle 
will  be  that  we  must,  and  we  desire  to,  convert  into 
friends  the  States  with  which  on  the  basis  of  the  suc- 
cess of  our  army  we  now  conclude  peace. 

I  will  say  a  word  regarding  Poland,  in  behalf  of 
which  the  Entente  and  President  "Wilson  have  recently 
appeared  specially  to  interest  themselves,  a  country 
liberated  from  oppressive  dependence  on  Czarist  Rus- 
sia by  the  united  forces  of  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  an  independ- 
ent State,  which,  in  unrestricted  development  of  its 
national  culture,  shall  at  the  same  time  become  a  pil- 
lar of  peace  in  Europe.  The  constitutional  problem 
— in  the  narrower  sense  the  question  what  constitution 
the  new  State  shall  receive — could  not,  as  is  easily 
understood,  be  immediately  decided,  and  is  still  in  the 
stage  of  exhaustive  discussions  between  the  three  coun- 
tries concerned.  A  fresh  difficulty  has  been  added 
to  the  many  difficulties  which  have  in  this  connection 
to  be  overcome,  difficulties  especially  in  the  economic 
domain  in  consequence  of  the  collapse  of  old  Russia. 
This  difficulty  results  from  the  delimitation  of  the 
frontier  between  the  new  State  and  the  adjacent  Rus- 
sian territory.  For  this  reason  the  news  of  peace 
with  the  Ukraine  at  first  evoked  great  uneasiness  in 
Poland.  I  hope,  however,  that  with  good-will  and 
proper  regard  to  the  ethnographical  conditions  a  com- 
promise on  the  claims  will  be  reached.  The  announced 
intention  to  make  a  serious  attempt  in  this  direction 
has  greatly  calmed  Polish  circles. 

In  the  regulation  of  the  frontier  question  only  what 
is  indispensable  on  military  grounds  will  be  demanded 
on  Germany's  part. 

148  February  26.  In  the  Reichstag  debate  on  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  treaty,  Philip  Scheidemann,  the  Majority  Socialist 
leader,  took  issue  with  the  Government : 

\  We  fought  for  the  defense  of  the  Fatherland  against 
barbarism  and  against  the  Entente's  plans  of  con- 
quest. We  did  not,  however,  fight  for  the  dismember- 
ment of  Russia  or  the  subjugation  of  Belgium.  The 
Government's  policy  toward  Russia  is  not  ours. 

True  the  Bolsheviks  played  into  the  hands  of  all 
the  disintegrating  tendencies  of  Russia,  but  we  do  not 


NEW  GERMAN  WAR  161 

desire  a  peace  with  the  Entente  like  that  which  is 
being  concluded  with  Russia.  The  Government  must 
remain  ready  for  a  real  peace  by  understanding. 

At  the  same  time,  Czernin,  the  Austro-Hungarian  For- 
eign Minister,  informed  the  Russian  Government  that  Aus- 
tria-Hungary was  ready  jointly  with  her  allies  to  bring 
the  peace  negotiations  to  the  desired  end. 

Despite  these  announcements,  a  Russian  wireless  of  Feb- 
ruary 25,  signed  by  Lenin  and  Trotzky  and  addressed  "TO' 
ALL"  and  to  Berlin,  Dvinsk,  Sofia  and  Constantinople,  de- 
clared that  no  formal  reply  h;.d  been  received  either  from 
the  German  Government  or  German  Headquarters  to  the 
communication  of  Krylenko  on  February  24,  asking  if  an 
armistice  would  automatically  ensue  upon  the  same  basis 
as  previously,  and  that  meanwhile  the  Germans  were  still 
advancing.     A  reply  was  asked  for. 

February  27.  It  was  announced  from  Petrograd  that  Gen- 
eral Hoffmann  had  replied  to  Krylenko 's  inquiry  by  say- 
ing that  the  German  advance  would  be  continued  until  a 
treaty  of  peace,  as  laid  down  in  the  German  peace  terms, 
had  been  signed. 

The  answer  to  General  Hoffmann's  reply  was  resistance 
by  the  Russian  troops  both  around  Pskov  and  Vitebsk  and 
Orsha  in  the  North,  as  well  as  near  Zhitomir  in  the  Ukraine. 

A  Russian  proclamation  calling  upon  the  people  for 
"resistance  to  the  German  hordes"  was  issued  on  the  same 
day: 

A  Peace  Delegation  is  now  on  the  way  to  Brest- 
Litovsk.  We  expect  any  moment  news  that  it  has  ar- 
rived at  the  place  appointed  for  peace  negotiations, 
but  there  is  no  armistice.  The  German  Government 
has  formally  refused  an  armistice,  and  German  de- 
tachments continue  to  advance. 

We  are  prepared  to  sign  their  peace  of  usurpation. 
We  have  already  declared  this,  but  there  are  many 
indications  that  the  German  imperialists  do  not  desire 
peace  at  the  present  moment,  but  rather  an  immediate 
strangling  of  the  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Revolu- 
tion. 

Brave,  heroic,  obstinate  and  pitiless  resistance  thus 
becomes   the   principal   task   of   the   Revolution.  .  .  . 


162  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

Every  possible  obstacle  must  be  put  in  the  way  of  the 
enemy.  .  .  .  Should  the  threat  to  Petrograd  increase, 
the  Government  will  remove  to  Moscow  or  any  other 
city  of  Russia.  .  .  .  Even  if  they  think  they  can  reach 
Petrograd  by  a  mere  military  promenade,  we  will  prove 
to  them  that  they  will  have  to  disperse  themselves 
all  over  Russia  before  they  can  reaeii  and  crush  the 
authority  of  the  Soviets.  .  .  .  However  deeply  they 
penetrate  Russia,  then  the  more  surely  will  they  bring 
about  the  outbreak  of  a  revolution  in  Germany.  .  .  , 
If  peace  with  the  revolution  is  not  the  aim  of  the  Ger- 
man imperialists,  they  will  see  that  the  revolution 
knows  how  to  defend  itself. 

In  another  proclamation,  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
miss  rs  declares  that  the  German  invaders  are  arresting 
the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils,  shooting  captured 
Red  Guards,  and  arming  German  and  Austrian  prisoners 
in  the  Ukraine.  The  proclamation  concludes:  "May  the 
blood  spilled  in  this  unequal  struggle  fall  on  the  heads  of 
the  German  Socialists,  who  are  allowing  the  German  work- 
men to  be  ranked  among  the  Cains  and  Judases." 

150         The  British  Foreign  Secretary  Balfour  replied  to  Chan- 
cellor Hertling  in  an  address  in  the  House  of  Commons : 

Von  Hertling  tells  us  that  the  recent  invasion  of 
Russia  was  solely  taking  place  on  urgent  appeals  from 
populations  for  protection  against  the  atrocities  and 
devastations  by  the  Red  Guard  and  other  bands,  and 
has,  therefore,  been  undertaken  in  the  name  of  human- 
ity. We  all  know — of  course  we  all  know — the  poet 
has  told  us  so — "That  East  is  East  and  West  is  West," 
but  I  cannot,  even  with  that  aphorism  ringing  in  my 
ears,  quite  follow  the  distinction  between  German 
policy  on  the  East  and  German  policy  on  the  West, 
German  policy  on  the  East  it  appears  has  been  recently 
entirely  directed  towards  preventing  atrocities  and 
devastation  and  carrying  out  military  operations  in 
the  name  of  humanity.  German  policy  on  the  West 
is  entirely  occupied  in  performing  atrocities  and  dev- 
astations and  in  trampling  under  foot  not  only  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  treaties,  but  the  very  spirit  of 
Immanity  itself.  Why  is  there  this  difference  of 
treatment  of  Belgium  on  the  one  side  and  of  the  Baltic 


NEW  GERMAN  WAR  163 

Provinces  on  the  other?  Why  this  humanity  appeal, 
with  such  an  overmastering  force,  of  Count  Hertling 
when  he  talks  about  Russia,  and  why  is  it  brushed 
aside  as  a  neglible  quantity  by  him  and  his  associates 
when  he  is  talking  of  Belgium?  I  know  of  no  ex- 
planation except  one,  which  is,  that  Germany  pursues 
her  methods  with  remorseless  insistency.  All  that 
v.;ries  is  the  excuse  that  she  gives  for  her  policy.  If 
she  wishes  to  invade  Belgium,  it  is  a  military  neces- 
sity; if  she  wishes  to  invade  Courland,  it  is  the  dic- 
tates of  humanity  and  the  desire  to  prevent  outrages 
and  devastations.  ...  I  am  unable  to  understand  how 
anybody  can  get  up  in  the  Reiclistag  and  say,  as  Count 
Hertling  said,  that  the  war  Germany  has  been  waging 
is  a  defensive  war. 
On  the  same  day.  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  Minister  of  Block- 
ade, said  regarding  Hertling 's  speech: 

It  would  be  foolish  to  enter  into  negotiations  unless 
there  were  a  re  ;sonable  prospect  of  success.  We  do 
not  desire  to  repeat  the  experim;^nt  of  the  Brest-Litovsk 
negotiations. 

February  28.  The  German  mil  it:  i  y  communication  con- 
tained the  following  passage : 

Eastern  Theatre — Operatioiv;  are  taking  their  regu- 
lar course.  In  Esthonia,  the  ^'ourth  Esthonian  Regi- 
ment also  has  placed  itself  under  our  command  to  clear 
the  country  of  bands  overrunning  it. 

March  1.  The  Petrograd  Government  received  a  message 
from  Brest-Litovsk  signed  by  Karakhan,  Secretary  of  the 
Russian  Peace  Delegation,  as  folio -vs: 

Send  us  a  train  to  Toroshaeis  near  Pskov,  escorted 
j  by  sufficiently  large  forces.  Communicate  with  Kry- 
'        lenko  concerning  the  bodyguard. 

This  message  was  interpreted   bv   Lenin  in  a  message 
**To  all  the  Soviets"  as  follows: 

i  This  message  most  probably  signifies  that  the  peace 

j       negotiations  have  been  broken  olt'  by  the  Germans.    We 
1       must  be  ready  for  an  immediate  German  advance  on 
Petrograd  and  on  all  fronts.       t  is  necessary  that  all 
the  people  rise  and  strengths     the  measures  for  de- 
fense. 


164  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

153  In  addition  to  making  preparations  for  the  defense  of 
Petrofrrad,  the  Extraordinary  General  Staff,  which  was 
formed  for  the  defense  of  the  revolution,  announced  the 
capture  by  Bolshevik  forces  of  Rostov-on-Don  and  Novo- 
cherkask  after  battles  with  troops  of  Generals  Kaledin 
and  Kornilov  and  Alexiev. 

154  March  2.  The  German  General  Staff  announced  that 
"Kiev,  capital  of  the  Ukraine,  has  been  liberated  by 
Ukrainian  and  Saxon  troops." 


XII.     THE  TREATY  OF  BREST-LITOVSK— "A 
TILSIT  PEACE" 

March  3.  The  Russian  Delegation  signed  the  treaty  of 
peace  with  the  Central  Powers,  without  in  any  way  dis- 
cussing its  contents.  They  had  asked  Lenin  for  a  special 
train  because  they  were  convinced  that  further  delibera- 
tions might  make  matters  worse,  in  view  of  the  German 
refusal  to  cease  military  operations  until  the  treaty  was 
signed.  Before  signing  the  treaty  they  issued  the  follow- 
ing statement : 

The  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government  of  the 
Russian  Republic,  which  has  announced  the  cessation 
of  war  and  has  demobilized  its  army,  is  compelled  by 
the  attack  of  the  German  troops  to  accept  the  ultima- 
tum presented  by  Germany  by  announcement  on  the 
twenty-fourth  of  February  and  has  delegated  us  to 
sign  these  terms  which  are  being  imposed  on  us  by 
violence. 

The  negotiations  which  previously  took  place  in 
Brest-Litovsk  between  Russia  on  one  side  and  Ger- 
many and  her  allies  on  the  other  made  it  evident  to 
all  that  the  so-called  (by  the  German  representatives) 
"Peace  of  Agreement"  is  in  reality"  a  peace  definitely 
annexational  and  imperialistic.  Now  the  Brest  terms 
are  made  a  great  deal  worse.  The  peace  which  now 
is  being  concluded  here,  in  Brest-Litovsk,  is  not  a 
peace  based  on  free  agreement  of  the  people  of  Rus- 
sian, Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Bvilg'^ria,  and  Tur- 
key. It  is  a  peace  which  is  being  dictated  at  the 
point  of  the  gun.  It  is  a  peace  which  Revolutionary 
Russia  is  compelled  to  accept  with  its  teeth  clenched. 
It  is  a  peace  which,  under  the  pretext  of  "liberation" 
of  the  frontier  districts  of  Russia,  in  reality  turns 
them  into  German  provinces,  and  denies  them  the 
right  of  free  definition  which  was  granted  to  them 
by  the  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government  of  Rev- 
olutionary Russia.  It  is  a  pence  which  under  the 
pretext  of  re-establishing  order  in  these  districts, 
gives  armed  assistance  to  the  oppressing  classes  against 
the  working  class,  and  helps  to  put  back  on  the  labor- 
ing masses  the  yoke  of  oppression,  which  was  thro\vn 
off  by  the  Russian  Revolution.     It  is  a  peace  which 


166  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

imposes,  for  a  long  time,  on  the  laboring  people  of 
Russia  the  old  commercial  treaty  of  1904,  which  was 
made  in  the  interests  of  the  German  agrarians,  and 
which  is  now  mp.de  even  worse ;  and  at  the  same  time 
it  assures  the  payment  of  interest  to  the  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  bourgeoisie  on  the  obligations 
of  the  Czar's  Government,  which  were  repudiated  by 
Revolutionary  Russia.  Finally,  as  if  to  emphasize 
clearly  the  real  class  character  of  the  German  armed 
raid,  the  German  ultimatum  attempts  to  stop  the 
mouth  of  the  Russian  Revolution  by  prohibiting  agita- 
tion directed  against  the  governments  of  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance  and  their  military  authorities. 

But  not  only  all  that.  Under  the  same  pretext  of 
re-establishing  order,  Germany  by  force  of  arms  oc- 
cupies districts  with  a  purely  Russian  population  and 
establishes  there  a  regime  of  military  occupation  and 
a  return  to  the  pre-Revolutionary  order.  In  the 
Ukraine  and  in  Finland  Germany  demands  non- 
interference of  Revolutionary  Russia,  and  at  the  same 
time  actively  assists  the  counter-Revolutionary  forces 
against  Revolutionary  workmen  and  peasants.  In  the 
Caucasus,  in  direct  violation  of  the  terms  formulated 
by  Germany  itself  in  the  ultimatum  of  February  21, 
Germany  tears  away  for  the  benefit  of  Turkey  the 
districts  of  Erivan,  Kars,  and  Batura,  which  were 
not  conquered  even  once  by  the  Turkish  armies,  with- 
out any  consideration  whatsoever  of  the  real  will  of 
the  population  of  these  districts. 

The  most  brazen  forcible  annexational  seizures  and 
possession  of  the  most  important  strategic  points, 
which  can  have  only  one  purpose ;  the  preparation  of 
further  invasion  of  Russia ;  and  the  defense  of  capi- 
talistic interests  against  the  workmen's  and  peasants' 
revolution — these  are  the  real  aims  that  are  served 
by  the  offensive  of  the  German  troops,  undertaken  on 
the  eighteenth  of  February,  without  the  seven  days' 
notice  which  was  assured  by  the  armistice  treaty  made 
between  Russia  and  the  powers  of  the  Quadruple  Alli- 
ance on  the  fifteenth  of  December  1917. 

This  invasion  was  not  stopped,  in  spite  of  the  state- 
ment of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars  of  its 
acceptance  of  terms  formulated  in  the  German  ulti- 
matum of  February  21.     This  invasion  was  not  stop- 


"A  TILSIT  PEACE"  167 

ped,  in  spite  of  the  resumption  of  the  work  of  the 
Peace  Conference  in  Brest-Litovsk  and  in  spite  of 
the  official  protest  of  the  Russian  Delegation.  By- 
all  this  all  the  peace  terms  offered  by  Germany  and 
her  allies  are  reduced  entirely  to  an  ultimatum  pre- 
sented to  Russia  and  supported  from  the  side  of  the 
framers  of  this  peace  treaty  by  threat  of  direct  armed 
violence. 

But  in  the  situation  thus  created  Russia  has  no  pos- 
sibility of  choice.  By  demobilizing  its  armies  the 
Russian  Revolution  had  placed  its  fate  in  the  hands 
of  the  German  people. 

The  Russian  Delegation  in  Brest-Litovsk  had  openly 
stated,  in  due  time,  that  not  a  single  honest  man 
would  believe  that  a  war  against  Russia  now  might 
be  a  defensive  war.  Germany  has  undertaken  the 
offensive.  Under  the  slogan  of  establishing  order,  but 
in  reality  for  the  purposes  of  strangling  the  Russian 
Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Revolution  in  the  interests 
of  the  world's  imperialism,  German  militarism  has 
now  succeeded  in  moving  its  troops  against  the  work- 
ingmen  and  peasant  masses  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
Republic.  The  German  proletariat  has  not  as  yet 
proved  to  be  sufficiently  strong  to  stop  this  attack. 
We  do  not  doubt  for  a  single  minute  that  this  triumph 
of  imperialism  and  militarism  over  the  international 
proletarian  revolution  will  prove  to  be  only  tem- 
porary and  transitory. 

Under  the  present  conditions  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment of  the  Russian  Republic,  which  is  left  only  to 
its  own  resources,  cannot  resist  the  armed  offensive 
of  German  imperialism,  and  in  the  name  of  the  preser- 
vation of  Revolutionary  Russia  is  compelled  to  accept 
the  demands  presented  to  it. 

We  are  authorized  by  our  Government  to  sign  the 
peace  treaty.  Compelled,  in  spite  of  our  protests, 
to  carry  on  negotiations  under  the  very  exceptional 
conditions  of  continuing  military  operations,  which 
are  not  meeting  with  resistance  from  the  Russian  side, 
we  cannot  subject  to  any  further  butchery  the  Rus- 
sian workmen  and  peasants,  who  have  refused  to  con- 
tinue the  war  any  longer. 

We  openly  state  before  the  fnce  of  workmen,  peas- 
ants, and  soldiers  of  Russia  and  Germany,  before  the 


168  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

face  of  the  laboring  and  exploited  classes  of  the  whole 
world,  that  we  are  compelled  to  accept  the  ultimatum 
dictated  by  the  side  which  is  at  the  present  time  more 
powerful,  and  are  signing  immediately  the  peice  treaty 
presented  to  us  by  ultimatum,  desisting  from  any 
deliberation  upon  it  whatsoever. 

156  The  following  are  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  signed  be- 
tween Russia  and  the  Central  Powers  at  Brest-Litovsk 
on  March  3,  1918. 

Article  1. — The  Central  Powers  and  Russia  declare 
the  state  of  war  between  them  to  be  terminated  and 
are  resolved  henceforth  to  live  in  peace  and  friendship 
with  one  another. 

Article  2. — The  contracting  nations  will  refrain 
from  all  agitation  or  provocation  against  other  signa- 
tory Governments,  and  undertake  to  spare  the  popu- 
lations of  the  regions  occupied  by  the  powers  of  the 
Quadruple  Entente. 

Article  3. — The  regions  lying  west  of  the  line  agreed 
upon  by  the  contracting  parties,  and  formerly  belong- 
ing to  Russia,  shall  no  longer  be  under  Russian  sov- 
ereignty. It  is  agreed  that  the  line  appears  from 
the  appended  map.  No.  1,  which,  as  agreed  upon,  forms 
an  essential  part  of  the  peace  treaty.  The  fixing  of 
the  line  in  the  M^est  will  be  settled  in  the  German- 
Russian  Mixed  Commission,  The  regions  in  question 
will  have  no  obligation  whatever  toward  Russia,  aris- 
ing from  their  former  relations  thereto.  Russia  un- 
dertakes to  refrain  from  all  interference  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  these  territories  and  to  let  Germany 
and  Austria  determine  the  future  fate  of  these  terri- 
tories in  agreement  with  their  populations. 

Article  4. — Germany  and  Austria  agree,  when  a 
general  peace  is  concluded  and  Russian  demobiliza- 
tion is  fully  completed,  to  evacuate  the  regions  east 
of  the  line  designated  in  Article  3,  No.  1,  in  so  far 
as  Article  6  does  not  stipulate  otherwise.  Russia  will 
do  everything  in  her  power  to  complete  as  soon  as 
possible  the  evacuation  of  the  Anatolian  provinces  and 
their  orderly  return  to  Turkey.  The  districts  of  Eri- 
van,  Kars,  and  B^tum  will  likewise  without  delay  be 
evacuated  by  the  Russian  troops.     Russia  will  not  in- 


"A  TILSIT  PEACE"  169 

terfere  in  the  reorganization  of  the  constitutional  or 
international  conditions  of  these  districts,  but  leave 
it  to  the  populations  of  the  districts  to  carry  out  the 
reorganization,  in  agreement  with  the  neighboring 
States,  particularly  Turkey. 

Article  5. — Russia  will  without  delay  carry  out  the 
complete  demobilization  of  her  army,  including  the 
forces  newly  formed  by  the  present  Government.  Rus- 
sia will  further  transfer  her  warships  to  Russian  har- 
bors and  leave  them  there  until  a  general  peace  or 
immediately  disarm.  Warships  of  States  continuing 
in  a  state  of  war  with  the  Quadruple  Alliance  will  be 
treated  as  Russian  warships  in  so  far  as  they  are 
within  Russian  control.  The  barred  zone  in  the  ar- 
ticle continues  in  force  until  the  conclusion  of  peace. 
An  immediate  beginning  will  be  made  of  the  removal 
of  mines  in  the  Baltic  and  in  so  far  as  Russian  power 
extends  in  the  Black  Sea.  Commercial  shipping  is 
free  in  these  waters,  and  will  be  resumed  immediately. 
A  mixed  commission  will  be  appointed  to  fix  further 
regulations,  especially  for  the  announcement  of  routes 
for  merchant  ships.  Shipping  routes  are  to  be  kept 
permanently  free  from  floating  mines. 

Article  6. — Russia  undertakes  immediately  to  con- 
clude peace  with  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  and 
to  recognize  the  peace  treaty  between  this  State  and 
the  powers  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  Ukrainian 
territory  will  be  immediately  evacuated  by  the  Rus- 
sian troops  and  the  Russian  Red  Guard.  Russia  will 
cease  all  agitation  or  propaganda  acainst  the  Gov- 
ernment or  the  public  institutions  of  the  Ukrainian 
People's  Republic.  Esthonia  and  Livonia  will  like- 
wise be  evacuated  without  delay  by  the  Russian  troops 
and  the  Russian  Red  Guard.  The  eastern  frontier 
of  Esthonia  follows  in  general  the  line  of  the  Narova 
River.  The  eastern  frontier  of  Livonia  runs  in  gen- 
eral through  Peipus  Lake  and  Pskov  Lake  to  the  south- 
westerly corner  of  the  latter,  then  over  Lubahner  (Lu- 
ban)  Lake  in  the  direction  of  Lievenhof  on  the  Dvina. 
Esthonia  and  Livonia  will  be  occupied  by  a  German 
police  force  until  security  is  guaranteed  by  their  own 
national  institutions  and  order  in  the  State  is  restored. 
Russia  will  forthwith  release  all  arrested  or  deported 
inhabitants  of  Esthonia  and  Livonia  and  guarantee 


170  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

the  safe  return  of  deported  Esthonians  and  Livonians. 
Finland  and  the  Aland  Islands  will  also  forthwith  be 
evacuated  by  the  Russian  troops  and  the  Red  Guard, 
and  Finnish  ports  by  the  Russian  fleet  and  Russian 
naval  forces.  So  loncj  as  the  ice  excludes  the  bringing 
of  Russian  warships  to  Russian  ports  only  small  de- 
t  ichments  will  remain  behind  on  the  warships.  Rus- 
sia is  to  cease  all  agitation  or  propaganda  against  the 
Government  or  the  public  institutions  in  Finland.  The 
fortifications  erected  on  the  Aland  Islands  are  to  be 
removed  with  all  possible  dispatch.  A  special  agree- 
ment is  to  be  made  between  Germany,  Russia,  Finland, 
and  Sweden  regarding  the  permanent  non-fortification 
of  these  islands,  as  well  as  regarding  their  treatment 
in  military,  shipping,  and  technical  respects.  It  is 
agreed  that  at  Germany's  desire  the  other  States  bor- 
dering on  the  Baltic  are  also  to  have  a  voice  in  the 
matter. 

Article  7. — Starting  from  the  fact  that  Persia  and 
Afghanistan  are  free  and  independent  States,  the  con- 
tracting parties  undertake  to  respect  their  political 
and  economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity. 

Article  8. — Prisoners  of  war  of  both  sides  will  be 
sent  home. 

Article  9. — The  contracting  parties  mutually  re- 
nounce indemnification  of  their  war  costs,  that  is  to 
say,  State  expenditure  for  carrying  on  the  war,  as  well 
as  indemnification  for  war  damages,  that  is  to  say, 
those  damages  which  have  arisen  for  them  and  their 
subjects  in  the  war  regions  through  military  me:isures, 
inclusive  of  all  requisitions  undertaken  in  the  enemy 
country. 

Article  10. — Diplomatic  and  Consular  relations  be- 
tween the  contracting  parties  will  be  resumed  imme- 
diately after  ratification  of  the  peace  treaty.  Special 
agreements  are  reserved  relative  to  the  admittance  of 
the  respective  Consuls. 

Article  11. — The  prescriptions  contained  in  appen- 
dices 2  to  5  shall  govern  the  economic  relations  be- 
tween the  Powers  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  and  Rus- 
sia, namely:  Appendix  2  for  German-Russian,  Ap- 
pendix 3  for  Austro-Hungarian-Russian,  Appendix  4 
for  Bulgarian-Russian,  and  Appendix  5  for  Turkish- 
Russian  relations. 


"A  TILSIT  PEACE"  171 

Article  12. — The  restoration  of  public  and  private 
relations,  the  exchan<?e  of  prisoners  of  war,  interned 
civilians,  the  amnesty  question,  as  well  as  the  treat- 
I  ment  of  merchant  ships  which  are   in  enemy  hands, 

*'  will   be   reofulated   by   separate   treaties   with   Russia 

which  shall  form  an  essential  part  of  the  present  peace 
treaty  and  as  far  as  is  feasible  shall  enter  into  force 
at  the  same  time. 

Article  13. — For  the  interpretation  of  this  treaty  the 
German  and  Russian  text  is  authoritative  for  the  re- 
lations between  Germany  and  Russia ;  for  the  rela- 
tions between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  the  Ger- 
man, Hungarian,  and  Russian  text;  for  the  relations 
between  Bulgaria  and  Russia,  the  Bulgarian  and  Rus- 
sian text ;  for  the  relations  between  Turkey  and  Rus- 
sia, the  Turkish  and  Russian  text. 

Article  14. — The  present  peace  treaty  will  be  rati- 
fied.    Instruments  of  ratification  must  be  exchanged 
as  soon  as  possible  in  Berlin.     The  Russian  Govern- 
ment undertakes  at  the  desire  of  one  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  powers  to  exchange  ratifications  within  two 
weeks.     The  peace  treaty  enters  into  force  on  its  rati- 
fication, in  so  far  as  its  articles,  appendices,  or  sup- 
plementary treaties  do  not  prescribe  otherwise. 
The  German  semi-official  Wolff  Bureau  stated  that  the 
trade  and  political  questions  referred  to  in  Article  11  are 
to  be  regulated  according  to  the  demands  of  the  German 
ultimatum  and  analogously  to  the  Ukrainian  treaty, 

157  March  4.  The  German  General  Staff  issued  the  following 
statement :  ' '  The  military  operations  in  Great  Russia 
stopped  yesterday  in  consequence  of  the  signing  of  a  Peace 
Treaty  wdth  Russia." 

158  Emperor  William  sent  the  following  telegram  to  Chan- 
cellor von  Hertling: 

The  German  sword  wielded  by  great  army  leaders 
has  brought  peace  with  Russia.  With  deep  gratitude 
to  God,  Who  has  been  with  us,  I  am  filled  with  proud 
joy  at  the  deeds  of  my  army  and  the  tenacious  per- 
severance of  my  people.  It  is  of  especial  satisfaction 
to  me  that  German  blood  and  German  kultur  have 
been  saved.  Accept  my  warmest  thanks  for  your 
faithful  and  strong  cooperation  in  the  great  work. 


172  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

March  5.  Announcement  was  made  that  Moscow  was  to 
become  the  capitol  of  Russia  in  place  of  Petrograd,  and 
that  State  institutions  were  to  be  transferred  to  Moscow, 
Nizhni-Novgorod  and  Kazan. 

A  preliminary  peace  treaty  was  signed  between  Ron- 
mania  and  the  Central  Powers  at  Bucharest. 

March  6.  Between  March  4  and  6  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Soviets,  the  Moscow  Soviet  and  the  Petro- 
grad Soviet  had  all  voted  to  instruct  their  Delegates  to  the 
forthcoming  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  to  support 
the  ratification  of  the  peace  terms.  In  the  Central  Execu- 
tive there  were  26  dissenting  votes.  The  German  peace 
terms  were  those  of  "political  bandits."  But  ratification 
was  necessary  in  view  of  the  lack  of  a  strong  army  and  the 
weakness  of  the  German  working  class  movement.  The 
Russian  people  would  never  be  reconciled  to  the  peace  terms 
and  would  accept  them  in  order  to  afford  the  social  revolu- 
tion "an  absolutely  necessary  respite." 

At  the  meeting  of  the  Moscow  Soviet,  Pokrovski  of  the 
Peace  Delegation  explained  all  the  disadvantages  of  the 
treaty.  The  new  frontiers  constituted  a  ring  of  iron 
around  revolutionary  Russia.  The  Germans  were  trying 
to  stifle  the  Revolution,  the  conquests  of  which  were  re- 
duced to  nothing  by  the  economic  demands  of  Berlin. 
The  decree  nationalizing  the  banks  had  fallen  into  abey- 
ance because  the  German  terms  had  the  effect  of  convert- 
ing the  banks  into  German  concerns. 

At  the  meeting  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet,  Zinoviev,  Sverd- 
lov  and  others  said  the  Russian  Delegates  were  compelled 
to  sign  the  treaty  at  Brest-Litovsk  as  a  tactical  measure, 
owing  to  the  situation  brought  about  by  the  Ukraine  in 
agreeing  to  ignominious  terms. 

March  7.  A  peace  treaty  was  signed  between  the  Svin- 
hufvud  Government  of  Finland  and  Germany,  The 
treaty  provided  that  the  contracting  parties  were  resolved 
to  live  in  peace  and  friendship  and  that  Germany  would 
exert  herself  to  secure  recognition  by  all  the  Powers  of 
Finland's  autonomy  and  independence.  Finland,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  cede  no  portion  of  her  territory  to  a 
foreign  power,  without  previously  coming  to  an  under- 
standing with  Germany  on  the  subject.     Each  party  re- 


"A  TILSIT  PEACE"  173 

nounces  compensation  for  war  costs  and  indemnities. 
Those  treaties  between  Germany  and  Russia  which  had 
ceased  to  be  operative  were  to  be  replaced  by  "new  treaties, 
particularly  by  a  new  commercial  treaty.  A  commission 
was  to  meet  in  Berlin  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  civil  dam- 
ages. It  was  to  be  composed  of  representatives  of  both 
parties  and  of  neutral  members,  each  to  have  a  one-third 
representation.  The  President  of  Switzerland  was  to  be 
requested  to  nominate  neutral  members,  including  the 
Chairman.  The  treaty  contains  stipulations  for  the  ex- 
change of  prisoners  of  war,  and  of  interned  civilians,  for 
amnesty,  compensation  for  merchant  ships,  etc.,  and  for 
the  settlement  of  questions  concerning  the  Aland  Islands, 
the  fortifications  on  these  islands  to  be  removed  as  speed- 
ily as  possible,  and  the  permanent  non-fortification  of  the 
islands  regulated  by  special  agreement. 

163  March  9.  Ambassador  Francis  sent  the  following  cable 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington,  according  to  a 
document  laid  before  a  sub-committee  of  the  U.  S.  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  Judiciary  investigating  propaganda  on 
March  10,  1919,  by  Colonel  Robins: 

Colonel  Robins  arrived  at  midnight.  He  returned 
from  Petrograd  after  an  important  conference  with 
Trotzky  on  the  fifth.  The  result  of  that  conference 
he  wired  to  me  in  the  code  of  the  military  mission, 
but  as  the  mission  had  left  for  Petrograd,  of  which 
fact  you  were  advised,  with  the  code,  I  did  not  learn 
of  the  conference  until  the  arrival  of  Robins  an  hour 
ago. 

Since  R.  left  Petrograd,  the  Moscow  and  Petrograd 
Soviets  have  both  instructed  their  delegates  to  the 
conference  of  March  12  to  support  the  ratification  of 
the  peace  terms.  I  fear  that  such  action  is  the  result 
of  a  threatened  Japanese  invasion  of  Siberia,  which 
I  have  anticipated  by  sending  Wright  eastward, 
Trotzky  told  Robins  that  he  had  heard  that  such  in- 
vasion was  countenanced  by  the  Allies  and  especially 
by  America,  and  it  would  not  only  force  the  Govern- 
ment to  advocate  tlie  ratification  of  the  humiliating 
peace,  but  would  so  completely  estrange  all  factions 
in  Russia  that  further  resistance  to  Germany  would  be 
absolutely  impossible. 


174  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Trotzky  furthermore  asserted  that  neither  his  Gov- 
ernment nor  the  Russian  people  would  object  to  the 
supervision  by  America  of  all  shipments  from  Vladi- 
vostok in  Russia  and  a  virtual  control  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Siberian  Railway,  but  a  Japanese  inva- 
sion would  result  in  non-resistance  and  eventually 
make  Russia  a  German  province.  In  my  judgment  a 
Japanese  advance  now  would  be  exceedingly  unwise 
and  this  midnight  cable  is  sent  for  the  purpose  of 
asking  that  our  influence  may  be  exerted  to  prevent 
same. 

March  11.  The  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Soviets,  together  with  the  Council  of  the  People's  Com- 
missars, established  themselves  at  Moscow  as  the  capitol. 

March  14-16.  The  Fourth  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets 
met  at  Moscow.  1164  delegates  were  present.  The  treaty 
of  peace  with  Germany  was  ratified  by  a  vote  of  704  to  261. 
Lenin  made  the  principal  speech  for  ratification : 

.  .  .  And  in  a  few  days  an  imperialistic  brigand 
knocked  us  down,  attacking  those  who  had  no  arms. 
He  forced  us  to  sign  an  incredibly  oppressive  and 
humiliating  peace — a  penalty  for  our  daring  to  break 
away,  even  for  as  short  a  time  as  possible,  from  the 
iron  grip  of  the  imperialistic  war.  And  the  more 
threateningly  the  spectre  of  a  working  class  revolu- 
tion in  his  own  country  rises  before  the  brigand,  the 
more  furiously  he  oppresses  and  strangles  and  tears 
Russia  to  pieces. 

We  were  compelled  to  sign  a  Tilsit  peace.  We  must 
not  deceive  ourselves.  We  must  have  courage  to  face 
the  unadorned,  bitter  truth.  We  must  measure  in 
full,  to  the  very  bottom,  the  abyss  of  defeat,  partition, 
enslavement,  humiliation,  into  which  we  have  been 
thrown.  The  clearer  we  understand  this,  the  firmer, 
the  more  hardened  and  inflexible  will  become  our  will 
for  liberation,  our  desire  to  arise  anew  from  enslave- 
ment to  independence,  our  firm  determination  to  see 
at  all  costs  that  Russia  shall  cease  to  be  poor  and 
weak,  that  she  may  become  truly  powerful  and  pros- 
perous. 

She  can  become  such,  for  we  still  have  left  suffi- 
cient expanse  and  natural  resources  to  supply  all  and 


"A  TILSIT  PEACE"  175 

every  one,  if  not  with  abundance,  at  least  with  suffi- 
cient means  of  subsistence.  ,  .  .  Russia  will  become 
such  provided  she  frees  herself  of  all  dejection  and 
phrase-mongering,  provided  she  strains  her  every 
nerve  and  every  muscle,  provided  she  comes  to  under- 
stand that  salvation  is  possible  only  on  the  road  of 
the  international  socialist  revolution  which  we  have 
chosen.  To  move  forward  along  this  road,  not  be- 
coming dejected  in  the  face  of  defeat,  to  lay  stone  upon 
stone,  the  firm  foundation  of  a  Socialist  society,  to 
work  tirelessly,  to  create  discipline  and  self-discipline, 
to  strengthen  everywhere  organization,  order,  effi- 
ciency, the  harmonious  cooperation  of  all  the  people's 
forces,  universal  accounting  and  control  over  the  pro- 
duction and  distribution  of  products — such  is  the  road 
towards  the  creation  of  military  power  and  socialist 
power. 

It  is  unworthy  of  a  true  Socialist  if  badly  defeated, 
either  to  deny  that  fact  or  to  become  despondent.  It 
is  not  true  that  we  have  no  way  out,  that  we  can  only 
choose  between  a  "disgraceful"  (from  the  point  of 
view  of  a  feudal  knight)  death,  which  an  oppressive 
peace  is,  and  a  "glorious"  death  in  a  hopeless  battle. 
It  is  not  true  that  we  have  betrayed  our  ideals  or 
our  friends,  when  we  ugned  the  Tilsit  peace.  We 
have  betrayed  nothing  and  nobody.  We  have  not 
sanctioned  or  covered  any  lie.  We  have  not  refused 
to  aid  any  friend  or  comrade  in  misfortune  in  any 
way  we  could,  or  by  every  means  at  our  disposal. 
A  commander  who  leads  into  the  interior  the  remnants 
of  an  army  which  is  defeated  or  disorganized  by  a  ■ 
disorderly  flight  and  who,  if  necessary,  protects  this 
retreat  by  a  most  humiliating  and  oppressive  peace, 
is  not  betraying  those  parts  of  the  army  whicli  he 
cannot  help  and  which  are  cut  off  by  the  enemy.  Such 
a  commander  is  only  doing  his  duty.  He  is  choos- 
ing the  only  way  to  save  what  can  still  be  saved.  He 
is  scorning  adventures,  telling  the  people  the  bitter 
truth,  "yielding  territory  in  order  to  win  time,"  util- 
izing any,  even  the  shortest,  respite,  in  order  to  gather 
again  his  forces  and  to  give  the  army  which  is  af- 
fected by  disintegration  and  demoralization  a  chance 
to  rest  and  recover. 


176  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

We  have  signed  a  Tilsit  peace.  When  Napoleon 
I.  forced  Prussia  in  1807  to  accept  the  Tilsit  peace, 
the  conqueror  had  defeated  all  the  German  armies, 
occupied  the  capitol  and  all  the  large  cities,  established 
his  police,  compelled  the  conquered  to  give  him  auxil- 
iary corps  in  order  to  wage  new  wars  of  plunder  by 
the  conquerors,  and  he  dismembered  Germany,  form- 
ing an  alliance  with  some  German  states  against  other 
German  states.  And,  nevertheless,  even  after  such  a 
peace,  the  German  people  were  not  subdued.  They 
managed  to  recover,  to  rise,  and  to  win  the  right  to 
freedom  and  independence. 

To  any  person  able  and  willing  to  think,  the  example 
of  the  Tilsit  peace  (which  was  only  one  of  the  many 
oppressive  and  humiliating  treaties  forced  upon  the 
Germans  in  that  epoch)  shows  clearly  how  childishly 
naive  is  the  thought  that  an  oppressive  peace  is,  under 
all  circumstances,  ruinous,  and  that  war  is  the  road 
of  valor  and  salvation.  The  war  epochs  teach  us  that 
peace  has  in  many  cases  in  history  served  as  a  respite 
to  gather  strength  for  new  battles.  The  peace  of 
Tilsit  was  the  great  humiliation  of  Germany,  and  at 
the  same  time  a  turning  point  to  the  greatest  national 
av/akening.  At  that  time  the  historical  environment 
offered  only  one  outlet  for  this  awakening — a  bour- 
geois state.  At  that  time,  over  a  hundred  years  ago, 
history  was  made  by  a  handful  of  noblemen  and  small 
groups  of  bourgeois  intellectuals,  while  the  m'^ss  of 
workers  and  peasants  were  inactive  and  inert.  Owing 
to  this,  history  at  that  time  could  crawl  only  with 
awful  slowness. 

Now  capitalism  has  considerably  raised  the  level  of 
culture  in  general  and  of  the  culture  of  the  masses 
in  particular.  The  war  aroused  the  masses,  awakened 
them  by  its  unheard  of  horrors  and  sufferings.  The 
war  has  given  impetus  to  history  and  now  she  is 
speeding  along  with  the  speed  of  a  locomotive.  His- 
tory is  now  being  independently  made  by  millions 
and  tens  of  millions  of  people.  Capitalism  has  now 
become  ripe  for  Socialism. 

Thus,  if  Russia  now  moves — and  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  she  does  move — from  a  Tilsit  peace  to  a  national 
awakening  and  to  a  great  war  for  the  fatherland — 


"A  TILSIT  PEACE"  177 

the  outlet  of  such  an  awakening  leads  not  to  the  bour- 
geois state  but  to  an  international  Socialist  revolu- 
tion. We  are  "resistants"  since  November  7,  1917. 
We  are  for  the  "defense  of  our  fatherland."  But 
the  war  for  the  fatherland  towards  which  we  are 
moving  is  a  war  for  a  Socialist  fatherland,  for  So- 
cialism, as  a  part  of  the  universal  army  of  Socialism. 

A  new  Central  Executive  Committee  was  elected.  Chi- 
cherin  was  made  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
Trotzky  was  made  Chairman  of  the  newly  created  Gov- 
ernment of  Petrograd,  known  as  the  Petrograd  Labor 
Commune.  It  was  asserted  that  the  full  provisions  of  the 
treaty  had  not  been  made  public,  and  that  Germany  had 
exacted  an  indemnity  of  9,000,000,000  roubles,  and  that 
secret  economic  provisions  gave  Germany  complete  mas- 
tery of  Russia.  At  this  Congress,  the  Bolsheviks  changed 
the  name  of  their  party  to  the  Communist  Party. 

At  the  opening  of  the  Congress  on  March  14,  Sverdlov, 
Chairman  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee,  who  pre- 
sided, said  in  presenting  a  telegram  from  President  Wilson, 
dated  Washington,  March  11 : 

Comrades,  I  shall  have  difficulty  in  reading  all  the 
telegrams  received  here.  We  have  received  a  vast 
number.  One  telegram  stands  out  among  them,  which 
I  shall  submit  to  your  attention.  It  is  the  telegram 
from  President  Wilson.     The  telegram  is  as  follows: 

May  I  not  take  advantage  of  the  meeting  of  the 
Congress  of  the  Soviets  to  express  the  sincere  sym- 
pathy which  the  people  of  the  United  States  feel  for 
the  Russian  people  at  this  moment  when  the  German 
power  has  been  thrust  in  to  interrupt  and  turn  back 
the  whole  struggle  for  freedom  and  substitute  the 
wishes  of  Germany  for  the  purposes  of  the  people  of 
Russia?  Although  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  unhappily  not  now  in  a  position  to  render 
the  direct  and  effective  aid  it  would  wish  to  render, 
I  beg  to  assure  the  people  of  Russia  through  the  Con- 
gress that  it  will  avail  itself  of  every  opportunity  to 
secure  for  Russia  once  more  complete  sovereignty  and 
independence  in  her  own  affairs  and  full  restoration 
to  her  great  role  in  the  life  of  Europe  and  the  modern 
world.  _  The  whole  heart  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  is  with  the  people  of  Russia  in  the  attempt  to 


178  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

free  themselves   forever   from   autocratic  government 
and  become  masters  of  their  own  life. 

[Signed]     WOODROW     WILSON. 
[Applause.] 

Comrades,  allow  me,  in  the  name  of  the  Congress, 
to  express  my  firm  belief  that  the  wide  masses  of  the 
proletariat  and  the  semi-proletariat  of  Western  Eu- 
rope, as  well  as  of  America  and  Australia,  are  with 
us  with  all  their  hearts.  Allow  me  to  express  my  firm 
belief  that  these  masses  are  watching  with  the  closest 
attention  the  struggle  which  we  are  carrying  on  here 
in  Russia,  and  I  will  permit  myself  to  submit  to  your 
attention  the  resolution  which  was  adopted  by  the 
presiding  body  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee 
in  answer  to  President  Wilson's  address  to  the  Con- 
gress. 

The  resolution  reads  as  follows :  The  Congress  ex- 
presses its  gratitude  to  the  American  people,  above 
all  to  the  laboring  and  exploited  classes  of  the  United 
States,  for  the  sympathy  expressed  to  the  Russian 
people  by  President  Wilson  through  the  Congress  of 
Soviets  in  the  days  of  severe  trials. 

The  Russian  Socialist  Federative  Republic  of  Soviets 
takes  advantage  of  President  Wilson's  communica- 
tion to  express  to  all  peoples  perishing  and  suffering 
from  the  horrors  of  imperialistic  war  its  warm  sym- 
pathy and  firm  belief  that  the  happy  time  is  not  far 
distant  when  the  laboring  masses  of  all  countries  will 
throw  off  the  yoke  of  capitalism  and  will  establish  a 
Socialist  state  of  society,  which  alone  is  capable  of 
securing  a  just  and  lasting  peace  as  well  as  the  culture 
and  well  being  of  all  laboring  people.     [Applause.] 

Comrades,  allow  me  to  consider  this  applause  a  suffi- 
cient answer  that  you  all  join  in  this  resolution. 


XIII.     AFTER  BREST-LITOVSK 

March  18.  The  Supreme  War  Council  of  the  Allies,  is- 
sued a  statement  in  London  on  the  Russian  and  Roumanian 
Tre  .ties,  which  they  called  "political  crimes  which,  under 
the  name  of  a  German  peace,  have  been  committed  against 
the  Russian  people."     The  statement  continues: 

Russia  was  unarmed  forgetting  that  for  four  years 
Germ  my  had  been  fighting  against  the  independence 
of  nations  and  the  rights  of  mankind.  The  Russian 
Government,  in  a  mood  of  singular  credulity,  expected 
to  obtain  by  persuasion  that  "democratic  peace"  which 
it  had  failed  to  obtain  by  war. 

The  results  were  that  the  immediate  armistice  had 
not  expired  before  the  German  Command,  though 
pledged  not  to  alter  the  disposition  of  its  troops,  trans- 
ferred them  en  masse  to  the  Western  front  and  so 
weak  did  Russia  find  herself  that  she  dared  to  raise 
no  protest  against  this  flagrant  violation  of  Germany's 
plighted  word. 

What  followed  was  of  like  character.  When  "the 
German  peace"  was  translated  into  action,  it  was 
found  to  involve  the  invasion  of  Russian  territory,  the 
destruction  or  capture  of  all  Russia's  means  of  de- 
fense and  the  organization  of  Russian  lands  for  Ger- 
many's profit — a  proceeding  which  did  not  difi^er  from 
"annexation"  because  the  word  itself  was  carefully 
avoided. 

Meanwhile,  those  very  Russi;'ns  who  had  made  mili- 
tary operations  impossible,  found  diplomacy  impotent. 
Their  representatives  were  compelled  to  proclaim  that 
while  they  refused  to  read  the  Treaty  presented  to 
them,  they  had  no  choice  but  to  sign  it ;  so  they  signed 
it,  not  knowing  whether  in  its  true  significance  it 
meant  peace  or  war,  not  measuring  the  degree  to  which 
Russian  national  life  was  reduced  by  it  to  a 
shadow.  ,  .  . 

Von  Hertling  on  the  first  reading  in  the  Reichstag  of 
the  Peace  Treaty  with  Russia,  declared  that  he  did  not 
wish  to  discuss  the  opinions  of  Germany's  enemies  re- 
garding the  Treaty.     He  continued: 


180  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

Hypocrisy  has  become  second  nature  to  the  enemy, 
whose  untruthfulness  is  made  worse  by  its  brutality. 
.  .  .  The  treaty  with  Russia  contains  no  conditions 
disgraceful  to  Russia  if  the  provinces  breaking  away 
from  Russia  say  it  is  in  accordance  with  their  own 
wisii,  and  the  wish  is  accepted  by  Russia.  ...  If  the 
Reichstag  adopts  the  Peace  Treaty,  peace  on  the  whole 
Eastern  front  will  be  restored. 

The  Chancellor  referred  to  Russia's  proposal  that  all 
the  belligerents  enter  into  the  peace  negotiations,  and 
added : 

We  and  our  allies  accepted  the  proposals  and  sent 
Delegates  to  Brest-Litovsk.  The  Powers  until  then 
allied  with  Russia  remained  aloof.  The  course  of  the 
negotiations  is  known  to  you.  You  remember  the  end- 
less speeches  which  were  intended,  not  so  much  for 
the  Delegates  there  assembled  as  for  the  public-at- 
large,  and  which  caused  the  desired  goal  of  an  under- 
standing to  recede  into  the  distance.  You  remember 
the  repeated  interruptions,  the  rupture  and  the  re- 
sumption of  the  negotiations.  The  point  had  been 
reached  where  yes  or  no  had  to  be  said,  and  on  March 
3  peace  was  concluded  at  Brest-Litovsk.  On  March 
16  it  was  ratified  by  a  competent  assembly  in  Moscow, 
If,  in  the  telegram  from  Washington,  it  was  thought 
fit  to  express  to  the  Congress  assembled  at  Moscow 
the  sympathy  of  the  United  States  at  a  moment  when, 
as  it  says,  the  German  power  obtruded  itself  in  order 
to  bring  success  for  the  battle  for  freedom,  then  I 
put  that  calmly  aside  with  the  rest.  We  have  not 
for  a  moment  contemplated,  and  do  not  contemplate, 
opposing  the  justified  wishes  and  endeavor  of  Russia 
to  be  liberated.  .  .  .  The  Russian  treaty  contains  no 
conditions  whatever  which  dishonor  Russia,  no  men- 
tion of  oppressive  war  indemnities,  no  forcible  appro- 
priations of  Russian  territory.  A  number  of  the  bor- 
der States  have  severed  their  connection  with  the  Rus- 
sian State  in  accordance  with  their  own  will,  which 
was  recognized  by  Russia.  In  regard  to  these  States, 
we  adopt  the  standpoint  formerly  expressed  by  me, 
that  under  the  mighty  protection  of  the  German  Em- 
pire, they  can  give  themselves  political  form  corre- 
sponding with  their  situation,  and  the  tendency  of 


AFTER  BREST-LITOVSK  181 

their  kultur,  while  at  the  same  time,  of  course,  we 
are  safeguarding  our  own  interests. 

168  March  20.  Meanwhile  the  Austro-German  advance  in  the 
Ukraine  continued.  The  invaders  held  Kiev,  Odessa  and 
most  of  the  principal  cities  of  the  Ukraine.  The  Turks 
had  recovered  Trebizond  and  Erzerum  and  were  in  pos- 
session of  Trans-Caucasia,  thus  giving  the  Central  Powers 
full  control  of  the  Black  Sea. 

169  Trotzky  is  reported  to  have  approached  the  American 
Military  Mission  in  Moscow,  asking  for  aid  in  organizing 
a  volunteer  army  and  improving  transportation.  A  dis- 
patch of  that  date  says :  ' '  There  has  been  a  marked  change 
in  the  attitude  of  the  Allies  toward  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment. .  .  .  There  are  many  signs  of  renewed  cooperation 
between  Russia  and  the  Allies."  It  was  also  reported  at 
about  the  same  time  that  Trotzky  had  asked  the  French 
to  help  him  in  organizing  his  military  forces.  A  leading 
article  in  Premier  Clemenceau's  L' Homme  Libre  declared: 
"The  Entente  as  long  as  the  war  lasts  will  regard  Russia, 
the  one  and  indivisible  Russia  which  signed  the  pact  of 
London,  as  an  Ally." 

170  March  21.  The  Trans-Caucasian  Constituent  Assembly 
at  Tiflis  refused  to  ratify  the  Peace  Treaty  with  Germany 
and  urged  immediate  war. 

171  March  22.  The  Main  Committee  of  the  Reichstag  ap- 
proved the  Russo-German  Peace  Treaty. 

172  March  29.  The  Caucasus  Diet  approved  the  basis  of  a 
Peace  Agreement  with  Turkey,  including  autonomy  for 
Armenia  and  the  restoration  of  old  frontiers. 

173  April  2.  Czernin,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Min- 
ister, replied  to  President  Wilson's  address  of  Feb.  11,  in 
a  speech  to  a  deputation  of  the  Vienna  City  Council.  He 
said: 

Three  Treaties  of  Peace  have  been  signed — with 
Petrograd,  Ukraine  and  Rumania.  One  principal  sec- 
tion of  the  war  is  thus  ended.  .  .  . 

We  first  gave  international  recognition  to  the  sep- 
aration of  the  Ukraine  from  Russia,  which  had  to  be 
accomplished  as  an  internal  affair  of  Russia.  Prof- 
iting from  resultant  circumstances  which  were  favor- 


182  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

able  to  our  aims,  we  concluded  with  the  Ukraine  the 
peace  sought  by  that  country. 

This  gave  the  lead  to  peace  with  Petrograd,  whereby 
Rumania  was  left  standing  alone,  so  that  she  also  had 
to  conclude  peace.  So  one  peace  brought  another ;  and 
the  desired  success,  namely,  the  end  of  the  war  in 
the  East  was  achieved.  .  .  . 

In  concluding  peace  with  the  Ukraine  and  Rumania, 
it  has  been  my  first  thought  to  furnish  the  monarchy 
with  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials.  Russia  did  not 
come  into  consideration  in  this  connection  owing  to 
the  disorganization  there.  .  .  . 

An  immediate  general  peace  would  not  give  us  fur- 
ther advantages,  as  all  Europe  is  to-day  suffering  from 
lack  of  foodstuffs.  .  .  . 

The  forcible  annexation  of  foreign  peoples  would 
place  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  general  peace.  .  .  . 
What  we  require  are  not  territorial  annexations,  but 
economic  safeguards  for  the  future. 

We  wish  to  do  everything  to  create  in  the  Balkans  a 
situation  of  lasting  calm.  Not  until  the  collapse  of 
Russia  did  there  cease  to  exist  the  factor  which  hith- 
erto made  it  impossible  for  us  to  bring  about  a  def- 
inite state  of  internal  peace  in  the  Balkans. 

We  know  that  the  desire  for  peace  in  Serbia  is  very 
great,  but  Serbia  has  been  prevented  by  the  Entente 
Powers  from  concluding  it.  .  .  . 

It  is  a  distortion  of  fact  to  assert  that  Germany  has 
made  conquests  in  the  East.  Lenin's  anarchy  drove 
the  border  peoples  into  the  arms  of  Germany.  Is  Ger- 
many t6  refuse  this  involuntary  choice  of  foreign  bor- 
der peoples?  .  .  . 

A  general,  honorable  peace  is  nearer  than  the  public 
imagines.  But  no  one  has  the  right  to  remain  aside 
in  this  last  decisive  struggle. 

174         Lord  Robert  Cecil  replied  to  Czernin.     He  said  : 

...  I  must  confess  I  prefer  Prussian  brutality  to 
Austrian  hypocrisy.  .  .  . 

Count  Czernin  claims  with  the  greatest  audacity 
that  he  and  his  allies  have  just  made  proposals  that 
are  moderate,  and  even  guided  by  the  principles  of 
self-determination,  no  annexations,  and  no  indemni- 
ties. 


AFTER  BREST-LITOVSK  183 

As  far  as  self-determination  is  concerned,  in  every 
one  of  the  new  States  they  have  set  up  they  have  done 
so  without  the  slightest  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the 
peoples  and  no  serious  attempt  was  made  even  to  fol- 
low racial  boundaries  or  racial  antecedents.  The 
province  of  Dobrudja  which  has  been  handed  over  to 
Bulgaria  has  only  18  per  cent  Bulgarians  and  50  per 
cent  Roumanians,  and  Southern  Bessarabia,  which  is- 
apparently  offered  to  Roumania,  is  the  part  of  Bessa- 
rabia having  the  fewest  Roumanians. 

As  for  no  annexations  .  .  .  what  he  really  has  done 
is  to  take  an  important  part  of  the  Danube  and  all 
the  passes  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Roumania. 
Not  only  that,  he  has  driven  back  the  Carpathian 
frontier  eight  or  ten  miles. 

But  the  most  hypocritical  part  ...  is  the  fact  that 
they  have  imposed  one  of  the  heaviest  war  indemnities 
ever  levied.  It  is  a  curious  provision  which  applies 
to  the  new  States,  that  they  are  to  be  under  no  obliga- 
tion toward  Russia  arising  from  former  relations  with 
her.  The  result  is  to  concentrate  on  Russia  [Soviet 
Russia]  the  debt  which  was  hitherto  spread  over  the 
whole  of  Russia,  ... 

175  April  6.  On  "the  anniversary  of  our  acceptance  of  Ger- 
many's challenge  to  fight,"  President  Wilson  delivered  an 
address  in  which  he  said: 

At  Brest-Litovsk  her  civilian  delegates  spoke  in  sim- 
ilar terms ;  professed  their  desire  to  conclude  a  fair 
peace  and  accord  to  the  peoples  with  whose  fortunes 
they  were  dealing  the  right  to  choose  their  own  alle- 
giances. But  action  accompanied  and  followed  the 
profession.  Their  military  masters,  the  men  who  act 
for  Germany  and  exhibit  her  purpose  in  execution, 
proclaimed  a  very  different  conclusion.  We  cannot 
mistake  what  they  have  done — in  Russia,  in  Finland, 
in  the  Ukraine,  in  Roumania.  The  real  test  of  their 
justice  and  fair  play  has  come.  From  this  we  may 
judge  the  rest. 

They  are  enjoying  in  Russia  a  cheap  triumpli  in 
which  no  brave  or  gallant  nation  can  long  take  pride. 
A  great  people,  helpless  by  their  own  act,  lies  for  the 
time  at  their  mercy.     Their  fair  professions  are  for- 


i 


184  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BEEST-LITOVSK 

gotten.  They  nowhere  set  up  justice,  but  everywhere 
imi^ose  their  power  and  exploit  everything  for  their 
own  use  and  aggrandizement,  and  the  peoples  of  con- 
quered provinces  are  invited  to  be  free  under  their 
dominion! 

Are  we  not  justified  in  believing  that  they  would  do 
the  same  things  at  their  western  front  if  they  were 
not  there  face  to  face  with  armies  whom  even  their 
countless  divisions  cannot  overcome?  If,  when  they 
have  felt  their  check  to  be  final,  they  should  propose 
favorable  and  equitable  terms  with  regard  to  Belgium 
and  France  and  Italy,  could  they  blame  us  if  we  con- 
cluded that  they  did  so  only  to  assure  themselves  of  a 
free  hand  in  Kussia  and  the  East? 

Their  purpose  is,  undoubtedly,  to  make  all  the  Slavic 
peoples,  all  the  free  and  ambitious  nations  of  the  Bal- 
kan Peninsula,  all  the  lands  that  Turkey  has  dominated 
and  misruled,  subject  to  their  will  and  ambition,  and 
build  upon  that  dominion  an  empire  of  force  upon 
which  they  fancy  that  they  can  then  erect  an  empire 
of  gain  and  commercial  supremacy — an  empire  which 
will  ultimately  master  Persia,  India  and  the  peoples 
of  the  Far  East.  .  .  . 

What  then  are  we  to  do?  For  myself,  I  am  ready, 
ready  still,  ready  even  now,  to  discuss  a  fair  and  just 
and  honest  peace  at  any  time  that  it  is  sincerely  pur- 
posed— a  peace  in  which  the  strong  and  the  weak  shall 
fare  alike.  But  the  answer  when  I  proposed  such  a 
peace,  came  from  the  German  commanders  in  Russia, 
and  I  cannot  mistake  the  meaning  of  the  answer.  .  .  . 

176  April  7.  The  Peoples'  Commissar'  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Chicherin,  signified  to  the  German  Government  his  willing- 
ness to  open  peace  negotiations  with  the  Ukrainian  Rada. 

177  April  10.  The  Commissar  of  Commerce  announced  that 
under  the  Brest-Litovsk  treaty  Russia  had  suffered  the  fol- 
lowing losses: 

Seven  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  square  kilome- 
ters (301,000  square  miles)  of  territory. 

Fifty-six  million  inhabitants,  constituting  32  per 
cent  of  the  entire  population  of  the  country. 


AFTER  BEEST-LITOVSK  185 

One-third  of  Russia's  total  mileage  of  railways, 
amounting  to  21,530  kilometers  (13,350  miles). 

Seventy-three  per  cent  of  the  total  iron  production. 

Eighty-nine  per  cent  of  the  total  coal  production. 

Two  hundred  and  sixty-eight  sugar  refineries,  918 

textile  factories,  574  breweries,  133  tobacco  factories, 

1,685   distilleries,    244   chemical   factories,   615   paper 

mills,  1,073  machine  factories. 

These  territories   which   now   become   German   for- 
merly brought  in  annual  revenue  amounting  to  845,- 
238  ( ?)  roubles,  and  had  1,800  savings  banks. 
Trotzky  was  appointed  Peoples'  Commissar  of  War  and 
the  Marine.     He  insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  having  a 
strictly  disciplined  army.     It  was  reported  that  the  Soviet 
Government  was  hoping  to  have  a  Red  Army  of  500,000  by 
the  Pall.     In  adopting  the  red  banner  with  the  inscription, 
''Russian  Socialist  Federative  Soviet  Republic"  on  April 
9,  the  Chairman  had  said: 

The  Russian  flag  will  have  to  wave  over  the  em- 
bassies in  Berlin  and  Vienna  and  we  cannot  have  the 
old  tricolor,  so  I  think  it  most  proper  to  adopt  the  red 
flag  under  which  we  fought  and  gained  victory. 
And  in  proposing  a  strictly  disciplined  army  Trotzky 
had  said : 

We  cannot  preserve  the  illusion  that  European  cap- 
ital will  patiently  suffer  the  fact  that  in  Russia  the 
power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  working  class.  .  .  .  We 
are  surrounded  by  enemies  on  all  sides.  If  it  were 
proposed  to  France  to  return  Alsace,  the  French 
Bourse  would  sell  Russia  tomorrow. 

September  6.  New  agreements  supplementary  to  the 
Brest-Litovsk  Treaty  were  ratified  in  Berlin  between  the 
German  Imperial  and  Russian  Soviet  Governments.  These 
supplementary  treaties  are  divided  into  three  parts:  (a) 
political;  (b)  financial;  and  (c)  relating  to  exchange,  pat- 
ents and  arbitration. 

(a)  Supplementary  Political  Treaty 
Article  I. — Deals  mainly  with  frontier  problems.     It  pro- 
vides above  all   for  the  establishment  of  "neutral   zones 
between  the  respective  fronts"  of  Germany  and  Russia, 
from  which  the  troops  of  both  parties  are  to  be  excluded. 


186  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BREST-LITOVSK 

Article  II. — A  special  commission  is  appointed  for  the 
demarcation  of  the  Eastern  frontiers  of  Esthonia  and  Livo- 
nia, and  as  soon  as  it  reaches  a  decision,  German  troops 
are  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  country  lying  further  to  the 
East. 

Article  III. — The  evacuation  of  the  territory  east  of 
Beresina  is,  however,  made  contingent  upon  the  cash  pay- 
ments by  Russia  provided  for  in  the  special  financial 
treaty,  and  is  to  take  place  in  five  stages  according  to  the 
five  money  installments.  This  evacuation  is  to  take  place 
before  the  conclusion  of  general  peace. 

Articles  V  and  VI. — Russia  undertakes  to  "employ  at 
once  all  the  means  at  her  disposal  to  expel  the  Entente 
forces  from  North  Russian  territory  in  observance  of  her 
neutrality;"  and  in  return  for  this  Germany  guarantees 
that  "during  these  operations  there  shall  be  no  Finnish 
attack  of  any  kind  on  Russian  territory,  particularly  on 
Petrograd."  The  Germans  also  undertake  that  after  the 
ejection  of  the  Allies,  the  restrictions  of  the  barred  zone 
shall  be  relaxed  in  favor  of  Russia  for  coastal  shipping  and 
fishing  boats  always  subject  to  German  control  of  contra- 
band. 

Articles  VII-X. — Russia  renounces,  also,  sovereignty 
over  Esthonia  and  Livonia,  as  she  had  already  done  in 
Courland  and  Lithuania,  and  undertakes  to  refrain  from 
all  interference  in  their  internal  affairs  and  to  leave  their 
future  fate  to  be  "decided  in  agreement  with  their  inhabi- 
tants." Russia,  however,  obtains  the  right  of  free  through 
transit  for  her  goods  to  Reval,  Riga  and  "Windau,  which 
become  free  ports,  with  free  Russian  zones  immune  from 
local  customs  control.  Special  provisions  are  made  for 
raihvay  and  waterway  tariffs,  in  particular  on  the  River 
Dvina :  for  the  maintenance  of  Lake  Peipus,  for  Petrograd 
interest  in  the  water  power  of  the  River  Narova,  as  a 
source  of  electric  supply,  and  for  the  transference  of  na- 
tionals and  their  property  between  Russia  and  the  newly 
formed  States. 

Articles  XIII-XIV. — Germany  undertakes  to  evacuate 
the  districts  bordering  on  the  Black  Sea  (with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Caucasus)  as  soon  as  peace  shall  have  been  con- 
cluded between  Russia  and  the  Ukraine.  The  Rostov- 
Voronez  railway  will  be  evacuated  when  the  Government 


AFTER  BREST-LITOVSK  187 

of  Moscow  requests  it.  With  regard  to  the  Don  coal  ba- 
sin, an  arrangement  is  made  by  which  Russia  is  to  receive 
three  tons  of  coal  for  every  ton  of  oil  which  Germany  re- 
ceives from  Baku,  and  it  is  laid  down  that  Germany  is  to 
obtain  at  least  one-quarter  of  Baku's  tot  ,1  output  of  oil. 
Tlie  minimum  monthly  amount  to  be  supplied  and  the  scale 
of  prices  to  be  followed  are  left  to  be  settled  later.  Russia 
consents  to  German  recognition  of  Georgian  independence, 
while  Germany  in  return  undertakes  to  prevent  "the 
forces  of  a  third  Power"  crossing  a  frontier  line,  running 
from  the  mouth  of  tiie  Kur  i  River  through  Petropavlov- 
skoje  and  Airriova,  along  the  north  boundary  of  the  Baku 
District  to  the  Caspian. 

Article  XV. — The  Germans  undertake  to  restore  Russian 
shipping  after  the  conclusion  of  the  genera!  peace. 

(b)  Supplementary  Financial  Treaty 
This  treaty  cssigns  to  Germany  a  sum  of  6,000,000,090 
marks,  due  (a)  for  the  war  losses  of  Germ  n  subjects  on 
Russian  territory  or  through  Russian  occupation,  and  (b) 
for  the  expenses  incurred  by  Germany  in  housing  and 
feeding  her  Russian  prisoners.  Stipulations  for  payment 
are  made  under  four  distinct  heads : 

1.  2,500,000,000  to  be  floated  as  a  6  per  cent  Russian 
loan, 

2.  1,000,000,000  to  be  delivered  in  goods,  not  later  thaii 
M  rch  31,  1020  (the  cash  payment  being  correspondingly 
increased  in  the  event  of  failure  to  comply). 

3.  1,500,000,000  in  cash.  This  again  falls  into  two 
sections : 

(a)  545,000,000  roubles  of  Czarist  p-.per  money,  val- 
ued at  the  rate  of  ly^  marks  to  1  rou])le. 

(b)  245,564  kilograms  of  fine  gold,  which  is  valued  at 
683,000,000  marks  in  gold.  The  first  installment,  42,860 
kilogr  ms  in  gold,  and  90,900,000  roubles  in  paper  was  to 
be  paid,  and  actually  w  :s  paid,  on  September  10;  the  sec- 
ond installment  on  September  30,  and  three  more  at  inter- 
vals of  a  month. 

4.  The  balance  of  1,000,000,000  falls  to  Finland  and  the 
Ukraine. 

According  to  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment itself  offered  gold  bee  use  they  considered  that 
under  Iheir  new  system  they  will  not  require  gold  as  an 
international  medium. 


1917 
Nov. 
Nov. 
Nov. 

6-7 

7-8 
10 

1. 

2. 
3. 

Nov. 
Nov. 

11 

20 

4. 
5, 
6. 

Nov. 

22 

7. 
8. 

Nov. 

23 

9. 
10. 
11. 

12. 

Nov. 

25 

13. 

Nov. 

27. 

14. 
15. 

Nov. 

28 

16. 
17. 

Nov. 

29 

18. 

Nov. 

30 

19. 

20. 
21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 
26. 

Dee. 

1 

27. 
28. 

Dee. 
Dec. 

Dec. 

2 
3 

4 

29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 

Dec. 
Dec. 

5 
6 

34. 
35. 

TABLE  OF  ITEMS 

Page 

The    overthrow    of    the    Kerensky    Government  7 
The    Second    All-Kussian    Congress    of    Soviets  7 
The  first  Peace  and  Armistice  offer  to  belliger- 
ents      7 

The  first  Soviet  Peace  proclamation 8 

Trotzlsy  offers  Armistice  and  Peace  to  Entente  9 
The   Soviet   offer  to   open   "pourparlers"  with 

the   enemy    9 

The  "Universal"  of  the  Ukrainian  Kada 10 

The  appointment   of   Krylenko   as   Commander- 
in-chief    1 

Decree  concerning  Self -Determination    1 

The  publication  of  the  secret  treaties 12 

The    English    reply    to    the    proposal    for    an 

Armistice    1 

The  British  Ambassador  and  the  Notes  of  the 

Soviet    1 

Trotzky   to   Neutral   Powers   on   Armistice   and 

Peace     1 

The  attitude  of  the  Entente  and  American  am- 
bassadors      14 

The    protest    of    the    U.    S.    lodged    with    Gen. 

Dukhonin    15 

Eussian  wireless  offering  Peace  to  belligerents  15 
Krylenko  orders  firing  to  cease  and  fraterniza- 
tion  to    begin 15 

Von    Hertling    declares    Eussian    proposals    ac- 
ceptable      16 

Czernin  declares  Eussian  proposals  acceptable.  16 

The  Inter-Allied  Conference  convenes  at  Paris  16 
Maklakov  dismissed  as  Eussian  Ambassador  to 

France     16 

Von    Kuhlmann    regards    Eussian   principles   as 

acceptable    17 

Trotzky  invites  Allies  to  participate   in  Nego- 
tiations     17 

Trotzky   warns    Allied    Missions   against   inter- 
ference in  Eussian  affairs 17 

Trotzky  declares  for  publicity  for  Negotiations  '    17 
Preliminary  negotiations  for  a  Truce  with  the 

Germans      19 

The  Truce  with  the  Austrians 19 

Trotzky   asks  participation   bf  Allies  in   Nego- 
tiations     20 

The   Eussian  Armistice   Delegation  at   Dvinsk.  20 

A  Truce  for  48  hours  sifrned  at  Brest-Litovsk. .  20 

The  opening  of  Negotiations  for  Armistice 20 

The    Armistice   proposals 21 

President    Wilson    accepts    the    Eussian    Peace 

Formula    22 

Eussian  Delegation  for  General  Armistice 22 

Preparations   for  fu^-ure   Neorotiations 23 

Trotzky  informs  Allied  Governments  of  Nego- 
tiations       23 


37. 

7 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

11 

42. 

12 

43. 

13 

44. 

14 

45. 

46. 

15 

47. 

17 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

18 

52. 

TABLE  OF  ITEMS  189 

Eepudiation   of   Russia 's   debts 24 

The  independence  of  Finland  proclaimed 24 

The  Ukrainian  Parliament  authorizes  Armistice 

Delegations    24 

Cessation  of  hostilities  on  the  Russian  Front 24 

Truce  between  Russia  and  Roumania 24 

The   Russian   Delegation   for  Brest-Litovsk 25 

Trotzky  on  a  Separate  Armistice  and  Separate 

Peace     25 

The  First  Sitting  of  the  Armistice  Delegations  25 
The   Second   Sitting   of   the    Armistice   Delega- 
tions       25 

Lloyd  George  says  America  will  take  the  place 

of  Russia    26 

The  Third  Sitting  of  the  Armistice  Delegations  _26_ 
Trotzky  asks  Allied  participation  in  the  Peace 

Negotiations    28 

A  declaration  to  the  Socialists  of  all  countries  28 

The  Soviet  Ultimatum  to  the  Ukrainian  Rada. .  28 

Kuhlmann  and  Czernin  at  Brest 29 

A  preliminary  Conference  between  the  delega- 
tions at  Brest 29  _ 

20  53.     Lloyd  George  says  Russia  must  be  responsible 

for  Territorial  Terms  of  the  Negotiations..  29 
23            54.     The    Negotiations    for    a    General    Peace    are 

begun     30 

25  55.     The   reply   of   the   Central   Powers   and   Joffe's 

answer     32 

26-28       56.     The   First   Sitting  concerning   Text   of   Treaty. 

The   Russian   Proposals 35 

57.  Second   Sitting.     The   German   Draft 36 

58.  Final  Sitting  of  the  Committee  of  the  Whole..  39 

27  59.     Trotzky  on  the  Entente  and  a  Separate  Peace       40 

28  60.     Pichon  on  the  reply  of  the  Allies 40 

29  61.     Russian   invitation  to   "The  Peoples  and   Gov- 

ernments of  Allied  Countries" 41 

1  62.     Russian   wireless  with  Peace  Terms  picked  up 

at   Washington    41 

3  63.     Soviet  condemns  German  Terms 41 

64.  Izvestia     calls     Germans    "wolves    in    sheeps' 

clothing ' '      43 

65.  Russian  propaganda  among  German  soldiers...       44 

66.  Proposed   aid   to   Soviet    Government.     Francis 

and   Robins    44 

67.  Leaders    of    Central    Powers    meet    with     the 

Kaiser     46 

68.  Von  Hertling  opposes  transfer  of  Negotiations 

to    Stockholm 47 

69.  Soviet  seeks  understanding  with  the  Rada 47 

70.  Germanv  refuses  passports  for  Russia  to  Inde- 

pendent  Socialists    47 

5  71.     Llnyd  George  outlines  peace  terms 47 

72.     Expiration  of  the  time  limit  for  Allied  partici- 
pation in  the  Negotiations 48 

6  73.     France  recognizes  the  Finnish  Republic 48 

74.     Meetincrs  of  the  Naval  and  Economic  Commis- 

siona    4]^ 


190  TABLE  OF  ITEMS 

Jan.       7  75.     Agreement  between  the  Russian  and  Ukrainian 

Delegations    50 

Jan.       8  76.     Trotzky   as   a   "true   revolutionary"   at   Brest- 

Litovsk     50 

77.     President    Wilson    addresses    Congress    on    the 

14  points    50 

Jan.       9  78.     Plenary    Session    of   the    Peace    Delegations    at 

Brest-Litovsk    55 

79.     Allied  recognition  of  The  Ukraine 57 

Jan.       10  80.     Plenary  Session  of  the  Peace  Delegations 58 

81.  First  Sitting  of  the  Committee  on  Political  and 

Territorial    Questions    61 

82.  "Peace    Riots"    in    Germany 63 

Jan.       11  83.     Krylenko     issues     appeal     for     Revolutionary 

Guard    64 

Attitude  of  the  Allies  to  the  Negotiations....  65 
Second   Sitting   of   the   Committee   on   Political 

and  Economic   Questions 65 

Plenary  Session  of  the  Peace  Delegations 71 

Third  Sitting  of  the  Committee  on  Political  and 

Economic    Questions    73 

Fourth   Sitting   of   the   Committee   on   Political 

and   Economic   Questions 79 

Fifth    Sitting    of    the    Committee    on    Political 

and  Territorial   Questions 86 

Address    of    the    British    Labor    Party    to    the 

Peoples  of  Russia  and  Central  Europe 89 

Private   Conference  of  the  Central  Delegations  90 
Confidential   discussion    of   Central   Delegations 

with  Ukrainian  Delegations 90 

Confidential    discussions   continued 90 

Fifth    Sitting   of    the    Committee    on    Political 

and   Territorial   Questions 91 

Russian   Constituent   Assembly   dissolved 95 

Peace  Strikes  in  Austria-Hungary 96 

Sittings   of    the    Russo-German   Legal    Commis- 
sion     ; 96 

Jan.       21            98.     Trotzky  at  Petrograd 96 

99.     Russian    protest   against   incorrect    German   re- 
ports of  Brest  Negotiations 97 

Two  Russian  wireless  messages  "To   All"....  97 

Hertling's  reply  to  Wilson's   14  points 98 

Czernin's   account   of   the   Brest-Litovsk   Nego- 
tiations      99 

Kuehlmann   on  the  Brest  Negotiations 101 

The  Third  Congress  of  Soviets 102 

"Peace,  Bread  and  Liberty"  strikes  in  Berlin  104 
Resumption     of     Plenary     Sittings     at     Brest- 
Litovsk   105 

107.  Denunciation   by   Russia   of   the   Anglo-Russian 
Agreement   concerning  Persia 106 

108.  Sixth    Sitting    of    the    Committee    on    Political 
and  Territorial  Questions    107 

Plenary  Session  of  the  Peace  Delegations 108 

Finnish  Delegation  at  Brest-Litovsk 113 

Seventh  Sitting  of  the  Committee  on  Political 

and   Territorial   Questions.'. 113 

112.     The  Allied  War  Council  answers  Hertling  and 

Czernin    114 


Jan. 

11-12 

84. 
85. 

Jan. 

12 

86. 
87. 

Jan. 

14 

88. 

Jan. 

15 

89. 
90. 

Jan. 

16 

91. 

92. 

Jan. 
Jan. 

17 
18. 

93. 

94. 

Jan. 
Jan. 
Jan. 

18-19 

19 

20-21 

95. 
96. 
97. 

Jan. 

22 

100. 

Jan. 

24 

101. 
102. 

Jan. 

25 

103. 

Jan. 

25-27 

104. 

Jan. 

28 

105. 

Jan. 

30 

106. 

Feb. 

1 

109. 
110. 

Feb. 

3 

111. 

TABLE  OF  ITEMS  191 

Conference  of   Central  Powers  at  Berlin 115 

North    German    Gazette   on    difference   between 

Northern   Kussia   and   The    Ulcraine 115 

The  Petrograd  Soviet  to  the  "Soviets"  in  Ber- 
lin   and    Vienna 116 

German  peace  ultimatum  to  Roumania 117 

Eighth   Sitting   of   the   Committee   on   Political 

and   Territorial  Questions 117 

Decree  abolishing  the  Kussian  National  Debt.  .      118 
The  Separate  Peace  of  the  Central  Powers  and 

The   Ukraine    120 

Letter  from  Trotzky  to  Lenin 122 

Final    Sitting    of    the    Committee    on    Political 

and   Territorial  Questions 124 

Sittings   of   the   Military   Sub-Commission 131 

The  final  Plenary  Sitting  of  the  Peace  Delega- 
tions         131 

A  wireless  "To  All"  from  the  Russian  Delega- 
tion          133 

President    Wilson    in    reply    to    Hertling    and 

Czernin      133 

Great  Britain  does  not  recognize  tlie  Ulirainian 

Separate    Peace    134 

Lloyd  George  on  Germany  at  Brest-Litovsk.  . . .      134 
Trotzky  before  tlie  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee  at   Petrograd 134 

Manifesto    of    Kaiser    Karl    concerning    Peace 

with    The    Ukraine 145 

Polish  protests  against  the  cession  of  Kholm  to 

The  Ukraine    146 

Announcement  by  German  Army  Headquarters 

that  armistice  expires  January  18 148 

Declarations     of     the     Ukrainian     Government 

' '  To  the   German  People  " 148 

German  purposes  in   "tlie  new  vv^ar" 149 

German-Austrian  military  agreement 149 

Sup])lement  to  the  Ukrainian  Treaty  concerning 

Kholm      149 

Wireless  of  Council  of  People's  Commissars  to 

Berlin  offering  to  sign  dictated  peace 150 

Krj'lenko's  orders  to  the  Russian  armies 150 

Trotzky  asks  if  Austro-Hungarian  Government 

is  at  war  with  Russia 151 

139.  German   request   for  written   authentication   of 

Council 's   wireless    151 

140.  Lenin  l)efore  the  Central  Executive  Committee 

of   Soviets    151 

20  141.     Von  Kuehlmann's  defense  of  the  "new  war" 

with  Russia   152 

The  German,  Austrian  and  Turkish  advances..      152 

Proclamations  of  the  People's  Commissars  call- 
ing for  armed  "defense  of  the  Republic"..      152 

Russia  receives  the  terms  of  the  German  peace 

ultimatum     154 

Central     Executive     Committee     accepts     Ger- 
many 'a    conditions     156 

Petrograd  Soviet  approves   action   of  the   Gov- 
ernment          158 


4 

113. 
114. 

115. 

6 

7 

IIG. 
117. 

8 
8-9 

118. 
119. 

9 

120. 
121. 

10 

122. 
123." 

124. 

11 

125. 

12 

126. 

14 

127. 
128. 

129. 

130. 

15. 

131. 

17 

132. 

18 
19 

133. 
134. 
135. 

136. 

137. 
138. 

142. 

21 

143. 

23. 

144. 

24 

145. 

192 


TABLE  OF  ITEMS 


Feb. 
Feb. 
Feb. 

25 

26 
27 

147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 

Feb. 
March 

28 

1 

151. 

152. 

March 

2 

153. 
154. 

March 

3 

155. 

March 

4 

156. 
157. 

March 

5 

158. 
159. 
160. 

March 

6 

161. 

March 
March 

7 
9 

162. 
163. 

March  11  164. 

March  14-16     165. 


March  18 

March  20 
March  21 
March  22 
March  29 
April     2 


April  6 

April  7 

April  10 

Sept.  6 


166. 

167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 

171. 

172. 

173. 

174. 
175. 
176. 
177. 
178. 


Hertling  on  German  aims  in  Eussia 158 

Scheidemann  on  the  Brest  Treaty 160 

Russian  resistance  to  the  German  advance....     161 
Balfour  and  Cecil  reply  to  Hertling 's  statement 

on  German  aims   162 

The  German  advance  in   Esthonia 163 

Eequest    of    Russian    Delegation    at    Brest    for 

armored  train   163 

Advance  of  Soviet  forces  in  Don  region 164 

German  Staff  announcement  that  Kiev  "has 
been    liberated    by    Ukrainian    and    Saxon 

troops "     164 

Statement  of  Russian  Delegation  before  sign- 
ing the  Treaty 165 

The  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk 168 

German   Staff   announces   cessation   of   military 

operations     171 

Emperor   William   to    Chancellor   Hertling 171 

Moscow  to  become  the  Capitol  of  Russia 172 

Preliminary  Treaty  between  Roumania  and  the 

Central    Powers    172 

The   Soviets  instruct  their  Delegates  to   ratify 

Treaty     172 

Treaty  between  Finland  and  Germany 172 

Ambassador  Francis  cables  to  the  Secretary  of 

State      173 

Moscow  the   Russian   Capitol 174 

The  Fourth  Congress  of  Soviets  ratifies  the 
Treaty.  Lenin's  address.  President  Wil- 
son 's  message  '. 174 

Allied  War  Council  on  the  Russian  and  Rou- 
manian   Treaties    179 

Von  Hertling  on  the  Treaty  with  Eussia 179 

The  Austro-German  and  Turkish   advances 181 

Russia  and  the  Allies 181 

The  Trans-Caucasian  Assembly  refuses  to  ratify 

Treaty     181 

The    Reichstag   Main    Committee    approves   the 

Treaty     181 

The  Caucasus  approves  Peace  Agreement  with 

Turkey    T 181 

Czernin   on   the   Treaties   with   Petrograd,   The 

Ukraine  and   Roumania 181 

Cecil   replies   to    Czernin 182 

President  Wilson  on  the  Brest  Negotiations...      183 

Eussia  and  the  Ukrainian  Eada 184 

Eussia 's  losses  under  the  Brest  Treaty 184 

The     terms     of     Ri  jso-German     Supplementary 

Agreements    185 


I 


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